Failure of the War on Terror

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where David Kilcullen, is speaking about his book "Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror". He started with the bold claim that the US invasion of Iraq was as a strategic mistake as Hitler's invasion of the USSR. He argues that the invasion created ISIS. The USA then failed to take the opportunity with the disarray on the death of Osama bin Laden, to eliminate
al-Qaeda. With the failure of the
Arab Spring and reintroduction of autocratic governments, liberation movements were required to turn to
al-Qaeda. Similarly the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq removed curbs on the government and forced opponents into the hands of al-Qaeda. Kilcullen argued that the USA's having  Russia assist in the removal of Syria's chemical weapon emboldened Russia to later intervene militarily. The intervention of Iran then caused problems for countries in the region who see this as much of a threat as ISIS.

Kilcullen then attributed the introduction of a transit visa by
Republic of Macedonia, and call-up of Syrians for military service, causing the refugee influx to Europe. He does not seem to see this as a military threat to Europe, just something which has finally got the attention of European government about Syria.

I asked if a US "President Trump" would understand how to take a patient long term approach to building democratic structures in middle eastern countries, Kilcullen commented that he was more worried about a President Cruz or Clinton.

Counterinsurgency Iraq and Afghanistan

Dr. John A. Nagl, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army (Retired) will speak on "Learning to eat soup with a knife - counterinsurgency Iraq and Afghanistan", at the Australian National University in Canberra, 13 August 2013. He is the author of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam" (University Of Chicago Press, 2005)

About the lecture:

In this lecture, celebrated counterinsurgency specialist John Nagl will discuss the lessons from the Iraq and Afghanistan war. As one of the chief authors of the US's Counterinsurgency field manual and celebrated scholar of counterinsurgency in history, John Nagl will offer insights into how counterinsurgency planning is developed, how, why and where it worked and did not work in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the implications for counterinsurgency operations in the future. With the rise of non-state threats to governments and increasing urbanisation of mankind, counterinsurgency conflicts are sure to remain a fundamental part of any militaries potential field of operations.
About the speaker
John A. Nagl is a retired Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army who is an influential expert in counterinsurgency. He is former president of the Center for a New American Security and incoming headmaster of The Haverford School. Nagl served in both the Gulf and Iraq wars. He has a PhD from Oxford university. His dissertation Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (drawing on a quote from T.E Lawrence) was later revised for publication and gained significant public and military debate. Nagl has worked as a Social Sciences Professor at Westpoint, and worked as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defence. As part of a team overseen by General David Petreus, Nagl helped write the United States Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency field manuel. Nagl is a non-resident fellow with the Centre for a New American Security in DC, and has taught at Georgetown University, Kings College London and the US Naval Academy.

British Strategic Failings in Iraq

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Brigadier Richard Iron, British Army (ret.) is speaking on "The Iraq war: A case-study in British strategic failure". Brigadier Iron started with the concerns the UK military had even before the start of the Iraq war, with different objectives of the UK and USA. One difference was the intended end state, with the USA setting out to destroy the Iraq government, whereas the UK wanted to put in place a new government. Brigadier Iron put up a WW2 photo of the USA, UK and USSR political leaders at the Yalta Conference,  with their military advisers behind them. He contrasted this with Iraq policy, which was decided at meetings with no military input. In Iraq, the original plan was to invade via Turkey into northern Iraq, but Turkey did not agree to this. Brigadier Iron argued that the planning should have considered what the British interest was in Northern or Southern Iraq and should have had their own diplomatic effort in Turkey.

In the actual operation, Brigadier Iron argued that the British failed to build up the Iraqi police and ensure the allegiance of the militia they supported was to the Iraqi state, not their own group.

The main message from Brigadier Iron seemed to be that a country going into a coalition war needs to be clear what its own interests are and that the political and military strategies need to be coordinated.He was relatively upbeat about the current security situation in Iraq.

Lecture Topic:
How do the British, and especially the British Army view the Iraq war? In this lecture, Richard Iron, British Army (ret.) argues the invasion of Iraq in 2003 represents a case of strategic failure.

Drawing on his own experience planning, participating in and later analysing the conflict for the British army, Iron examines the British role in Iraq and what it has meant for the United Kingdom. He draws on his personal experience, such as the retaking of Basra in 2008 to provide insight into how the war was fought.

Finally he will touch on Iraq today, and examine the political, military and economic changes and the US 'legacy' ten years after the conflict.

About the speaker:Brigadier Richard Iron, British Army (ret.)
Richard Iron commanded 1st Battalion of the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment, serving in Bosnia and Macedonia. During two years as an instructor at the UK’s joint staff college he was responsible for development of campaigning concepts. He was subsequently appointed Assistant Director Land Warfare (Doctrine) responsible for the development of British Army doctrine, including its capstone Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations. In this latter post he also deployed to the Coalition Land Component HQ in Kuwait in 2002-03, where he led a UK/US planning team. He was also responsible for the British Army’s subsequent analysis of the Iraq War. He was a Visiting Fellow of the Changing Character of War programme in 2009/10 and occasionally returns to Oxford, most recently to assist with developing a new funding strategy in November 2011.

The Iraq war: A case-study in British strategic failure

Brigadier Richard Iron, British Army (ret.) will speak on "The Iraq war: A case-study in British strategic failure" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30 PM 3 July 2013.

Lecture Topic:
How do the British, and especially the British Army view the Iraq war? In this lecture, Richard Iron, British Army (ret.) argues the invasion of Iraq in 2003 represents a case of strategic failure.

Drawing on his own experience planning, participating in and later analysing the conflict for the British army, Iron examines the British role in Iraq and what it has meant for the United Kingdom. He draws on his personal experience, such as the retaking of Basra in 2008 to provide insight into how the war was fought.

Finally he will touch on Iraq today, and examine the political, military and economic changes and the US 'legacy' ten years after the conflict.

About the speaker:Brigadier Richard Iron, British Army (ret.)
Richard Iron commanded 1st Battalion of the King’s Own Royal Border Regiment, serving in Bosnia and Macedonia. During two years as an instructor at the UK’s joint staff college he was responsible for development of campaigning concepts. He was subsequently appointed Assistant Director Land Warfare (Doctrine) responsible for the development of British Army doctrine, including its capstone Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations. In this latter post he also deployed to the Coalition Land Component HQ in Kuwait in 2002-03, where he led a UK/US planning team. He was also responsible for the British Army’s subsequent analysis of the Iraq War. He was a Visiting Fellow of the Changing Character of War programme in 2009/10 and occasionally returns to Oxford, most recently to assist with developing a new funding strategy in November 2011.

General John Cantwell on War in Afghanistan

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra,  where retired General John Cantwell is speaking on  Australia’s military involvement in the Gulf and Afghanistan. This is to launch his book   "Exit wounds: one man’s war on terror" (with Greg Bearup). There are around 500 people in the audience, including senior current and former military officers. General Cantwell recommended "The General's regrets: John Cantwell" (Melanie Sim with Alex Sloan, ABC Radio, 27 September, 2012 12:55PM AEST).

The book excerpts and some of the interviews have given a very depressed impression of the General, but he was a lively and entertaining speaker (he should do well on the US speaking circuit). The talk got more serious as he talked about his experience in the first gulf war, when attached to US forces.

The technique used by the US 1st Infantry Division
for the Iraqi breakthrough was to use tanks equipped dozer blades to fill in trenches, burying the enemy troops in them alive. This is a valid and lawful military tactic, but appears to have affected the General deeply. He made the point that as well as being a soldier he is a person and the experience of war takes a toll.

General Cantwell traces his "demons" to this experience and points out that any normal person would naturally be effected. Returning to Australia, the General was one of few in the ADF who had experienced combat. There was little sympathy or understanding of behaviour such as jumping at noises.

I have some understanding for this, after the Canberra 2003 Bushfires. On that day I was at the Belconnen Library when a state of emergency was declared and made my way home seeing water bombing helicopter against a sky which looked like one of the lower levels of hell. Some weeks later thinking I was fine, I went to the library but had an attack of sheer panic when the PA was used to announce the normal closing time. this may sound silly, to anyone who has not had the experience.

General Cantwell explained that he went back to Iraq, despite his condition, as he thought he could make amends for the destruction of the first gulf war. Unfortunately this coincided with more sectarian violence. The General was head of operations in a headquarters much of the time, but receiving detailed graphic reports of the causalities. The situation was made worse by the casual attitude to violence by many involved. He also described in graphic detail witnessing the effects of improvised explosive devices on the civilian population. He described the agony of having to make decisions over the allocation of resources which resulted in deaths.

After his Iraq experience the General wanted to command in Afghanistan. A professional soldier, he explained that this is what soldiers live to do. He explained that he thought he could be "tough", bury his demons and do his job. He described how Australian soldiers went out every day, in the face of casualties.

After twenty years General Cantwell was admitted to hospital to be treated for posttraumatic stress disorder and is still recovering. He explained at question time that those who operate remote pilot-less aircraft (UAVs) and other remote equipment can also be affected by the experience.

One of the privileges, perhaps obligations, of former solders is to point out the cost of war and General Cantwell does that well. However, potential enemies of Australia should not take this as weakness. He does not advocate a rushed withdrawal of Australian forces from Afghanistan and supports those who are ready to step forward to risk wounds, both physical and physiological, to defend their country.

General Cantwell received a standing ovation at the end of his talk, which I have not seen at ANU before.

Public Lecture

Exit wounds: one man’s war on terror by Major-General John Cantwell with Greg Bearup

Canberra Times / ANU Literary Event: Meet the Author Series 2012
Australia has been at war for the past twenty years and yet there has been no stand-out account from these conflicts. The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have constituted major Australian military involvements since the Vietnam War. In the case of Afghanistan, Australia has paid much in blood and treasure. This lecture elucidates Australia’s military involvements in the Gulf and Afghanistan from a practitioner’s perspective. Major-General John Cantwell’s book Exit Wounds is his searing story of the realities of Australia’s recent wars and the enduring scars they leave on our armed forces.
Major-General John Cantwell AO DSC retired from the Australian Army in early 2012 after a unique career spanning almost 40 years. Starting as a 17-year-old Private in 1973, he rose through the ranks in a career that included Commanding Officer of the Royal Military College at Duntroon, Commander of a brigade of around 3,000 troops, the Deputy Chief of the Army, and Head of the Force Structure Review as part of the 2009 Defence White Paper. He was also Interim Head (and later, Chief of Operations) of the Victoria Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority, coordinating all Commonwealth, State and non-government efforts to recover from the deadly Black Saturday fires in 2009.
Major-General Cantwell served in three distinct wars: combat duty in Operation Desert Storm in 1991; as the Director of Strategic Operations in the US-led coalition headquarters in Baghdad in 2006; and as the Commander of all Australian forces in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East area of operations in 2010. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership in action in Afghanistan, has been made a Member of the Order of Australia and an Officer of the Order of Australia, and received the United States Legion of Merit.
Book sales and signings will follow the lecture. 

Presented by The Canberra Times and ANU Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies

General John Cantwell on Afghanistan War

Retired General John Cantwell will speak about  Australia’s military involvement in the Gulf and Afghanistan at the Australian National University in Canberra,  27 September 2012. This is to launch his book   "Exit wounds: one man’s war on terror" (with Greg Bearup). The event is free, but bookings are required.

Public Lecture

Exit wounds: one man’s war on terror by Major-General John Cantwell with Greg Bearup

Canberra Times / ANU Literary Event: Meet the Author Series 2012
Australia has been at war for the past twenty years and yet there has been no stand-out account from these conflicts. The Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have constituted major Australian military involvements since the Vietnam War. In the case of Afghanistan, Australia has paid much in blood and treasure. This lecture elucidates Australia’s military involvements in the Gulf and Afghanistan from a practitioner’s perspective. Major-General John Cantwell’s book Exit Wounds is his searing story of the realities of Australia’s recent wars and the enduring scars they leave on our armed forces.
Major-General John Cantwell AO DSC retired from the Australian Army in early 2012 after a unique career spanning almost 40 years. Starting as a 17-year-old Private in 1973, he rose through the ranks in a career that included Commanding Officer of the Royal Military College at Duntroon, Commander of a brigade of around 3,000 troops, the Deputy Chief of the Army, and Head of the Force Structure Review as part of the 2009 Defence White Paper. He was also Interim Head (and later, Chief of Operations) of the Victoria Bushfire Reconstruction and Recovery Authority, coordinating all Commonwealth, State and non-government efforts to recover from the deadly Black Saturday fires in 2009.
Major-General Cantwell served in three distinct wars: combat duty in Operation Desert Storm in 1991; as the Director of Strategic Operations in the US-led coalition headquarters in Baghdad in 2006; and as the Commander of all Australian forces in Afghanistan and the wider Middle East area of operations in 2010. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his leadership in action in Afghanistan, has been made a Member of the Order of Australia and an Officer of the Order of Australia, and received the United States Legion of Merit.
Book sales and signings will follow the lecture. 

Presented by The Canberra Times and ANU Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies

Financial Analysis of al-Qa'ida in Iraq

An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq" is a fascinating look at the business side of a militant organisation. Financial records of al-Qa'ida for the Anbar province of Iraq were captured. Some of the insights from this were that the militant organisation had a similar structure to the forces opposing them and that the militants were so successful financially from extortion and theft, they could export some surpluses to fund foreign groups. Militant fighters were not well paid for their work, but even so mounting attacks was expensive and the authors suggest that disrupting the finances of militant groups could be an effective way to reduce attacks. A Summary (0.1 MB) and the Full Document (0.8 MB) are avialable.

An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa'ida in Iraq

by Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson, Barbara Sude with Sara Beth Elson, Ghassan Schbley

This monograph analyzes the finances of the militant group al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) in Anbar province during 2005 and 2006, at the peak of the group's power and influence. The authors draw on captured documents that give details on the daily financial transactions of one specific sector within Anbar province and of the financial transactions of the AQI provincial administration. Some of their conclusions are: AQI was a hierarchical organization with decentralized decisionmaking; AQI in Anbar was profitable enough to send substantial revenues out of the province in 2006; AQI relied on extortion, theft, and black market sales to fund its operations in Anbar; AQI needed large, regular revenue sources to fund its operations, but its administrative leaders did not hold much cash on hand. The authors' interpretation of data on compensation practices and participants' risk of death indicates that AQI members were poorly compensated and suggests that they were not motivated primarily by money to join the group. The authors also find that mounting attacks required organizational expenditures well beyond the cost of material used in attacks. One major conclusion is that disrupting AQI's financial flows could disrupt the pace of their attacks.

Document Details

• Copyright: RAND Corporation
• Availability: Available
• Format: Paperback
• Pages: 114 ...
• ISBN/EAN: 9780833050397
• Document Number: MG-1026-OSD
• Year: 2010
• Series: Monographs

Contents

1. Introduction
2. AQI and the Political and Economic Environment in Anbar Province
3. Auditing al-Qa'ida in Iraq
4. The Economics of AQI's Compensation
5. The Flow of Expenditures and the Pace of Attacks
6. Implications

• Appendix A:Anbar Province
• Appendix B: Time Line of Events in Anbar Province

...