Robot Submarines for Australian Navy

The Australian Liberal Party has proposed an "Autonomous undersea warfare capability for Australia's navy" as part of its electoral platform (5 May 2022). Unlike many political promises, this is a very detailed proposal for the Defence Department and the company Anduril. Interestingly the Australian arm of the company was formed only a month ago, and the parent company in 2017, and appears to have limited experience building large long endurance robot submarines. 

The proposed submarines would be eXtra Large Autonomous Underwater Uninhabited Vehicles (XLAUVs). These are the size of crewed mini submarines used in WWII, and can cross an ocean, thus suited to operation in Australia's large maritime region. Unlike smaller torpedo sized AUVs, the XLAUVs can't be launched from a submarine, and would normally be supported by a specially fitted out submarine tender vessel. However some US nuclear submarines have the capability to carry an external cargo, and may be able to transport a XLAUV covertly to its launch point. The XLAUV may in turn launcher smaller AUVs, and  UAVs, as well as conventional torpedoes, mines, and missiles.

XLAUVs are conceptually similar to the Boeing MQ-28 Ghost Bat UAV aircraft being developed for the RAAF. The ADF would need to develop tactics and train personnel for operating this equipment and learn how to use it effectively, at the same time it is developed. Support personnel, and equipment would also be required. In the case of the XLAUV surface ships would need to be acquired, built, or adapted in support. Oil industry support ships, which the RAN now has two of, may prove useful in this role. Australian designed fast ferries could also be used to deploy and replenish the robots.

If development proceeds well, the XLAUV may render the proposed Australian nuclear submarines obsolete even before they are ordered. The XLAUVs would be superior in the surveillance role to a nuclear submarine, being more stealthy. They would also be superior to deny large ocean areas via the threat of attack. They would not be able to provide as heavy conventional salvo attack as a larger submarine, however, that is not a role Australia is likely to require. In geopolitical terms XLAUVs may have an advantage by not appearing as threatening  as large nuclear submarines, while actually being militarily more useful. Australia could support and supplement the robot submarines with a small number of conventionally powered, crewed boats, such as the Korean KSS-III.

Blockchain for Military Operations

Last week I had a call from the Australian Financial Review newspaper asking about blockchain for military operations. As noted in the article I could see some application, but was a little skeptical. Later I found a paper on it by Verma, Desai, Preece and Taylor (2017), but remain skeptical.

References

Abernethy, M. (2017, Jul 14) Blockchain becoming an integral part of some defence technology. AFR. URL http://www.afr.com/news/special-reports/cyber-security/blockchain-becoming-an-integral-part-of-some-defence-technology-20170713-gxaipa

Verma, D., Desai, N., Preece, A., & Taylor, I. (2017, May). A blockchain based architecture for asset management in coalition operations. In SPIE Defense+ Security (pp. 101900Y-101900Y). International Society for Optics and Photonics. Retrieved from https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/verma2017blockchain.pdf

Cyber Security Forum in Australian Parliament House

Greetings from  Parliament House in Canberra, where I am on a panel for a Cyber Security Forum convened by Inside Canberra. This is preceded by a keynote by Michael McCormack, Assistant Minister for Defence. Perhaps I was invited to be on the panel because of the cyberwar hypothetical I wrote recently for teaching ICT Ethics at the Australian National University.

The panel was primed with some questions before the event. Here are my off-the-cuff responses:

Cyber Security and Cyber Sovereignty why it matters - Apple versus FBI

As I said on ABC News Radio a few weeks ago, on balance, I am on the FBI's side. Apple should assist with access to this one iPhone in this one case.

ASPI’s annual Cyber Security Report

I am not sure I agree with ASPI's 7/10 rating for Australia government organisational structure on cyber matters. It seems a little fragmented. Perhaps a 5/10.

Hacking from white to black and who does it

ANU has a fascinating talk on the Ruxcon 2015 Security Conference in Melbourne:

Progress on Snowden and Assange

What progress?

Policy like data storage and clouds, safe or a disaster waiting to happen

The Australian Government Cloud Computing Policy is okay, but is it being implemented? A larger issue is wghat is happening in the private sector?

Proprietary ecosystems: a threat to the open Internet?

Yes and the Chinese government has a different view of "open".

Need a G20 group on policy and enforcement

The G20 is not really set up for "enforcement". While the UN may appear slow, they do have an international infrastructure. For something to be done quicker, it needs to be done by less than twenty countries, perhaps eight.

Cyberwar Preparations in Australian Defence White Paper 2016

The Australian Government issues a 2016 Defence White Paper  (25 February 2017). As well as big ticket items, such as twelve of the largest conventional submarines in the world, there is provision for cyber-security. The government proposes  800 new jobs in intelligence, space and cyber security. If well trained these personnel will have more military impact than the 12 new submarines. It happens that earlier in the week I prepared a "Hypothetical on Cyberwar Over the South China Sea" for teaching this workforce.

"New and complex non-geographic security threats in cyberspace and space will be an important part of our future security environment. The cyber threat to Australia is growing. Cyber attacks are a real and present threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability as well as to other government agencies and other sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure." (Page 17).

"2.5 Cyber attacks are a direct threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability given its reliance on information networks. State and non-state actors now have ready access to highly capable and technologically advanced tools to target others through internet-connected systems and we are seeing greater use of offensive cyber operations. This trend is likely to continue." (Page 53)

"2.51     Cyber threats also have impacts well beyond Defence, with the potential to attack other Australian government agencies, all sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure and, in the case of state actors, conduct state-based espionage including against Australian defence industry. The Australian Signals Directorate detected over 1,200 cyber security incidents in 2015, including attacks on government agencies and non-government sectors. Australian defence industry was one of the key non-government sectors targeted in that period, along with energy, banking and financial services, communications and transport. Cyber attacks also threaten Australia’s secure access to the global communications system which is critical to Australia’s prosperity." (page 54)

"3.19     To counter the growing threat of cyber attack, the Government is improving our national cyber security capabilities. Defence’s cyber security capabilities will be strengthened to protect the ADF’s warfighting and information networks. Defence will contribute to the Government’s enhanced national cyber security efforts, which include better coordinated cyber security capabilities and working with industry and academia to counter the threat of cyber attack." (Page 75)

"4.19     The Government is committed to ensuring that Australia can address the growing cyber threat including through enhanced cooperation with the United States and our other international partners. Defence makes a critical contribution to Australia’s whole-of-government cyber-security efforts, ensuring the integrity of Australian government information and systems. This includes the invaluable work of the Australian Signals Directorate. Defence will continue to work closely with other agencies to protect Australian interests in the cyber domain, including through the multi-agency Australian Cyber Security Centre.

4.20     The Government will strengthen Defence’s cyber capabilities to protect itself and other critical Australian government systems from malicious cyber intrusion and disruption. Enhancing the resilience of Defence networks, including networks used by our deployed forces, and the capability of the Australian Cyber Security Centre are key areas of focus in strengthening Australia’s cyber defences. This will include considerable new investment in strengthening the Defence cyber workforce, including new military and APS positions and training programs.
4.21     The Government will also establish a research and development capability to help strengthen the defences of the ADF’s military information systems against cyber attack." (Page 90)

"6.17     Within this total workforce of around 18,200 FTE, enhancements to intelligence, space and cyber security capabilities will involve 800 new APS positions. Four hundred new positions will be created in information technology support, simulation, support to Navy engineering and logistics, security, force design and analysis, and strategic and international policy, including civilian policy officers posted overseas." (Page 152)

Table of Contents

 Minister’s Introduction 9
Executive Summary 13
Strategy 14
Australia’s strategic outlook 14
Australia’s defence strategy 17
Capability 18
A more capable, agile and potent future force 18
Australian defence industry and innovation 20
Shipbuilding 21
Defence posture – more active and internationally engaged 21
International engagement 22
Defence preparedness 22
People 23
Resources 24
Reform 24
Funding 24
Implementation 25
Chapter One: The Government’s Approach to Defence 29
The purpose of this Defence White Paper 29
Why now? 30
Managing strategic risk 32
Chapter Two: Strategic Outlook 39
Australia’s security environment 39
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The United States and China 41
The rules-based global order 44
The threat of terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters 46
State fragility 48
Military modernisation 49
Cyber and space 51
Regional security environments 53
Australia’s borders and offshore territories 53
Our immediate neighbourhood 54
South East Asia 56
Indonesia 59
North Asia 60
South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim 61
The Middle East 63
Weapons of Mass Destruction 64
Chapter Three: Australia’s Defence Strategy 67
Australia’s Strategic Defence Framework 68
Strategic Defence Interests 68
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and
proximate sea lines of communication 68
A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia
and the South Pacific 69
A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order 70
Strategic Defence Objectives 71
Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national
interests, and northern approaches 71
5
Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime
South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea,
Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen
their security 74
Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order 75
Implications for force structure and force posture 77
Chapter Four: The Future Australian Defence Force 83
Designing the future force 84
Capability priorities 86
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic
Warfare, and Cyber Security 86
Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces 89
Strike and Air Combat 94
Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 97
Key Enablers 100
Air and Sea Lift 106
Industry, innovation, research and development 108
A new approach to Australian defence industry policy 108
A new approach to defence innovation 111
Shipbuilding 113
Chapter Five: Positioning Defence for Tomorrow’s Challenges 117
International engagement 117
International defence relationships 120
The Australia-United States Alliance 121
New Zealand 124
Indonesia 125
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The South Pacific 126
Timor-Leste 128
South East Asia 128
North Asia 132
South Asia 134
Global relationships 135
Defence preparedness 140
Current operations 141
Chapter Six: People 145
Growing the integrated Defence workforce 146
Permanent Australian Defence Force 146
Reserves 148
Australian Public Service 149
Recruiting the people we need 150
Developing our people 152
Retaining our people 153
Defence culture 154
Looking after our people 156
The Defence community 159
Delivering the future workforce 160
Chapter Seven: Reform of Defence 165
The First Principles Review – The Government’s reform program 165
A strong strategic centre 168
Capability development life cycle 170
Corporate and military enablers 172
Implementing the First Principles Review 174
7
Chapter Eight: Funding Defence 177
The Government’s plan for funding Defence 177
The funding model 177
How will Defence funding be spent? 181
Budgeting in Defence 182
Chapter Nine: Implementing this Defence White Paper 185

Cybersecurity Conference in Canberra

The conference "Securing our Future in Cyberspace", is being hosted by the Australian National University in Canberra, 15-19 February 2016. There are also free public talks during the conference (registration for each required):

1. Towards a political ecology of cyberspace, Research symposium, 8:30am-12pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Chair: Professor Roger Bradbury, Director, Strategy and Statecraft in Cyberspace research program, ANU National Security College
2. Quantum sovereignty: the Westphalian principle and the global governance of cyberspace, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Paul Cornish, Research Group Director for Defence, Security and Infrastructure at RAND Europe, Cambridge
3. Taming cyberspace: Applying international law in a new domain, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Wednesday 17 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Fred Cate, Vice President for Research at Indiana University, Distinguished Professor and C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
4. The role of cybersecurity in Chinese foreign policy, Public seminar, 12:30-1:30pm, Thursday 18 February 2016, Speaker: Assistant Professor Jon Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs 
5. Securing our future in cyberspace: Next steps, Closing plenary, 12:30-2pm, Friday 19 February 2016, Speakers: Dr Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and others.

Vertical Replenishment of Chinese Aircraft Carrier Using Robot Helicopter

Greetings from the 10th International Conference on Computer Science and  Education (ICCSE 2015) in Cambridge (UK), where Ben M. Chen from the UAV Research Group at the National University of Singapore is speaking on "Unmanned Systems Research and Education". He showed a video of a competition in China, where the UAV helicopter had to pick up a load from one moving platform and transfer it to another moving platform. What got my attention was that this was intended to simulate the transfer of material from a supply ship to an aircraft carrier. This vertical replenishment (VERTREP) application is one still carried out with pilot operated helicopters in most navies. His paper "Development of an Unmanned Helicopter for Vertical Replenishment" provides details. It would be interesting to know the view of Australia about Singapore assisting China with its ability to project naval power.

Research Improving Target Detection for Australian Defence

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Brian Anderson is speaking on "Optimal Path Planning and Sensor Placement for Mobile Target Detection". This is a problem from the Australian Defence Science and Technology (DSTO), which is looking to improve the effectiveness of radar for detecting aircraft. The same research methods could be used for airborne sensors looking for ground targets. Australia has purchased new military aircraft with sophisticated sensors which could be networked to improve their performance. As an example, the  RAAF's F/A-18 Hornets could exchange digital data with their datalink transceivers.

These techniques can also be used to plot a path for an aircraft to avoid detection. This is currently done in advance of a mission, but that provides limited ability to react if a new radar is detected in mid-flight. 

Joint Strike Fighter in Australia

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Dr Paul Bevilaqua, Chief Engineer of the Lockheed Martin "Skunk Works" is speaking on "Inventing the Joint Strike Fighter". The Australian Government has announced they will order 72 F-35A aircraft.

Dr Bevilaqua developed the F-35-B lift fan for the Short Takeoff / Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. He discussed the history of attempts to create a vertical landing fighter aircraft. The Harrier is the only successful such aircraft so far, using a ducted turbofan engine, but is not supersonic. The problem was to create an aircraft with the speed of an F-18, but land vertically like a Harrier.

The F-18's engines have only half the thrust needed to land vertically. Also engine's thrust is at the back of the aircraft and so the solution was to balance with with a shaft driven fan at the front. In retrospect this sounds obvious, but as Dr Bevilaqua pointed out that previously engines were either used as a turbojet or turbo-shaft, not both. Research shows the the combination is possible with only a small drop in power.

Interestingly Dr Bevilaqua's initial sketch for the aircraft has the lift fan mounted horizontally in front of the turbojet, with two nozzles to direct the air down, as with the Harrier. The final design for the F-35B has the fan vertical, so no nozzles are required. However, it seems to me this gives up some subsonic efficiency, as the fan is not used in forward flight (as it is in the Harrier). It might be possible to have an annular fan with a clutch. This would be shut down at high speed, but operate as a turbofan at low speed, then with additional doors open, direct air down for vertical landing.

Dr Bevilaqua pointed out that the stealth features of the F-35 are not designed to make the aircraft completely invisible to radar, just hard to spot from some angles.

Dr Bevilaqua related how the design of the VSTOL aircraft was turned into an idea for a conventional aircraft, simply by taking out the lift fan and replacing it with a fuel tank. He related how previous such "joint" designs had a bad reputation in the US DoD due to the TFX project (which resulted in the F-111 which Australia purchased).

One interesting part of the talk was the approach to making the prototypes of the X-35. 3-D printing was used to produce plastic mock-ups of the parts, so the companies making them had a full size template for making metal parts.

Dr Bevilaqua explained that the three variants of the F-35: Airforce, Beach and Carrier have essentially the same fuselage with some different components attached.

Australia is planning to order the conventional take-off F-35A, which does not use a lift fan. Dr Bevilaqua explained that the US Marines have had their own air-support using Harrier aircraft and the F-35B is the supersonic replacement for it. Air support for amphibious operations is very relevant to the Australian Army, which is re-equipping itself to operate from Australia's two new Canberra Class amphibious assault ships. These ships have flight decks specifically designed for the Harrier and the F-35B STOVL aircraft. I have suggested Australia order eighteen F-35b aircraft, to equip the ships.

ps: The event was organised by the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics - Australia. They showed a very cheesy video promoting AIAA and aerospace technology. What got my attention was that AIIA membership is free for school teachers.

Defence IT Strategist Enterprise Architecture in Complex Changing Organisations

Greetings from the CSIRO Discovery Centre in Canberra, where Christopher Rodrigues Macias, Defence IT Strategist, is speaking on "Enterprise Architecture in Complex Changing Organisations". The is of great interest as I am teaching the ACS Virtual College course in Business Analysis.

In a refreshing change from IT presentations, Christopher had no slides, quipping that "Power corrupts and Powerpoint corrupts absolutely". He contrasted TOGAF with Zachman Framework and derived approaches (which come out of the COBOL era). He criticised the Zachman has breaking the architecture down into too small constituent parts (reminds me of  J.R.R. Tolkien's 'He that breaks a thing to find out what it is has left the path of wisdom.'). Christopher asserted that the people doing the analysis for systems are usually two organisation levels below that at which the real problem is discussed. The problem then is to be able to have a discussion about high level business problems, without delving down into the technical details of solutions.

Christopher used the analogy of defence procurement, where you need to know why you are buying a system (the intent), rather than just what. This brought back memoires of nine years working in IT at the Defence Department, working out what was needed (including for joint amphibious operations)

As Christopher pointed out standard modules can be used for standard functions in the business, such as finance. But the core business of the organisation needs to be custom designed. Continuing the defence analogy, the ADF is still working out how to use the new LHD ships. One indication of this is the numerous books on amphibious operations at ANU and ANU libraries. ;-)

One of the audience asked where to get good enterprise architects. My suggestion was to train them: the Australian Computer Society offers a postgraduate course in Enterprise Architecture.

Australia to Acquire Long Range Maritime UAVs

The Australian Government announced the intention to acquire "Triton Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to boost maritime surveillance capabilities" (13 March 2014). A decision on the number and timing of the aircraft will be made in 2016 after a Defence White Paper. The announcement this week appears to be designed to support the South Australian Liberal party’s election campaign,. The announcement was made at the RAAF base in SA where the aircraft will be based.

The Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton is a high cost, but relatively low risk, choice. Based on the successful Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV and ordered by the USA to complement the Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (which Australia is also acquiring) the Triton has had a relatively trouble free development.

IT for Australia's Defence

Peter Lawrence, the relatively new CIO of the Australian Department of Defence talked at the ACS Canberra Branch Conference just now. He talked about the challenge of maintaining millions of lines of code in the new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and what form of IT support to provide in the new warships now being built for the Australian Defence Force.

Peter said how IT needs to be something organization leaders need to worry about more. In my time at Defence there were few senior officers who were comfortable with IT. Hopefully this can be changed, with senior military personnel now being trained at ANU.

An interesting question from the audience to Peter was about the difficulty of international IT students getting a security clearance to work on defence projects. Peter explained that security requirements had to be conformed with. However I have found there are ways to address this. I have had international students  working on IT defence projects. In some cases they were just doing prototype software and research which was not intended for a real system, in others their work was compartmentalized from the sensitive parts of the system.

Limited Resources Changing Warfare

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Dr. Albert Palazzo, Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, is speaking on "The Revolution of Limits and the Changing Character of War". Dr. Palazzo started by emphasizing that he was expressing his own opinion, which may not reflect the Army or centre policy. 

Dr. Palazzo  explained that the "Revolution of Limits" referred to limits on natural resources. As more people in developing nations move into the middle class, their expectations increase along with their consumption of resources. This will result in reduced resources for the poorest people, with resulting civil and military conflict. He suggested the Arab spring will be a mere harbinger of the conflict to come. The resulting refugees may be treated as a threat to nation states and treated as such. Climate change will cause further stresses.

Dr. Palazzo suggested that limited resources will challenge economic globalization, with the previous assumed improving living standards ended. Governments will not be able to subside food and other essential resources, due to shortages. Global trade will break into regional groups, as nation states place a priority on feeding their own population.

Dr. Palazzo pointed to the building of dams limiting water supply to downstream countries as a source of conflict. Also he envisaged large scale refugee movements causing security problems on one thousand times the current scale.

As someone who read "The Limits to Growth" decades ago, none of this seems new. Clearly in a pure sense continual expansion of the consumption of resources is not possible. During the decades since the release of the Limits of Growth, technology has provided access to new sources of resources and more efficient use of them in some cases. But there is no guarantee this can continue indefinitely.

Dr. Palazzo pointed out that the cost of energy effects the military directly. Fuel is a significant cost in military operations. The US DoD has looked to alternative energy sources (such as solar panels. The cost of energy will change the cost/benefit of war, with military personnel needed at home to counter civil unrest, or used to capture resources from others. The laws of war may be ignored by desperate groups.

Dr. Palazzo  suggested the military skills in risk assessment could be put to use in identifying points of failure in the civil society. But I am not sure the civilian government or the non-government sector would welcome military involvement. 

Dr. Palazzo asked if the USA would be willing to safeguard Australia in a world of limited resources, turmoil, with more and more violent wars. He argued for flexible defence systems for Australia, but without being more specific.

It is an ideal time for Australia to consider how to structure its military. The new Australian government is looking to make the whole government more efficient. The military are not targeted for large budget cuts, but there is the opportunity to rethink investments. During the election campaign the Coalition government promised a new Defence White Paper within 18 months of the new government, but other areas of government are being reviewed in three months and perhaps the same should apply to defence.

At question time I asked Dr. Palazzo what changes should be made in defence spending and structure, given that other changes are now being made with the next government. He said this would need further study, but I suggest that Australia does not have that luxury, with decisions having to be made.

Dr. Palazzo  commented that cyberwar and dealing with China was taking up the attention of military planners, with resource issues not receiving the attention they deserve.

Dr. Palazzo is author of "The Future of War Debate in Australia", Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 140, August 2012.

Synopsis:

In this paper I consider the implications of resource peaks and climate change, their possible effect on the character of war and the challenge these developments pose for the future of Australian security. The analytical approach I use is one that will be familiar to most military and security professionals, the idea that periodic Military Revolutions are responsible for discontinuous shifts in the nature of society which have a cascading effect on the parameters of what is possible (and not possible) in the art of war. I explain why conditions are becoming likely for the onset of another Military Revolution; perhaps one that has already begun but whose effect is not yet being felt. The paper will highlight that the guiding force of the coming Military Revolution will be global limits on the availability of resources, particularly food, water and energy. In making the case for the Military Revolution of Limits I will outline possible repercussions on Australian society that will effect the Army and suggest ways forward in order to adjust to coming changes.

Biography:

Dr. Albert Palazzo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre in Canberra. His Ph.D. is from The Ohio State University and his thesis was published as Seeking Victory on The Western Front: The British Army & Chemical Warfare in World War I. He has written widely on warfare in the modern age and on the Australian Army in particular. His many publications include: The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001; Battle of Crete; Australian Military Operations in Vietnam; Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in Contemporary Military Environment and The Future of War Debate in Australia. His current research concerns the implications resource shortages to lead to conflict and the waging of war in an age of mutually assured precision.

War With Mutually Assured Precision

Dr. Albert Palazzo, Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, will speak on "The Revolution of Limits and the Changing Character of War" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30pm, 12 September 2013. Dr. Albert Palazzo is author of "The Future of War Debate in Australia", Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Paper No. 140, August 2012.

Synopsis:

In this paper I consider the implications of resource peaks and climate change, their possible effect on the character of war and the challenge these developments pose for the future of Australian security. The analytical approach I use is one that will be familiar to most military and security professionals, the idea that periodic Military Revolutions are responsible for discontinuous shifts in the nature of society which have a cascading effect on the parameters of what is possible (and not possible) in the art of war. I explain why conditions are becoming likely for the onset of another Military Revolution; perhaps one that has already begun but whose effect is not yet being felt. The paper will highlight that the guiding force of the coming Military Revolution will be global limits on the availability of resources, particularly food, water and energy. In making the case for the Military Revolution of Limits I will outline possible repercussions on Australian society that will effect the Army and suggest ways forward in order to adjust to coming changes.

Biography:

Dr. Albert Palazzo is a Senior Research Fellow at the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre in Canberra. His Ph.D. is from The Ohio State University and his thesis was published as Seeking Victory on The Western Front: The British Army & Chemical Warfare in World War I. He has written widely on warfare in the modern age and on the Australian Army in particular. His many publications include: The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation, 1901-2001; Battle of Crete; Australian Military Operations in Vietnam; Moltke to bin Laden: The Relevance of Doctrine in Contemporary Military Environment and The Future of War Debate in Australia. His current research concerns the implications resource shortages to lead to conflict and the waging of war in an age of mutually assured precision.

 

Defence Rapid Prototyping Program

The Defence Rapid Prototyping, Development  and Evaluation Program (RPDE) is an interesting model for government-industry cooperation on problem solving. The Defence Department pays for industry personnel and academic experts to work on RPDE projects, which aim to come up with quick solutions to problems:

1. Quicklooks: in less than three months.
2. Tasks:  delivers a prototype or report in a year to a year and half.

The industry participants of the RPDE are a "whos who" of defense companies. University members include the ANU.

This is similar to some US DARPA programs.

Are US Drone Strikes Legal?

Professor Steven Ratner, University of Michigan Law School and Shahzad Akbar, Barrister, Foundation of Fundamental Rights (FFR) Pakistan, will discuss "Drone strikes, US policy and the law", at the Australian National University College of Law, in Canberra, 2 August 2013.

Steven Ratner: The United States government has offered a legal theory for the use of drones based primarily on the jus ad bellum concept of self-defense as well as jus in bello concepts of distinction and proportionality. The US position, now elaborated in a formal paper by the Obama Administration, combines traditional doctrines and new ideas. I will examine whether that policy is and should be the basis for a new set of legal regulations on drone warfare.

Shahzad Akbar: The United States government has been conducting drone strikes within the sovereign territory of Pakistan since 2004, in breach of a plethora of international and domestic laws. According to independent sources, these drone strikes have caused a large number of civilian casualties including those of women and children. I will discuss the impact of drone warfare on civilians in Pakistan and outline the various strategies adopted by the victims to seek redress.

Killer robots and military ethics

Professor Christian Enemark will speak on "Killer robots: military ethics and post-human war" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30pm 8 August 2013.

Event Details

About the topic

In April this year the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions recommended a moratorium on the development of lethal autonomous weapon systems (so-called ‘killer robots’). In some countries there is strong technological and military momentum towards the use of such systems, partly because the physical and mental frailties of human users of force are increasingly seen as posing operational risks and impediments. However, there is also growing concern over the prospect of a machine that can make a decision to extinguish human life. From an ethical perspective, an argument in favour of autonomy might be that, given the poor record of human adherence to principles of military ethics, a robot could be programmed to do a better job. An alternative is to hold fast to the notion that war is necessarily, albeit tragically, a human affair. In exploring the idea of ‘post-human war’, Christian Enemark addresses the critical issue of whether robotics technology can overcome ethical shortcomings in the use of force while preserving the moral influence of human responsibility.

About the Speaker

Christian Enemark is Associate Professor in the National Security College, Crawford School of Public Policy. Prior to completing a PhD at the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Christian worked as a policy advisor in the Parliament and Attorney General's Department of New South Wales. He has held academic positions as Lecturer in Global Security at the University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, and Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of Sydney. Christian has held ANU Visiting Fellowships at the John Curtin School of Medical Research (2007-08) and the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (2009-11). He currently teaches two postgraduate courses -- NSPO8013 Disease, Security and Biological Weapons, and NSPO8014 Ethics and Technologies of War -- and he was listed among the Crawford School's 'Best Teachers' in 2012.

Australian Defence Facing the Next Enemy

Dr Robert O'Neill will speak on "Defence 2013 - preparing to face our next enemy" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30pm 9 July 2013

Defence 2013 - preparing to face our next enemy

Public Lecture

Speaker Dr Robert O'Neill ... 

About the Lecture:

As the Australian Defence Force prepares to leave combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014, a question arises as to who our next enemy might be. For what contingencies should the ADF train? How should our forces be organized, equipped, commanded and deployed in the interval between 2014 and the next possible assignment? Shall we prove to be very good at preparing to fight our latest war, which will probably never repeat itself, or might we be able to take a well-founded look into the future and prepare the ADF for the challenges it will actually have to face? Releasing his Centre of Gravity Paper Dr O'Neill will explore the challenges facing the ADF today and how they should prepare to face the next enemy. Previous Centre of Gravity papers can be downloaded from http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/sdsc/centre_of_gravity.php

We hope you will join us for drinks and nibbles after the speech.

About the Speaker:

Dr Robert O'Neill, AO is Honorary Professor at the US Studies Centre. O'Neill served as Planning Director for the Centre before its CEO was appointed. One of the world's leading experts on strategic and security studies, O'Neill previously served as Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and then as Chichele Professor of the History of War and Fellow of All Souls College at Oxford University. Earlier in his career, O'Neill was Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the ANU. Professor O'Neill's extensive record of public service includes appointments as Chairman of Trustees of the Imperial War Museum, Chairman of the Council of the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, Chairman of the Sir Robert Menzies Centre for Australian Studies in the University of London, and Chairman of the Council of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Lowy Institute for International Policy. A prodigious author and editor, O'Neill wrote the Official History of Australia's role in the Korean War, influential reports for the Ford Foundation on reducing levels of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as dozens of academic books and innumerable articles and essays. Professor O'Neill is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society in Britain. O'Neill is a graduate of the University of Melbourne and the Royal Military College of Australia. A Rhodes Scholar, he received his PhD in Modern History from Oxford University.

ABC Four Corners on Cyber-attacks in Australia

ABC Four Corners report "Hacked!" (27th May at 8.30pm on ABC1), alleged that Chinese military hackers were targeting Australian Government departments and corporations to steal secrets and business information. The program contained little hard evidence or new information. One allegation, that the plans to the new ASIO headquarters had been stolen to assist penetration of the building was new, but not particularly significant. However, the program will be useful if it prompts the Australian Government to restart its dormant work on public cyber security policy.

One curious segment of the program had a private security consultant asked if the Australia was preparing for offensive cyber-warfare, that is preparing to attack,. not just defence. The consultant hedged around the question, hinting but not answering clearly.

This reluctance to answer the question is at odds with a media release from Northrop Grumman in 2012 which announced it was building a cyber test range at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) in Canberra, to train defence force personnel. A cyber range is analogous to a test range for conventional weapons: the cyber range is used to test cyber warfare techniques, which can be both defensive and offensive. I attended a presentation to the Australian Computer Society, 13 March 2013, where one of the staff from Northrop Grumman gave a presentation on the cyber range.

US, Australian UK Naval Interoperability for the Next War

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Steven Paget is speaking on "The Special Relationship at Sea: Naval Gunfire Support Interoperability during the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq Wars". He mentioned problems with access to the US Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) during the second Iraq war. The problem was that the network was not compartmentalized, limiting the access which non-nationals could have. This was corrected by creating a separate network, but the UK and USA tended to miss out on some information sent over SIPRNet. It occurred to me that not only to the nations navies require compatibility with each other, but with other forces of their own and each other countries. Not all ships in warfare are operated by the navy. There are ships operated by coastguards, the army, reserves, the army and civilian contractors. In previous times these ships were not considered combatants and were assumed to be kept safely in the rear. But just as a front line is less clear in modern land warfare it will be less clear in future naval warfare. Also navies will need to cooperate with forces they do not entirely trust. In the case of Australia,  the RAAF are purchasing US aircraft with minimal customization, providing good interoperability. However, the RAN is purchasing Spanish ships with a mix of European and US weapons systems, which will make interoperability more complex. Also the two new RAN two Canberra Class Landing Helicopter Dock ships (LHDs) will create complex issues. These ships are purpose designed for amphibious assault in the littoral zone, transporting, supporting the Australian Army and acting as the flag ships for support vessels. 

One of hallmarks of modern naval operations – from the 1991 Gulf War to ongoing anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden – is the formation of multi-national task forces to pursue common interests. In particular, the navies of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have a long history of operating together which continues to this day. This trend is set to continue given the reduction in fleet sizes worldwide, which may see allied nations seeking to build complimentary force elements that can produce combined capabilities.

In this public lecture, Steven Paget will explore the cooperation between the Royal Australian Navy, the United States Navy and the Royal Navy in the provision of naval gunfire support to operations ashore in the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. These historical case studies will open a window on the broader issue of interoperability between the three navies and assess the effectiveness of their efforts to work together, and what lessons can be learned for future operations.

Steven Paget is a graduate of St Andrews University and a doctoral student in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU. In 2012 he was awarded the Royal United Services Institute of Australia’s Leo Mahony Scholarship to support the research on which this lecture is based.

Australian and US Naval Gunfire Off Korea

Steven Paget, will speak on "The Special Relationship at Sea: Naval Gunfire Support Interoperability during the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq Wars", at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University in Canberra, 6pm 17 April 2013:

One of hallmarks of modern naval operations – from the 1991 Gulf War to ongoing anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden – is the formation of multi-national task forces to pursue common interests. In particular, the navies of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom have a long history of operating together which continues to this day. This trend is set to continue given the reduction in fleet sizes worldwide, which may see allied nations seeking to build complimentary force elements that can produce combined capabilities.

In this public lecture, Steven Paget will explore the cooperation between the Royal Australian Navy, the United States Navy and the Royal Navy in the provision of naval gunfire support to operations ashore in the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. These historical case studies will open a window on the broader issue of interoperability between the three navies and assess the effectiveness of their efforts to work together, and what lessons can be learned for future operations.

Steven Paget is a graduate of St Andrews University and a doctoral student in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU. In 2012 he was awarded the Royal United Services Institute of Australia’s Leo Mahony Scholarship to support the research on which this lecture is based.