Turkish Drones for Australian Aircraft Carriers?

Baykar Bayraktar TB3,
photo from Ali Özkök

The Chinese Navy's southern fleet have released a video showing the aircraft carrier Shandong, with seven drones on the flight deck (Drones deployed on aircraft carrier Shandong,  Liu Xuanzun, Global Times, Jun 05, 2022 09:36 PM). These are relatively small UAVs. However, I suggest Australia could acquire much larger armed drones for shipboard use. These could be the Baykar Bayraktar TB3, which is a shipboard version of the TB2 which has been operating successfully in Ukraine. The TB3 was modified to operate from the Turkish  amphibious assault ship, TCG Anadolu, which is to the same design as Australia's HMAS Canberra and Adelaide. 

 Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma UAV, 

photo by Selçuk Bayraktar

Turkey is also developing the jet powered supersonic stealth Baykar Bayraktar Kızılelma UAV. Turkey was forced to adapt UAVs for  shipboard use, after the USA decided not to supply F-35B aircraft. Australia is hosting the development of the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat (aka Loyal Wing-man). The MQ-28 is a similar size and configuration to the Kızılelma, and it may be possible to adapt the MQ-28 for operation from Australian ships.

Will Australia Defend Taiwan?

Greetings from the ANU Australian Centre on China in the World, where Iain Henry from the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre is speaking on "ANZUS and Taiwan: What are Australia’s obligations?". He went back to the formation of the ANZUS pact, arguing neither Australia or New Zealand wanted to defend Taiwan. The USA argued that an attack on their forces in Japan obliged Australia and NZ to act, but Taiwan was not mentioned.

While an interesting academic argument, I am not sure that the wording of the ANZUS treaty would have much to do with what Australia would do. The only time the treaty has been invoked was by Australia on 14 September 2001, after terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. This was an attack by a non state actor, based outside the Pacific, on the US Atlantic seaboard. If Australia would act similarly over Taiwan would perhaps depend more on the likely reaction of Australian popular opinion, than the wording of the treaty.  

On 24 April Australian PM, Scott Morrison said a Chinese military base at the  Solomon Islands would be a "red line": saying "We won't be having Chinese military naval bases in our region on our doorstep." This is a very serious statement, given the last time a regional power attempted to establish a base around the Solomon Islands was May 1942, resulting in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The USA and Australia met the Japanese Navy, with 13 ships sunk, and more than 1,500 lives lost.

Strategic Drone Material Stockpile for Australia

The Australian Government has been investing in billions in big weapons systems. But the Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the value of small smart systems. Perhaps there could be government funding to provide an Australian stockpile of carbon fiber, & other materials needed for airborne & underwater drones.

Companies such as Carbonix could buy from the stockpile at a discounted price, to keep the stocks fresh. In time of need, the government would order military drones made using the materials.

The avionics could be made just-in-time by companies like Core Electronics, from a stockpile of components.

This way the military could have a supply of up to date drones, suited to whatever situation arises.

The same could be done for underwater drones (UUVs). Imagine the number of small robot submarines which could have been built with the
$5B Australia is paying for French non-nuclear, non-submarines. ;-)

Information Warfare Division Video

FOR THE WARFIGHTER

The Information Warfare Division (IWD) of the Australian Department of Defence has a snappy new video on the "new and emerging threats in the digital world", to promote Information Warfare jobs in the Australian Defence Force. But this may make people think the threat is from little green men crawling up our data cables. ;-)

Smaller Overseas Submarines and Australian Tenders

The Australian Government is reported to be having negation difficulties with the French builder selected for the Collins Class submarine replacement. Perhaps it is time to consider not attempting to build very large bespoke submarines in Australia. Instead a smaller proven design could be ordered from an overseas shipyard, with recent experience in submarine building. Australian shipyards could instead build small submarine tenders to resupply these vessels.

Australia's unique requirement for a very long range conventionally powered submarine to transit from Australian ports meant that no proven designs were suitable. However, recently it was announced Australia and the USA would return to their former naval base on Manus Island, which is capable of operating submarines. Australia could complement the base with a small fleet of submarine tenders, based on the Arafura class multipurpose warship, or an Austral multi-hull design.

The small tenders could be fitted for the same modular mission payload system as the Arafura class. The tenders could dash at high speed to a suitable sheltered location to re-provision a submarine. The ships could be built in Australia in the shipyards currently building the Arafura class, meeting the political need for employment, as well as maintaining a shipbuilding capability.

Container Roll-Out Solar System

ECLIPS Engineering demonstrated their Container Roll-Out Solar System (CROSS) in Canberra today. These are standard solar panels attached to a hinged framework mounted on a shipping container compatible platform. This can be sued to reduce military fuel use.

The demonstration was held at the Canberra drag-strip, normally used for Street Machine Summernats Car Festival. In place of high speed cars there was a forklift which unloaded the solar panels from a shipping container. 

The system is designed to provide power for military forward bases and mining camps. A stack of platforms is transported to the site in a standard 20 or 40 foot shipping container. The container is stacked with platforms, each fitted with 5 or 10 solar modules. Each platform is slid out, placed on the ground and then the panels hinged up to face the sun.

The panels are standard domestic units, mourned to an aluminum frame with standard brackets. While made of glass, the panels are reasonably robust. The steel platform they are mounted on appears heavy enough to keep the panels in place in the strongest wind.

This appears a workable system for military use, but may be over-engineered for civilian applications. The platform used is derived from one used for transporting tens of tonnes of supplies. The 20 foot unit weighs more than 1,350 kg, of which less than one quarter would be the panels and their frame. A much lighter platform might be developed to hold the few hundred kilos of solar panels. This would particularly useful for transport by air.

Australian Signals-intelligence in the Pacific War

In "The Secret Code-Breakers of Central Bureau" David

Dufty provides a boys (and girls) own adventure account of Australian signals intelligence in the WW2 Pacific War. The book makes the case for Australia's contribution to Macarthur's fight from Australia back to the Philippines, the role of academics and civilians in this effort and of women, against bureaucratic obstacles. The book is packed with anecdotes, as well as history.

With modern day concerts over cyber-security and its likely part in future wars in our region, it is useful to be reminded where the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) came from and their difficult relationship with government, the military establishment and Australia's allies.

21st Century Maritime Military Cooperation by Australia, USA and Japan

Greetings from the 21st Century Trilateral Maritime Cooperation Conference at the Australian National University in Canberra, where scholars and military personnel from Japan, the USA and Australia are speaking on issues of mutual interest, including "disputes over obscure maritime features" (as one speaker described territorial issues in the East and South China Seas). The conference is sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, USA, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Staff College. Interestingly, this is an open conference which the general public was invited to attend, no cost. Interestingly one speaker raised the issue of cyber-warfare. A few months ago I was teaching ANU students about Cyberwar Over the South China Sea.

Speakers include: 

ADM ret. (RAN) Chris Barrie, Adjunct Professor SDSC; ADM ret. (USN) Dennis Blair, Chairman and CEO Sasakawa Foundation; VADM (MSDF) Umio Otsuka, President JMSDF Command and Staff College; Dr. Jeffrey Hornung, Fellow Security and Foreign Affairs Program Sasakawa USA; Mr. Stanley Roth, Former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Dr. Stephan Fruehling, Associate Professor SDSC; AMB Shingo Yamagami, Acting Director JIIA; VADM ret. (USN) Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., CEO GeoOptics Inc.; Dr. Anthony Bergin, Deputy Director Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr. Toshio Yamagata, Director Application Laboratory of Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology; Mr. Yoshikiyo Ono, Secretary General Japanese Shipowners’ Association; Dr. Carol Anne Clayson, Director Ocean and Climate Change Institute, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute; Mr. Peter Jennings, Executive Director Australian Strategic Policy Institute; CAPT (MSDF) Katsuya Yamamoto, JMSDF Command and Staff College; RADM ret. (RAN) James Goldrick AO, CSC, Adjunct Professor SDSC; Dr. Isami Takeda, Professor of International Relations Dokkyo University; VADM ret. (USN) Robert Parker; Dr. Euan Graham, Director International Security Program at the Lowy Institute; ADM ret. (USN) Walter Doran, President Pacific Vision LLC; Dr. Brendan Taylor, Head of SDSC.

Analysis of the 2016 Defence White Paper

Greetings from the Great Hall of the Australian National University in Canberra, what a panel of ANU defence experts are discussing the Australian Government's 2016 Defence Whitepaper. The first speaker suggested that the white-paper had a "status quo" approach showing three concentric circles of influence.  The first of the three zones is strategic denial in the South Pacific. Second is a zone of stability in South East Asia (where Australia's "edge" is rapidly eroding). The third zone is that of "rules", based on overwhelming US power, which the speaker suggests has been upset by a sea denial fulled arms race.

The second speaker suggested distinguishing between what the paper says it is doing and actually does.They agreed with the first speaker that the white-paper assumes only incremental changes are needed to Australian defence policy. The white-paper assumes that the USA will remain the primary power in Asia and uphold Australia's security, despite indications from US Presidential candidates to the contrary.

The third speaker was in support of the white-paper, describing it as comprehensive and its proposals credible, provided they are funded.The white-paper was developed by competent defence professionals (unlike the former Minister for Defence). The speaker suggested that money and geography were important, but a public white-paper cannot be blunt about other nations. China will have internal problems with old, Russian derived military equipment. The speaker suggested "It will soon be time to teach China a lesson". They then listed US military equipment Australia will "soon" have, including the EA-18G Growler, electronic warfare aircraft. It was surprising to hear this blunt warning in a public forum by a person close to parts of the Australian Government. However, it the speaker also cautioned Australia has limited defence capacity and promises of increased defence spending have not been honored in the past. Some of the speaker's position seemed to be lacking in logic. They argued that Australia should be prepared to take military action to defend trade routes in the South China Sea against China, but that does not make a lot of sense if the trade is with China.

The fourth speaker pointed out that a white-paper is not the end of the defence policy process. They also pointed out, as the previous speaker, previous plans have been undermined by budget cuts. The budget does not allow for turning the Australian Army into a marine force for deployment from new Landing Helicopter Dock ships, or for converting them into F-35b aircraft carriers.In contrast 12 submarines and an increased number of maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft. the speaker suggests the key aim in the white-paper is to defend Australia.This is very different to the previous speaker's emphasis on confronting China.

ps: See also "Cyberwar: Hypothetical for Teaching ICT Ethics".

Cyberwar Preparations in Australian Defence White Paper 2016

The Australian Government issues a 2016 Defence White Paper  (25 February 2017). As well as big ticket items, such as twelve of the largest conventional submarines in the world, there is provision for cyber-security. The government proposes  800 new jobs in intelligence, space and cyber security. If well trained these personnel will have more military impact than the 12 new submarines. It happens that earlier in the week I prepared a "Hypothetical on Cyberwar Over the South China Sea" for teaching this workforce.

"New and complex non-geographic security threats in cyberspace and space will be an important part of our future security environment. The cyber threat to Australia is growing. Cyber attacks are a real and present threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability as well as to other government agencies and other sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure." (Page 17).

"2.5 Cyber attacks are a direct threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability given its reliance on information networks. State and non-state actors now have ready access to highly capable and technologically advanced tools to target others through internet-connected systems and we are seeing greater use of offensive cyber operations. This trend is likely to continue." (Page 53)

"2.51     Cyber threats also have impacts well beyond Defence, with the potential to attack other Australian government agencies, all sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure and, in the case of state actors, conduct state-based espionage including against Australian defence industry. The Australian Signals Directorate detected over 1,200 cyber security incidents in 2015, including attacks on government agencies and non-government sectors. Australian defence industry was one of the key non-government sectors targeted in that period, along with energy, banking and financial services, communications and transport. Cyber attacks also threaten Australia’s secure access to the global communications system which is critical to Australia’s prosperity." (page 54)

"3.19     To counter the growing threat of cyber attack, the Government is improving our national cyber security capabilities. Defence’s cyber security capabilities will be strengthened to protect the ADF’s warfighting and information networks. Defence will contribute to the Government’s enhanced national cyber security efforts, which include better coordinated cyber security capabilities and working with industry and academia to counter the threat of cyber attack." (Page 75)

"4.19     The Government is committed to ensuring that Australia can address the growing cyber threat including through enhanced cooperation with the United States and our other international partners. Defence makes a critical contribution to Australia’s whole-of-government cyber-security efforts, ensuring the integrity of Australian government information and systems. This includes the invaluable work of the Australian Signals Directorate. Defence will continue to work closely with other agencies to protect Australian interests in the cyber domain, including through the multi-agency Australian Cyber Security Centre.

4.20     The Government will strengthen Defence’s cyber capabilities to protect itself and other critical Australian government systems from malicious cyber intrusion and disruption. Enhancing the resilience of Defence networks, including networks used by our deployed forces, and the capability of the Australian Cyber Security Centre are key areas of focus in strengthening Australia’s cyber defences. This will include considerable new investment in strengthening the Defence cyber workforce, including new military and APS positions and training programs.
4.21     The Government will also establish a research and development capability to help strengthen the defences of the ADF’s military information systems against cyber attack." (Page 90)

"6.17     Within this total workforce of around 18,200 FTE, enhancements to intelligence, space and cyber security capabilities will involve 800 new APS positions. Four hundred new positions will be created in information technology support, simulation, support to Navy engineering and logistics, security, force design and analysis, and strategic and international policy, including civilian policy officers posted overseas." (Page 152)

Table of Contents

 Minister’s Introduction 9
Executive Summary 13
Strategy 14
Australia’s strategic outlook 14
Australia’s defence strategy 17
Capability 18
A more capable, agile and potent future force 18
Australian defence industry and innovation 20
Shipbuilding 21
Defence posture – more active and internationally engaged 21
International engagement 22
Defence preparedness 22
People 23
Resources 24
Reform 24
Funding 24
Implementation 25
Chapter One: The Government’s Approach to Defence 29
The purpose of this Defence White Paper 29
Why now? 30
Managing strategic risk 32
Chapter Two: Strategic Outlook 39
Australia’s security environment 39
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The United States and China 41
The rules-based global order 44
The threat of terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters 46
State fragility 48
Military modernisation 49
Cyber and space 51
Regional security environments 53
Australia’s borders and offshore territories 53
Our immediate neighbourhood 54
South East Asia 56
Indonesia 59
North Asia 60
South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim 61
The Middle East 63
Weapons of Mass Destruction 64
Chapter Three: Australia’s Defence Strategy 67
Australia’s Strategic Defence Framework 68
Strategic Defence Interests 68
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and
proximate sea lines of communication 68
A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia
and the South Pacific 69
A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order 70
Strategic Defence Objectives 71
Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national
interests, and northern approaches 71
5
Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime
South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea,
Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen
their security 74
Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order 75
Implications for force structure and force posture 77
Chapter Four: The Future Australian Defence Force 83
Designing the future force 84
Capability priorities 86
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic
Warfare, and Cyber Security 86
Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces 89
Strike and Air Combat 94
Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 97
Key Enablers 100
Air and Sea Lift 106
Industry, innovation, research and development 108
A new approach to Australian defence industry policy 108
A new approach to defence innovation 111
Shipbuilding 113
Chapter Five: Positioning Defence for Tomorrow’s Challenges 117
International engagement 117
International defence relationships 120
The Australia-United States Alliance 121
New Zealand 124
Indonesia 125
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The South Pacific 126
Timor-Leste 128
South East Asia 128
North Asia 132
South Asia 134
Global relationships 135
Defence preparedness 140
Current operations 141
Chapter Six: People 145
Growing the integrated Defence workforce 146
Permanent Australian Defence Force 146
Reserves 148
Australian Public Service 149
Recruiting the people we need 150
Developing our people 152
Retaining our people 153
Defence culture 154
Looking after our people 156
The Defence community 159
Delivering the future workforce 160
Chapter Seven: Reform of Defence 165
The First Principles Review – The Government’s reform program 165
A strong strategic centre 168
Capability development life cycle 170
Corporate and military enablers 172
Implementing the First Principles Review 174
7
Chapter Eight: Funding Defence 177
The Government’s plan for funding Defence 177
The funding model 177
How will Defence funding be spent? 181
Budgeting in Defence 182
Chapter Nine: Implementing this Defence White Paper 185

Japan, Australia and regional security architecture

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra where I am attending a panel discussion on "Japan, Australia and regional security architecture". Dr Amy King (ANU), with Professor Mie Oba (Tokyo University of Science), Associate Professor Ryo Sahashi (Kanagawa University), and Professor Nick Bisley (La Trobe University) are discussing Japan and Australia's role in regional security institutions, including  ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus, and East Asia Summit. But it quickly become evident that the real topic was what Japan and Australia could do about China claims to islands in the region. The claim was made by one of the panelists that Australia is not directly involved in the dispute. However, I suggest it is, in that RAAF aircraft are flying over some of the islands, in a direct military challenge to China's claim of sovereignty. I am not a foreign policy expert, but it seems to me that one effective initiative for Japan and Australia is to build more submarines. Forums, Meetings and Summits have no effect, unless they can be backed by a credible military force.

Rearming Australia for Cyber Warfare

In "AUSTRALIA REARMED! Future Needs for Cyber-Enabled Warfare" Professor Greg Austin, from the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) states "Australia’s defence forces need to maintain distinct capabilities for cyber warfare at the strategic level ... for mobilization of the country in very short time to fight a medium intensity, cyber-enabled hot war ...". The ADF has made a significant step towards this already by including cyber-security in the curriculum of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), where the ACCS is located.

In an accompanying paper, Group Captain (ret.) Dr. Keith Joiner discussed "Integrating Cyber-survivability into Australian Defence Force Platform Development". He points out that the ADF's taks is not only protect its systems in peacetime, "... but includes preventing its systems and platforms from being crippled or subverted by the offensive cyber operations of an enemy in combat...".

Australia has recently invested billions of dollars in advanced aircraft and ships. In any hostilities these can be expected to come under intensive and sustained cyber-attack, before during and after any conventional warfare. These attacks will not just be directly against the weapons systems, but also through their logistics and support systems, the personnel and their families and friends. It would be unfortunate if these platforms were disabled even before they could be deployed, because the ADF has not spent a few hundred million dollars to to conduct cyber- survivability trials and train personnel to protect the systems.

Propose Australian Defence Force Adopt Common Uniform

This is to suggest that the Australian Air-force and Navy adopt the same Australian Multicam Camouflage Uniform (AMCU) as the Australian Army. The RAAF's recently introduced blue General Purpose Uniform (GPU) should be discontinued as it makes personnel very visible.

Australian air-force personnel previously wore the same Disruptive Pattern Camouflage Uniform (DPCU) as the Australian army (the photo shows me wearing the DPCU at a military exercise).


The Royal Australian Navy personnel wear a gray version of the DPCU. There was some logic to the Navy wearing a gray version of the distinctive Australian DPCU, as it showed them to be Australian personnel (the gray background is to hide grime from shipboard duties).

The new RAAF GPU is a blue version of the  Australian Multicam. The RAAF claim this is a "provides a unique and easily identifiable Air Force presence ... still effective in meeting service requirements ... non-warlike environments...". However, the Multicam pattern is worn my many nation's military and similar patterns by potential foes. When rendered in blue the pattern does not look distinctly Australian. The blue color provides no value as camouflage and would make RAAF personnel very obvious targets.

Australian Army, RAAF and RAN personnel are increasingly operating in a joint environment and one where the distinction between peace and war-fighting are blurred. It makes little sense for the joint logistics system to have to carry three uniforms, identical except for color, two of which are unsuitable for use in an operational environment.

The idea that RAAF personnel would wear a uniform not suitable for combat on a peacekeeping operation does not accord with modern practice. A militia force is not going to send advance warning of hostile intent and then politely wait while the RAAF personnel change out of their blue uniforms into camouflage, before attacking. Instead RAAF personnel will be targeted first, as they will be most visible.

A better alternative would be for the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force to wear the same camouflage uniform, with service specific head-wear and patches. The uniforms should also have removable high visibility markings. All services will require high visibility patches on their clothing for some duties, for example on the flight deck of an amphibious ship.

Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons in Sino-Japanese War

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball are speaking on the alarming topic of "Escalation in the East China Sea: A Political and Military Possibility". Their thesis is that a dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea could result in a way which draws in the USA. A lack of crisis management and China’s command and control system's vulnerability could result in their use of nuclear weapons. Professor Ball stated that the USA had plans for "limited" use of nuclear weapons against China, including in a conventional war between China and Japan. Attacks on US undersea surveillance systems around China, some of which are collocated with Japanese facilities may also provoke a nuclear response on Chinese mainland bases. Knowing this China would then be tempted to make a preemptive nuclear strike. One area for concern is that the PLAN (Cihinese Navy) may become overconfident in its abilities.

Executive Summary:

• Political competition and a lack of crisis management mechanisms could make it very hard for China and Japan to resist escalatory pressures in the very plausible event of a minor armed clash in the East China Sea.
• Japan’s reluctance to use force may be less extensive than some assume and its connections to US strategy and C4SIR systems increase the prospect of early American participation.
• Command and control vulnerabilities could mean serious pre-emption pressures if Beijing thought a larger conflict was possible. American attacks on the PLA’s conventional war-fighting systems could create perverse incentives for China to use its nuclear weapons early while it was still confident in its physical ability to do so.

This would suggest some obvious actions:

• Crisis management mechanisms including a secure political hot-line and military to military communication channels which are regularly tested. Military personnel should visit each other, observe exercises and attend training courses.
• The USA could ensure it has a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (C4SIR) which can operate separately from that of Japan. Japan could harden its system.
• China could make clear it has a robust C4SIR. China's deployment of military forces world wide recently may be in part to send such a message to potential enemies. This could include conducting exercises which the media and other nations military leaders are invited to attend. China could improve its C4SIR using its considerable commercial ICT industry capability and workforce.

Ayson and Ball recommend:

1. Australian planners should assume that China and Japan may not be able to continue avoiding minor hostilities over their conflicting East China Sea claims.

2. Australian planners should also assume that initial hostilities between Japan and China could easily escalate into a much more serious conflict, potentially involving the United States and possibly crossing the nuclear threshold.

3. Australian policymakers and decision-makers should encourage their Chinese and Japanese counterparts to treat the Sino-Japanese relationship as an adverse partnership involving common as well as competing interests.

All of this is worrying for Australia as a close partner of the USA and Japan. I suggest Australian could go further and help directly with some of the risk reduction measures, especially where China and Japan could not be seen to be doing this directly. Australia could provide some channels for communication in a crisis. If Australian politicians and military commanders know their Chinese and Japanese counterparts and have secure and robust technical communications with them, they could help defuse a crisis.

Use of Nuclear Weapons Possible in Sino-Japanese War

Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball will speak on "Escalation in the East China Sea: A Political and Military Possibility" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30pm, 11 November 2014.

Event Details

Presented by the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre
Even if the leaders of China and Japan can lessen the significant political tensions between North Asia’s two biggest powers, the East China Sea dispute could still spark a bilateral war which might also bring in the United States. A recent spate of near misses shows that a minor armed clash is eminently possible. Nationalist sentiment and the lack of crisis management mechanisms could make restraint difficult once this occurs. Japan’s reluctance to use force may be less extensive than some assume and its connections to US strategy and C4SIR systems increase the prospects of early American participation. China’s command and control vulnerabilities could create serious pre-emption pressures if Beijing thought a larger conflict was possible. Moreover American attacks on China’s C4SIR systems and its conventional maritime and missile forces might create perverse incentives for China to use its nuclear weapons early while it was still confident in its physical ability to do so.

Australian defence planners should not assume that China and Japan are going to be able to keep their tense relationship in the East China Sea below the threshold of armed violence. Neither should they assume that China, Japan, and the United States will find it easy to avoid a very serious escalation once minor hostilities have occurred. This seminar presentation marks the launch of a new SDSC Centre of Gravity paper by Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball entitled "Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia", based on their forthcoming Survival article "Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?".

Research Improving Target Detection for Australian Defence

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Brian Anderson is speaking on "Optimal Path Planning and Sensor Placement for Mobile Target Detection". This is a problem from the Australian Defence Science and Technology (DSTO), which is looking to improve the effectiveness of radar for detecting aircraft. The same research methods could be used for airborne sensors looking for ground targets. Australia has purchased new military aircraft with sophisticated sensors which could be networked to improve their performance. As an example, the  RAAF's F/A-18 Hornets could exchange digital data with their datalink transceivers.

These techniques can also be used to plot a path for an aircraft to avoid detection. This is currently done in advance of a mission, but that provides limited ability to react if a new radar is detected in mid-flight. 

Australia’s Defence: Towards a New Era

Senator David Johnston, Minister for Defence, will launch the book "Australia's Defence: Towards a New Era?" by Peter Dean, Brendan Taylor and Stephan Frühling, at the Australian National University in Canberra, 2 October 2014. It will be interesting to see if the book deals with Cyber Warfare.

Chief of Australian Army on Protection of Women in Conflict

Greetings from the Australian National University where Lieutenant General David Morrison AO, the Chief of Army is speaking on "Protection of women in conflict: Chief of Army discusses the London Global Summit".  General  Morrison's "Chief of Army message regarding unacceptable behaviour" went viral on the Internet last year. Gender restrictions on combat roles were removed from the Australian Defence Force, 1 January 2013. There is also a "Defence Abuse Response Taskforce".

In person the General was a little milder than the video, but just as compelling. He made the point that the Army is authorised by the state to use violence, but should respect the diversity of the community. The Army has set targets for women's participation (I have noted this in the café at ADFA). The General was asked why all the Expert Panel members for the 2015 Defence White Paper are white males. The general responded that they had a point and would raise it with the Minister. The General was asked what practical steps were being implemented to involve local women when the ADF is on peacekeeping missions. He made the point that having female front-line troops would aid this and all receive relevant training.

There was a "Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict" in London on in June 2014. There is a Chair’s Summary, Statement of Action and Summit blog. Curiously, the UK Government have "archived" the website, as if the event is over and they can forget about it now.

Armed conflicts are currently occurring in various regions of the world and the need to protect innocent victims of these conflicts has never been greater. Women are particularly vulnerable in times of conflict and the recent Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, co-chaired by William Hague (United Kingdom Foreign Secretary) and Angelina Jolie (Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) brought together 1,700 delegates and 129 country delegations to consider ways in which women could be better protected. The Summit agreed on practical steps to tackle impunity for the use of rape as a weapon of war, and to begin to change global attitudes to these crimes.

Preparations for Next Asia-Pacific War

Greetings from the Australian War Memorial in Canberra, where Mr Dennis Richardson AO, Secretary of Defence launched of Stephan Frühling's book "Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the next Asia-Pacific War". The sectary described the books in glowing terms, with its historical context and what is "happening in the region at the moment" and described it as "extremely timely". The secretary described the book as a "realistic conceptual framework to think about the debate" for the new defence white paper.An issue which the Sectary focused on was if Australian defence should focus on contributions to international operations.

Stephan Frühling then spoke, explaining that the book came pout of his PHD thesis.Dr Frühling then discussed "codification" to carefully consider defence strategy.

Preparations in Canberra for the Next Asia-Pacific War

Dennis Richardson, Secretary of Defence, will speak at the launch of Stephan Frühling's book "Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the next Asia-Pacific War", in Canberra, 10 April 2014 from 5:00 PM.

Book Launch of Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the next Asia-Pacific War, by Dr Stephan Frühling
Launched by:  Mr Dennis Richardson, AO Secretary of Defence

Description

How can countries decide what kind of military forces they need, if threats are uncertain and history is full of strategic surprises? This is a question that is more pertinent than ever, as countries across the Asia-Pacific are faced with the military and economic rise of China. Uncertainty is inherent in defence planning, but different types of uncertainty mean that countries need to approach decisions about military force structure in different ways. This book examines four different basic frameworks for defence planning, and demonstrates how states can make decisions coherently about the structure and posture of their defence forces despite strategic uncertainty. It draws on case studies from the United States, Australian and New Zealand, each of which developed key concepts for their particular circumstances and risk perception in Asia. Success as well as failure in developing coherent defence planning frameworks holds lessons for the United States and other countries as they consider how best to structure their military forces for the uncertain challenges of the future. ‘Stephan Frühling has written by far the most insightful book to appear for many years on the ubiquitous and eternal challenges of defence planning …Frühling provides an exceptionally rigorous yet clear guide to the ways in which we can strive to conduct prudent defence planning despite our uncertainty: his is a landmark work that deserves a readership in many countries.’ – Colin Gray, Professor of Politics and International Relations, Reading University, UK.
Stephan Frühling is Senior Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Australia. He is a member of the Government’s external panel of experts to assist with the preparation of the 2015 defence white paper.
Please join us for drinks and canapes after the launch.
Reviews: 
‘Stephan Frühling's book examines the challenges of defense planning through an enlightening and insightful series of case studies. It provides scholars and policy-makers alike a rigorous and rich understanding of an important and under-examined field.’ – Thomas G. Mahnken, US Naval War  College
 ‘Stephan Frühling has written by far the most insightful book to appear for many years on the ubiquitous and eternal challenges of defence planning. Few subjects as critically important as this have attracted so little disciplined and persuasive scholarly effort. Fruhling explains that defence planning is about the attempted management of risk in an unavoidably uncertain future, and that the risk management process is essentially always political. No matter how advanced the methods employed to try and reduce uncertainty, the inconvenient fact remains that because the future has yet to happen, thoroughly reliable knowledge about its dangers is unknowable now. Defence planning always is conducted in the context of an incurable ignorance about a future that has not occurred. Fruhling provides an exceptionally rigorous yet clear guide to the ways in which we can strive to conduct prudent defence planning despite our uncertainty: his is a landmark work that deserves a readership in many countries.’ – Colin Gray, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Reading University, UK
‘Stephan Frühling has provided a thoughtful and thought-provoking work on defense planning at a time when the Pentagon needs it most. With the United States planning a major reorientation of its defense posture toward Asia following over a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pentagon planners are once again brushing up on strategy. They would do well to include Stephan Frühling's Defense Planning and Uncertainty among their readings.’ – Andrew Krepinevich, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), USA