Showing posts with label cybersecurity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cybersecurity. Show all posts

Sunday, May 23, 2021

What your boss really knows about your internet usage

West Live Podcast
I was interviewed by Ben O'Shea for PerthNow's The West Live Podcast, on "What your boss really knows about your internet usage and why incognito mode won’t protect you" (West Australian Newspapers, May 21, 2021 2:35PM):

"It turns out your boss can see much more than you think when it comes to your internet usage at work, no matter how incognito you get.

Australian National University honorary lecturer and technology consultant Tom Worthington knows a thing or two about what you can and can’t get away with at work when it comes using the web."

Tuesday, March 06, 2018

Federal Regulation Needed to Stop Financial Institutions Placing Customers at Risk of Scammers

Had a call from someone claiming to be from NIB Health Insurance. They wanted to discuss my policy and asked me for personal details to verify who I was. However, when I asked the caller to verify who they were, they could not. They provided a telephone number and suggested I call. I explained that as they gave me the number, I could not use it for verification. They then gave me a web address to check the number, but again, as they gave me that I could not rely on it being genuine.

The caller did not seem to grasp the fact that because I get so many scam calls, I have to assume anyone calling is a scammer, until they can prove otherwise. Assuming this caller really was from NIB, the company appears to not understand that they should not call customers in this way. By doing so they make it easier for scammers. I suggest a mandatory code of conduct needs to be put in place for insurance companies, and other financial institutions, to stop this practice.

Friday, December 09, 2016

Lights Out in Cyber Attack

Professor Roger Bradbury, from then ANU National Security College, has portrayed the "South Australian power shutdown ‘just a taste of cyberattack'" (ANU Reporter, 2016). He speculates that Australia's electrical, telecommunications, water, sewerage, transport and financial services infrastructure already has been compromised by China, in preparation for a "surgical cyberattack" in a future dispute over the South China Sea. The effects of a possible cyber attack are not exaggerated, but perhaps Professor Bradbury should not have singled out China.

It is likely that all nations are now preparing for cyber-attacks, as a routine adjunct to conventional military operations. This year I ran ANU computing students through a "Cyberwar: Hypothetical for Teaching ICT Ethics". This was based on a possible conflict over the South China Sea. However, I was careful not to identify who might be attacking who. 
 
Professor Bradbury suggests that our systems can be made less vulnerable by not having them top-down or hierarchical. He suggests "We need 21st-century networks that have no centre: no main power station, no main water dam, no main interconnector, no main transport hub or central train station...". In this he is perhaps suggesting a system like the Internet, which consists of a collection of interconnected networks (literally an Inter-Net). However, even a system with no hierarchy is vulnerable to attack if it uses the same computer control software for all iots nodes and those nodes are all connected to the Internet.
 
One way to build resilience is to rely on gravity, as is done with much of the water supply. Water is pumped to reservoirs and then flows by gravity. Similarly, sewage systems have overflow valves, which open to allow sewage to flow into waterways (bad for the environment, but better for human health than sewage backing up into people's homes).

The electrical grid can be similarly protected by having generators independently working to maintain the system, rather than acting via central control. Local home solar panels could have a role in this, by boosting the grid when required. However, these systems need to be protected from hacking, or they could be used to attack the grid.

Friday, November 25, 2016

Cyber Bootcamp for Australian Government Ministers

Alastair MacGibbon, Special Adviser to the Australian Prime Minister on Cyber Security has said senior government executives and Ministers should be set to “Cyber Bootcamp”. This is one of the recommendations in "Review of the Events Surrounding the2016 eCensus". This is a report on the successful denial of service attack on the 2016 Australian Census website, in August 2016.

The government downplayed the significance of the incident by describing it as a "truck across the driveway", just preventing access but doing no other damage. However, continuing the analogy, the truck may be filled with armed terrorists, or a very large bomb. On Wednesday, Dan Tehan MP, Minister Assisting the Prime Minister for Cyber Security outlined a scenario where a virus introduced to critical systems shuts down the electricity grid, causing widespread deaths and injury.

Summary of Recommendations
  • Crisis Communications and Coordination ...
  • Education: The Attorney-General’s Department should develop a “Cyber Bootcamp”
  • Security Framework: The Australian Signals Directorate should strengthen the framework...
  •  Embracing Adaptive Government...
  • Cyber Security in a Digital First World
  • The ABS should engage an independent security consultant ...
  • The ABS should ensure future significant changes to personal information handling ...
  • The ABS should adopt a privacy management plan ...
  • The ABS should assess and enhance existing ABS privacy training for staff.
  • The ABS should develop a specific strategy to remove the current state of vendor lock-in.
  • Agencies should review their approach to cyber security incident response planning and coordination ...
  • Agencies should ensure independent security assessments are conducted on critical ICT deliverables.
  • Agencies should test security measures and monitoring systems for online government services ...
  • Agencies should be conscious of updated interpretations of governing legislation ...
  • The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner has recommended the government develop an APS-wide Privacy Code in collaboration with the Office. ...

Monday, August 15, 2016

RAND Report on Cyber War with China

In the RAND report "War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable" Gompert, Cevallos and  Garafola assume a regional conventional war, using ships, submarines, aircraft, spacecraft and also cyber-war. RAND is a US based think tank, which also has a Canberra Office.

The authors suggest that "Escalating cyberwarfare, while injurious to both sides, could worsen China’s economic problems and impede the government’s ability to control a restive population." (p. xiv). Also that "We also assume that China would not attack the U.S. homeland, except via cyberspace, given China’s minimal capability to do so with conventional weapons." (p. 11) and:
"In the future, cyberwarfare against military, dual-purpose, and civilian systems could figure importantly in a severely intense war. ... Whether with kinetic or nonkinetic (namely, cyber) weapons, the highest targeting priority for China would be U.S. strike platforms, bases, and force concentrations in the region." (p. 19). 
Also the report warns that cyber-attacks could escalate to nuclear war:
"... it is important for the United States to be aware of potentially dangerous ambiguities involved in attacks on targets that the Chinese could regard as strategic: attacks on missile launchers, even if intended only to degrade China’s theater-range missile capabilities; attacks on high-level military C2, even if intended only to degrade China’s conventional-operational capabilities; cyberwarfare attacks on strategic systems;" (p. 30)
The report warns of the cost of cyberwar and the difficulty of preventing it harming civilian systems which support military operations:
"Would both countries not be tempted to crash telecommunications or air-traffic control or energy-distribution systems that support fighting, or interfere with government-service networks?" (p. 49)
What this report fails to address is the effect of deliberate attack and collateral damage on other countries. Cyber-attacks are difficult to confine to one geographic area and will likely effect interconnected international systems and national and local ones well away from the conflict. In addition both sides may well make use of cyber-attacks on third countries, as a way to send a low risk political signal.

Australian Government Needs a Planned Response to Cyber Attack

The security of government information systems is the responsibility of government ministers, not IBM or the ABS. What should be of concern is not just that there was a successful denial of service attack on the Australian Census, but the apparent lack of a planned and practiced response from the relevant government ministers and their staff. Had this been a more serious attack, such as one on critical infrastructure threating lives, the poor performance by ministerial level of government could have been disastrous.

At the senior levels of government there need to be plans in place for who says what and when. These plans need to be tested in exercises, just as is done for natural disaster planning, which Australian state and local governments do well. Internet Australia (IA) members are discussing what form of submission to make to the likely Parliamentary inquiries into this matter. I suggest the Australian Computer Society (ACS) join with IA on this and try to widen the discussion to cover Internet security more generally. ACS and IA need not agree on every aspect, buy could loosely coordinate, as was done for the Internet regulation inquiries of the 1990s, as  described by Chen (2000, p. 161).

Reference

Chen, P. J. (2000). Australia's online censorship regime: the Advocacy Coalition Framework and governance compared. Retrieved from
https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/38780/65881_00000240_01_AOCR.pdf?sequence=1#page=162

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Cyber Security Forum in Australian Parliament House

Screen image of the web page for the fictional Concinna Day Care CentreGreetings from  Parliament House in Canberra, where I am on a panel for a Cyber Security Forum convened by Inside Canberra. This is preceded by a keynote by Michael McCormack, Assistant Minister for Defence. Perhaps I was invited to be on the panel because of the cyberwar hypothetical I wrote recently for teaching ICT Ethics at the Australian National University.

The panel was primed with some questions before the event. Here are my off-the-cuff responses:

Cyber Security and Cyber Sovereignty why it matters - Apple versus FBI

As I said on ABC News Radio a few weeks ago, on balance, I am on the FBI's side. Apple should assist with access to this one iPhone in this one case.

ASPI’s annual Cyber Security Report

I am not sure I agree with ASPI's 7/10 rating for Australia government organisational structure on cyber matters. It seems a little fragmented. Perhaps a 5/10.

Hacking from white to black and who does it

ANU has a fascinating talk on the Ruxcon 2015 Security Conference in Melbourne:

Progress on Snowden and Assange

What progress?

Policy like data storage and clouds, safe or a disaster waiting to happen

The Australian Government Cloud Computing Policy is okay, but is it being implemented? A larger issue is wghat is happening in the private sector?

Proprietary ecosystems: a threat to the open Internet?

Yes and the Chinese government has a different view of "open".

Need a G20 group on policy and enforcement

The G20 is not really set up for "enforcement". While the UN may appear slow, they do have an international infrastructure. For something to be done quicker, it needs to be done by less than twenty countries, perhaps eight.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

Cybersecurity Conference in Canberra


The conference "Securing our Future in Cyberspace", is being hosted by the Australian National University in Canberra, 15-19 February 2016. There are also free public talks during the conference (registration for each required):
  1. Towards a political ecology of cyberspace, Research symposium, 8:30am-12pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Chair: Professor Roger Bradbury, Director, Strategy and Statecraft in Cyberspace research program, ANU National Security College
  2. Quantum sovereignty: the Westphalian principle and the global governance of cyberspace, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Paul Cornish, Research Group Director for Defence, Security and Infrastructure at RAND Europe, Cambridge
  3. Taming cyberspace: Applying international law in a new domain, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Wednesday 17 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Fred Cate, Vice President for Research at Indiana University, Distinguished Professor and C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
  4. The role of cybersecurity in Chinese foreign policy, Public seminar, 12:30-1:30pm, Thursday 18 February 2016, Speaker: Assistant Professor Jon Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs 
  5. Securing our future in cyberspace: Next steps, Closing plenary, 12:30-2pm, Friday 19 February 2016, Speakers: Dr Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and others.

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Rearming Australia for Cyber Warfare

In "AUSTRALIA REARMED! Future Needs for Cyber-Enabled Warfare" Professor Greg Austin, from the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) states "Australia’s defence forces need to maintain distinct capabilities for cyber warfare at the strategic level ... for mobilization of the country in very short time to fight a medium intensity, cyber-enabled hot war ...". The ADF has made a significant step towards this already by including cyber-security in the curriculum of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), where the ACCS is located.

In an accompanying paper, Group Captain (ret.) Dr. Keith Joiner discussed "Integrating Cyber-survivability into Australian Defence Force Platform Development". He points out that the ADF's taks is not only protect its systems in peacetime, "... but includes preventing its systems and platforms from being crippled or subverted by the offensive cyber operations of an enemy in combat...".

Australia has recently invested billions of dollars in advanced aircraft and ships. In any hostilities these can be expected to come under intensive and sustained cyber-attack, before during and after any conventional warfare. These attacks will not just be directly against the weapons systems, but also through their logistics and support systems, the personnel and their families and friends. It would be unfortunate if these platforms were disabled even before they could be deployed, because the ADF has not spent a few hundred million dollars to to conduct cyber- survivability trials and train personnel to protect the systems.

Wednesday, December 16, 2015

Ruxcon Security Conference Teaching Hacking Techniques in Australia


Greetings from the ANU in Canberra, where Bob "The Builder" Edwards is speaking on "Ruxcon 2015 Computer Security Conference: A Brief Report"
his attendance at the Ruxcon 2015 Security Conference in Melbourne. The conference is sponsored by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). As well as the usual presentations, the conference has a Black Bag Competition where delegated attempt to covertly access a computer in the conference hotel and Capture The Flag. Presenters discuss how to hack systems, so as to alert system owners to the problems and to better educate security professionals. One point was that computer systems are getting more complex, which opens up  more security vulnerabilities.

The interesting question for me is how to have some of the fun and excitement of such events in an educational environment, in a way which is safe. One issue is to make sure that students understand the legal and ethical issues involved. Even when the intention is benign there is the problem of preventing educational experiments escaping and causing damage.  One way to address this by having a "Cyber Range" which provides and isolated computer environment to test security. The new Australian SDN Test-Bed, is also intended for security research.

The PM announced a $30M "Cyber Security Growth Centre". It would be interesting to include some contests in this.

Wednesday, July 29, 2015

Australian Cyber Security Centre Threat Report 2015

The government Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) has issued its first threat report. "The Australian Cyber Security Centre Threat Report 2015" is a 29 page PDF document (issued 29 curiously dated 1 January 1970). The ACSC is made up of federal agencies including Australian Crime Commission (ACC), Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO).

The report indicates that the number of significant compromises of federal Australian Government networks decreased from 2012 to 2014. The report includes the end of support for Windows XP and MS Office 2003 as a security risk. Hopefully individuals and organisations changing to Windows 10 will result in improved security.

Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) is listed as "the primary method for Australians to report cybercrime"  acorn.gov.au.

A major deficiency in the report is that it does not acknowledge the predominate role of the non-government sector in cyber-security. In particular there is no mention of AusCERT, a non-government organization, who have been providing coordination cyber-security services from before the creation of ACSC, AusCERT has more experience in the field and a longer track record than the governments own CERT and most other federal agencies.

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Cyber Security Careers at the Australian Signals Directorate

Yesterday I was taking part in a discussion of the role of national security agencies with colleagues from the IT industry. I mentioned how when giving a seminar on computer security at the Cambridge University Computer Lab (UK) I noticed someone in the back row who did not look like a student or academic. They turned out to be from GCHQ, the UK security agency, presumably there to recruit students. Much to my surprise today I walked into seminar room N101 at the ANU Research School of Computer Science (to help get the projector to work) and found it was for staff from the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) presenting to students on Careers at ASD.

Monday, March 16, 2015

Intelligence Organisations and IS

Greetings from the Australian National University where Professor Keith Jeffery, Queen’s University Belfast, is speaking on"Keeping secrets? Lessons from history on the challenges facing intelligence organisations in the age of IS". He commented that the Internet had redressed the balance of information in favor of the public. However, there is a danger of information which needs to be kept secret by government becoming public. He pointed out that Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden were relativity low level functionaries in the US intelligence community, they had access to large volumes of information. He also pointed out that the quantity and quality of information about consumers which businesses have may be of higher quality than that at GCHQ. He related how Sir Compton Mackenzie revealed some details of UK intelligence in WW1 (he also appears in the novel "Murder and Mendelssohn" by Kerry Greenwood with the fictional Phryne Fisher).
Professor Jeffery also commented that "techies" seemed to be more likely reveal secrets that others and that ideological driven whistle-blowers are most useful sources of information.

Professor Jeffery mentioned the UK Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament's report "Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework" (12 March 2015):
i. The internet has transformed the way we communicate and conduct our day-to-day
lives. However, this has led to a tension between the individual right to privacy and the collective right to security, which has been the focus of considerable debate over the past
18 months.
ii. The leak by Edward Snowden of stolen intelligence material in June 2013 led to
allegations regarding the UK Agencies’ use of intrusive capabilities – in particular those
relating to GCHQ’s interception of internet communications. This Committee investigated
the most serious of those allegations – that GCHQ were circumventing UK law – in
July 2013. We concluded that that allegation was unfounded. However, we considered
that a more in-depth Inquiry into the full range of the Agencies’ intrusive capabilities
was required – not just in terms of how they are used and the scale of that use, but also
the degree to which they intrude on privacy and the extent to which existing legislation
adequately defines and constrains these capabilities. "
Unfortunately I had to go across campus to hear his Excellency Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão, Minister of Planning and Strategic Investment for the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and so missed the mention of IS by
Professor Jeffery.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Cybersecurity is Everyones Responsibility

Had a request from the ANU Strategic Communications and Public Affairs unit to be interviewed on radio about the apparent Islamic State (ISIS) hack of US twitter accounts and the Anonymous group's attacks on IS websites.

According to news reports (such as "Apparent Islamic State backers hack U.S. military Twitter feed", by David Alexander and Jim Finkle, Reuters, Jan 12, 2015), hackers claiming to be from ISIS posted their own messages and videos to  the U.S. Central Command Twitter account. The account was shut down after 30 minutes and no internal military systems were reported compromised ("Statement from U.S. Central Command Regarding Twitter/YouTube Compromise",  U.S.
Central Command News Release #20140101, January 12, 2015).

In a separate incident, the hacking group "Anonomus" are reported to have briefly disabled an ISIS website (see "Anonymous Declares War Vs Al Qaeda, ISIS; Brings Down A Jihadist Website", by Esther Tanquintic-Misa, International Business Times, January 13, 2015 ).

Neither of these incidents are particularly serious. Also it cannot be clearly established who was behind them. But there is a real risk of far more serious attacks. The first and best line of defence is a well trained workforce, which knows what to do (all Australian Defence Force Academy undergraduates will be trained in cyber security, commencing this year) and UNSW Canberra has the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) for advanced research. There is the Australian Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (ACORN) for the general public to report incidents, the  Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT) which companies can subscribe to for assistance.

Friday, November 07, 2014

Public Wifi Security Risk

I will be on a panel discussing the security of public WiFi services, on Radio 2CC Canberra, 10:30am Sunday, 9 November 2014. This is timely as news reports indicate that the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) is warning of increased risk of hijacking public wifi networks during the G20 summit next weekend. Even though the G20 is in Brisbane, Canberra makes an attractive target for attack, as the seat of national government and with many public servants, security and military personnel based here.

So far the CBRfree Public WiFi Service covers the central Civic area of Canberra's CBD. The plan is to have 745 access points at a cost of $3.1M. The major security issue with public WiFi is "SSID spoofing”  hot-spots: that is someone sets up what appears to be a public hot-spot, but it is a private system which  reads the traffic before passing it to the public network.

iiNet warn users about “SSID spoofing” when they access the real system (see "Wi-Fi security flaw for smartphones puts your credit cards at risk", The Guardian, Tuesday 26 April 2011 or "Secure user-friendly Wi-Fi access point joining" for a more technical explanation). The system also looks for “pirate” wireless access points. iiNet Online security is important. iiNet recommends users encrypt sensitive information,  maintain strong passwords (and change them regularly), and have anti-virus software and operating system patches. They also seem to be warning not to use the service for on-line banking (which would be prudent).

Apart from the security of the user there is the issue of security problems caused by access to anonymous WiFi. Those with criminal or terrorist intent could use the public WiFi network for planning or conducting illegal activities. As they are not required to register for the service, it will be more difficult for security services to trace their activities.

The CBRfree service is run by iiNet and paid for by the ACT Government, with no charge to users for 250 megabytes per day. The service is provided, in part, to attract tourists and reflect the image of a high-tech city. However, just one serious security incident with the system could undermine Canberra's image as a safe and secure place to visit and do business.

There is an additional public WiFi service available in Canberra: EduRoam. This provides WiFi access on campuses of participating universities worldwide. In Canberra, EduRoam is available at the Australian Catholic University (ACU), Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Australian National University (ANU), University of Canberra and CSIRO. EduRoam users have a userid and password but this is encrypted before transmission to their host institution for access (using the 802.1x Network Access Control Standard). This is more secure than having a web page where the user types in their password.

Telstra is also installing 30 Wi-Fi hotspots in Civic.  Telstra can afford to provide the service at no charge to the government, as it is part of the Fon service. Fon customers pay for access to this service, as well as Telstra broadband customers having free access (in return for letting Fon users share their home broadband WiFi). The Fon system requires user-ids and passwords, but does not use the 802.1x standard and so is not as secure as EduRoam. BT offer the FON service in the UK, but suggest subscribers use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to improve security when using the public hotspots.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Half a million warrantless meta data requests

I was interviewed on radio 2SER Sydney this-morning about the release of metadata from Internet Service providers for law enforcement: "Half a million warrantless meta data requests!". For an overview of the issues, see: "Access to and retention of internet 'metadata'" by Jaan Murphy, Australian Parliamentary Library, 18/08/2014.

Wednesday, May 07, 2014

Cyber Security Challenge Australia

Four teams of students from the Australian National University are currently taking p[art in the "CySCA Cyber Security Challenge Australia 2014". This is timely as there have been allegations the Australian Parliamentary Email System was hacked by China. Also the CSIRO recently released "Enabling Australia's Digital Future: Cyber Security Threats and Implications". For more on the topic see my blog Cyberwar and Security.

Friday, May 02, 2014

Australian Parliamentary Email System Hacked?

Yesterday I was interviewed by ABC Radio about alledged hacking of the Australian Parliamentary Email System, the result is "China rejects Australian hacking allegations" (ABC Radio Australia, 1 May 2014, 14:05 AEST). This seems a reasonably balanced update on an old story that email on the  Australian Parliament’s unclassified system was being monitored by China. I pointed out there was no way to know who was doing the monitoring, this should be investigated,  but it is was not a major security issue. The problem with security in parliament house is that while public servants are trained in security measures, this is less the case for the MPs and their political staff.

ps: It was amusing to be described as a  "cyber warfare specialist" at the Australian National University. I actually teach IT ethics and sustainability at ANU. I did work for the Defence Department, but mostly on essentially administrative IT policy.

Tuesday, April 29, 2014

WiFi Baby Monitor Hacked: How Hard is it?

Had a call from TV news asking how hard it is to hack a baby monitor. There is a story going around, which may have been recycled from last year:
  1. This year: Stranger Hacks Into Baby Monitor and Screams at Child, Olivia B. Waxman, Time, April 28, 2014:
  2. Last year: Baby monitor hacked, spies on Texas child, Chenda Ngak, CBS News, August 13, 2013, 6:22 PM:
I found some sensible advice about securing your router, changing the default password and the like in "Can my WiFi baby monitor be hacked by predators?",  Liz, Home Security, April 28, 2014. Anything more anyone can suggest?

Saturday, November 23, 2013

Cyber War Will Take Place

Thomas Rid's book "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" (Oxford University Press, 2013), is readable and well researched. It argues that on-line attacks on nation states will be at most an adjunct to the use of conventional military force. The limits to the effectiveness of an on-line attack are discussed, using documented cases. The conclusion is that cyber-war will not happen, because it is unreliable in its effect, cannot be well targeted and can't cause violence directly. Surprisingly, Queensland, Australia, features prominently as one place where a cyber-attack on infrastructure had a significant effect. In 2000 the Maroochy Shire SCADA system was commanded to dump millions of liters of raw sewage into waterways.

Rid soberly counters the hype around "cyber-war", but perhaps goes too far in dismissing it altogether. There are many weapons which have uncertain military value, but are nonetheless made ready for use. An example is Barnes Wallis' bouncing bomb, used to breech the Möhne and Edersee Dams in WW2. The bomb had a mostly indirect effect, by breeching the dam wall, cutting off hydroelectric power and flooding the land below. The bombs has some propaganda value, but were of limited military value.

It is unlikely there will be a pure cyberwar, but very likely that any future major conventional war will involve extensive use of on-line attacks. These will be intended to cause confusion and degrade the enemy infrastructure to make conventional kinetic attack more effective, rather than replace it.

Compared to conventional warfare, cyber-war takes little hardware. Office computers are cheap compared to missiles, submarines and supersonic aircraft. A country with a conscription army also has a ready supply of recruits, who can be screened for computing skills. Reserve personnel, who work in the ICT, can be used, with most of their technical training taken care of by their civilian employers (previously I proposed such a "Australian CyberWarfare Battalion").

Nations with less developed infrastructure may also see this as a useful form of asymmetric warfare. A less developed nation has little to fear in terms of retaliation when  disrupting the water, transport and power infrastructure of a developed nation.