Will Australia Defend Taiwan?

Greetings from the ANU Australian Centre on China in the World, where Iain Henry from the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre is speaking on "ANZUS and Taiwan: What are Australia’s obligations?". He went back to the formation of the ANZUS pact, arguing neither Australia or New Zealand wanted to defend Taiwan. The USA argued that an attack on their forces in Japan obliged Australia and NZ to act, but Taiwan was not mentioned.

While an interesting academic argument, I am not sure that the wording of the ANZUS treaty would have much to do with what Australia would do. The only time the treaty has been invoked was by Australia on 14 September 2001, after terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. This was an attack by a non state actor, based outside the Pacific, on the US Atlantic seaboard. If Australia would act similarly over Taiwan would perhaps depend more on the likely reaction of Australian popular opinion, than the wording of the treaty.  

On 24 April Australian PM, Scott Morrison said a Chinese military base at the  Solomon Islands would be a "red line": saying "We won't be having Chinese military naval bases in our region on our doorstep." This is a very serious statement, given the last time a regional power attempted to establish a base around the Solomon Islands was May 1942, resulting in the Battle of the Coral Sea. The USA and Australia met the Japanese Navy, with 13 ships sunk, and more than 1,500 lives lost.

4th Age of War with 3D Printed Pizza Drone Delivered to Battlefield

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Dr Albert Palazzo, Director of War Studies at the Australian Army Research Centre is speaking on "Transition Point: Embracing the 4th Age of War". He started with 3D printing (additive manufacturing), which is already being used to produce replacement parts on-board US warships at sea. A more amusing example was the US Army experimenting with 3D printed pizza drone delivered to the battlefield.

Dr Palazzo then drew a contrast between a traditional trade route map of the world and a data transmission map. Current main routes are trans-Atlantic and he suggests this is where wealth will be created.

Dr Palazzo suggested that we don't know who makes the rules about trans-national data communications. This clearly is not true. There was a well established international governance framework for telecommunications before the Internet. This was supplemented with new bodies and rules with the advent of the Internet. I helped establish this structure and stumbled into one of the meetings of the people who ran the Internet one day in Stockholm.

Dr Palazzo then claimed that AI can't come up with quirky original actions and may result in predictability on the battlefield. My experience is that AI comes up with anticipated results, as it is not possible for the human, even the one who programmed it, to anticipate how the data will interact.

One area not addressed by Dr Palazzo were information warfare and irregular warfare techniques enhanced by the Internet. Examples of this are the use of sophisticated social media by terrorists, high quality videos by the Russian military in Syria and "Little green men" deployed in the Ukraine. Western military forces have had difficulty in countering these due in part to a lack of suitable training and doctrine.

That these new forms of warfare are now here was brought home to me when ANU started offering a course in "Offensive Cyber Security Operations" (COMP3702).

One point I agreed with Dr Palazzo on was that the barriers to entry with some new technologies is low. This just needs engineers.

ps: My nephew, Sam Worthington, is an engineer and just set up Rapid 3d Printing.

UAVs Over the Indian Ocean

The India and China at Sea: Competition and Coexistence in the Indo-Pacific Conference is underway at the ANU in Canberra. The topic of the role of aircraft carriers and submarines came up in the first session so I asked the panel if Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) would render large vessels obsolete, changing the balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

Within the next ten years, I suggest, countries in the region, including China, will be able to mass produce small, long range, low cost drones on the production lines set up for smart-phones and consumer appliances. India will be able to harness its skilled IT workforce to program their own drones manufactured in the new high hi-tech industrial corridors being built with Japanese funding.

These low cost robot aircraft and submarines will make make aircraft carriers and submarines as useful as the battleship HMS Prince of Wales, was for defending Singapore. This powerful ship was commissioned in January 1941, but sunk by aircraft in December 1941, two days after leaving Singapore.

One of the conference panel thought Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles more of a threat than drones. The other panelist pointed out that India is the major customer for Israeli UAVs. With the signing of arms limitations agreements, India will be able to acquire armed UAV technology from Israel.

I suggest UAV/AUV technology, unlike ballistic missiles, is not something easily regulated. At the annual Australian UAV Challenge, teams of hobbyists and students test their technology in the field. In last years challenge, teams had to scan for a survivor on the ground and drop supplies to them. In this years challenge, teams had to coordinate two aircraft, with one acting as an airborne communications relay for the other.

Much of the software developed for the UAV Challenge is open source. It is not difficult to imagine the same software being used for a flock of military UAVs to search the ocean for warships,  relaying the coordinates to a flotilla of armed AUVs. This is something a mid-level country, with IT and engineering graduates could implement.

Conference on India and China in the Indo-Pacific

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where the India and China at Sea: Competition and Coexistence in the Indo-Pacific Conference just opened. This is a welcome change from the events I have attended recently, which have a mid-Atlantic view, that the world revolves around Europe and the USA.

PROGRAM

9.30am Welcome and introduction: Professor Craig Jeffrey, Director and CEO, Australia India Institute.Professor Rory Medcalf, Head, National Security College, Australian National University
9.50am Sino-Indian relations in the Indian Ocean: a contest of status and legitimacy. Dr David Brewster, Senior Research Fellow, National Security College
11.05am Morning tea11.25am China's emerging Indo-Pacific naval strategy:Professor You Ji, University of Macau
12.40pm Lunch
1.40pm New Delhi at Sea:  The China Factor in Indian Ocean Policy under the Modi and Singh governments: Mr Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times
2.55pm Afternoon tea
3.15pm Aspects of India’s evolving naval strategy in the Indian Ocean: Mr Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Ms Darshana Baruah, Carnegie India
4.30pm Conclusion

Role of Asia-Pacific Middle Powers

Yesterday Professor Kim Richard Nossal from Queens University Canada talked on "Asia-Pacific middle powers: cooperation or conflict" at the 

Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, 

College of Asia & the Pacific, Australian National University in Canberra. 

Professor Nossal characterized Canada as a "middle power" and appeared frustrated that the current Canadian government had a lack of interest in the strategic situation in East Asia. He concluded we would have to look elsewhere for a middle power to have an impact on the Asia-Pacific (which appeared directed at Australia).

Dr Andrew Carr suggested we are moving to a neo-medieval or multiplex world order, without a few dominant superpowers. A a result smaller states do not have to pick one side or the other, as they did during the cold war. Interestingly Andrew suggests that military force is becoming less of an assurance of winning a war. He suggests that Asia's middle powers will matter, are strong and able to see to their own defense.

Professor High White suggested that military conflict is more likely while the new world order stabilizes. He pointed out that a lesser power doesn't have to win a war against a greater power, just threaten or cause enough damage for the latter to back off. Professor White asked what great powers would go to war over in Asia today. He suggested that Australia could assist by putting its independent views to the great powers, while building collations. He suggests that Australia could help the USA and China with order in Asia. More worryingly, he suggested that China is testing the USA's resolve in the South China Sea.

Analysis of the 2016 Defence White Paper

Greetings from the Great Hall of the Australian National University in Canberra, what a panel of ANU defence experts are discussing the Australian Government's 2016 Defence Whitepaper. The first speaker suggested that the white-paper had a "status quo" approach showing three concentric circles of influence.  The first of the three zones is strategic denial in the South Pacific. Second is a zone of stability in South East Asia (where Australia's "edge" is rapidly eroding). The third zone is that of "rules", based on overwhelming US power, which the speaker suggests has been upset by a sea denial fulled arms race.

The second speaker suggested distinguishing between what the paper says it is doing and actually does.They agreed with the first speaker that the white-paper assumes only incremental changes are needed to Australian defence policy. The white-paper assumes that the USA will remain the primary power in Asia and uphold Australia's security, despite indications from US Presidential candidates to the contrary.

The third speaker was in support of the white-paper, describing it as comprehensive and its proposals credible, provided they are funded.The white-paper was developed by competent defence professionals (unlike the former Minister for Defence). The speaker suggested that money and geography were important, but a public white-paper cannot be blunt about other nations. China will have internal problems with old, Russian derived military equipment. The speaker suggested "It will soon be time to teach China a lesson". They then listed US military equipment Australia will "soon" have, including the EA-18G Growler, electronic warfare aircraft. It was surprising to hear this blunt warning in a public forum by a person close to parts of the Australian Government. However, it the speaker also cautioned Australia has limited defence capacity and promises of increased defence spending have not been honored in the past. Some of the speaker's position seemed to be lacking in logic. They argued that Australia should be prepared to take military action to defend trade routes in the South China Sea against China, but that does not make a lot of sense if the trade is with China.

The fourth speaker pointed out that a white-paper is not the end of the defence policy process. They also pointed out, as the previous speaker, previous plans have been undermined by budget cuts. The budget does not allow for turning the Australian Army into a marine force for deployment from new Landing Helicopter Dock ships, or for converting them into F-35b aircraft carriers.In contrast 12 submarines and an increased number of maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft. the speaker suggests the key aim in the white-paper is to defend Australia.This is very different to the previous speaker's emphasis on confronting China.

ps: See also "Cyberwar: Hypothetical for Teaching ICT Ethics".

International Security and Cooperation

Greetings from the Australian National University, where  General James "Jim" Mattis (USMC Retired) is speaking on "Dealing with Threats in Tumultuous Times: International Security and Cooperation". General Mattis pointed out that the ANZUS Treaty was envisaged as providing US military assistance to Australia during the cold war, but was first invoked by Australia's PM after the September 11 attacks, with Australian forces the first to assist the USA in Afghanistan.

The general discussed Russian destabilization of Ukraine and ISIS destabilization of Syria and Iraq (although not suggesting Russian involvement in the latter). General Mattis described ISIS as the most successful terrorist group in history, with a territory the size of the UK and a social media presence seductive to young people. He cautioned against assuming ISIS could not win and urged disruption of their recruiting, as they will inspire copy-cat attacks in western countries. He suggested that th western response has been ineffective, not because ISIS have such a good strategy but because the west has a bad strategy. He pointed to Turkey, which had been willing to let ISIS attack the Syrian regime, but it now threatens Turkey itself.

General Mattis described UAE as "little Spata" for its willingness to support US operations in Afghanistan, but a coherent strategy is needed. He criticized US policy of per-announcing withdraw of troops as this aids the enemy and advocating keeping them guessing. General Mattis said allies like Australia were needed by the USA, for more than military contribution. He pointed out that he had good intelligence on a strategic level, but future operations will be more uncertain.

General Mattis noted that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is written to avoid Iran cheating. He suggested that there will be international inspectors, backed up by national intelligence organizations. While the agreement covers nuclear weapons, General Mattis noted this does not cover ballistic missiles or cyber warfare. He suggested that countries of the region will need a coordinated ballistic defense. He suggested that the US 5th Fleet will be vital to keeping sea lanes open for oil.

However, General Mattis had so suggestions to offer to counter Iranian cyber-attack. He characterized Iran as a "crazy group" rather than a country. However, it occurs to me that the USA is the only country to have used nuclear weapons on civilian cities (Hiroshima and Nagasaki), to use a cyber-weapon against a nuclear facility (Natanz nuclear facilities) and shoot down an Iranian civilian airliner (Iran Air Flight 655). Later in answer to a question General Mattis touched on the USA's somewhat tainted image by suggesting that Australia has a role in the Middle East because it is seen to be doing good works.

General Mattis described an exercise by the 5th Fleet to counter mines in the Gulf. This was interesting in that he described how he formulated the exercise, with its military and political objectives, then expressed concern that Iranian commanders would be a destabilizing influence by acting on their own initiative.

In answer to a question about if ISIS was more than a terrorist organization (re "Blood Year:Terror and the Islamic State" by David Kilcullen) General Mattis comments was like Al-Qaeda combined with Hamas on steroids. He suggests that ISIS effect will get worse and cannot be addressed until the new US administration is in place which could form a strong enough international collation. 

Normally in the ANU strategic seminar series I would ask about cyber-warfare, but General Mattis had already addressed that so I asked about the US  pivot to Asia. The General was not positive about this, pointing out that the USA already had significant military forces in Asia and that European and Middle Eastern allies were unsettled by the implication that the USA's attention would be elsewhere. He suggested that the USA should be able to "walk and chew gum" (that is address issues in multiple regions simultaneously) but also does not have to take the military lead everywhere in the world.

On a positive note General Mattis suggested the USA should look to inspiration, rather than intimidation. He gave the example of offering educational scholarships as a way to exercise soft power. He told an anecdote of talking to a captured Iraqi insurgent who wanted to stop fighting and emigrate to the USA. The general suggested that the USA was not fighting the war of ideas in a way they would win. It occurs to me that perhaps the USA needs to dust off some lessons of WW2 and realize that the Disney Corporation is a more effective weapon than anything Boeing has.

Setting Australia's Strategic Direction: Here and Now

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where John Garnaut, former Fairfax China correspondent and speaking to Professor Hugh White about the "Power Shift" to China and what Australia's response should be.

Illustrating one of the short term decisions for Australia,the ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre banner, behind the speakers, has a photo of a Collins Class submarine on it. Australia has to decide what to replace these submarines with. That choice has international political implications, as one option is from Japan. Also there is the issue of what Australia is going to use the largest, longest range,  non-nuclear submarines in the world for (certainly not just to protect the waters around Australia).

John Garnaut asked Professor White if the Chinese government would share power at the international level, when the are not willing to do so internally. Secondly John Garnaut asked if countries in the region would accept Chinese dominance, when so far they have called for US help. Professor White responded that he assumed the Chinese are "normal" and will "strive for leadership" as the British and Spartans did previously.

Professor White argued that the Chinese would have a sense of grievance about what was done to them by great powers from the Opium wars onwards. he commented that Japan was the only economically powerful country in history not to strive for a dominant global position.

Professor White also argued that China could not be trusted to keep a global agreement, unless there were severe sanctions for non-compliance. He pointed out that this is no different to previous European powers which have abrogated when it suited them.

Professor White suggested that Asian countries (and Australia) want the USA to balance Chinese power in Asia, but the USA wants primacy. However, it occurs to me that the USA may not be able to afford the economic cost of stationing military forces in Asia.

Professor White pointed out that while Australia wants t support the USA, it does not want to be explicitly seen as militarily opposing China (with PM Abbot quick to dismiss basing US strategic bombers in Australia). However, I suggest this is more a matter of public relations. Australia will not have US bases, but will have Australian bases with a significant US presence. US strategic bombers are likely to take part in exercises in Australia.

John Garnaut arges that China has not fought a "serious" war since the Korean War and is there primarily for internal security. He also argues that divisions within the Chinese military reduce its effectiveness. However, I suggest China has had several large border incidents. Also China does not have to make use of its military force for it to have an effect. In particular, the British and US Navies have shown how effective a blue-water navy is for applying diplomatic pressure. The PLAN are rapidly learning these lessons. It should be noted that in WW2, it was the Australian Army which developed some of the doctrine which the US Marines then adopted.

Professor White argues that the US Navy has no recent experience of high intensity war. Therefore the Chinese Navy's lack of experience is not so significant. The discussion then turned to the capability of the Chinese Navy to sink US aircraft carriers. However, I suggest Professor White may not be placing enough weight on the development of smaller, lower cost, non-nuclear aircraft carriers. The USA can afford to operate only a small number of large nuclear aircraft carriers.

Once China works out how to build and operate an aircraft carrier, it would be able to mass produce them, at low cost using its commercial shipbuilding industry. However, China might choose to produce cheaper, smaller and more flexible Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships. These look like aircraft carriers and so have the same public relations value. Although China lacks VSTOL aircraft to equip these ships, they could operate attack helicopters in the near term and armed UAVs in the future.

Professor White suggested a nuclear armed Japan might have a stabilizing effect. In response I asked of cyber-warfare might have a de-stabalising effect. What I had in mind was that countries would not know for certain who is attacking them and this might create an "On-The-Beach" scenario, releasing cyber weapons which do not have a decisive or focused effect and cause global collateral damage. Professor White was skeptical of the effectiveness of cyber-weapons.

Vietnam and the South China Sea Disputes

Greetings from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University where Thanh Hai Do is speaking on "Vietnam and the South China Sea Disputes". The first question he asked was why so little progress has been made on this territorial dispute compared to others. He pointed to Vietnam's ambivalent strategic posture, wanting to assert their claims, but not upset China. Vietnam is hedging by normalizing relations with the USA, joining ASEAN and working with oil companies. Interestingly one company Veitnam is working with is Russia's Gazprom. Thanh Hai Do's 2009 paper "Vietnam’s evolving claims in the South China Sea" is also available.

It seems to me that if Vietnam can agree a common position with other countries in the region there is the possibility of negotiating with China. Countries around the South China Sea probably do not want to have to be seen to be aligned with China or the USA in a great power dispute.

Last night in the presentation "A Small Navy in a Great War: Australians at sea, 1914-18" Dr David Stevens pointed out how the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)  played a key role in South East Asia during WW1. He argued that the RAN was seen as separate from the Royal Navy and so was seen separate, to some extent, from the great powers involved in the European conflict. Australia was able to play this role as in the years before WW1 it developed a small but powerful navy. This is detailed in his book "All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World War One".

The RAN is now developing a significant surface force of Amphibious Assault Ships, upgraded ANZAC class frigates, and Hobart class destroyers. These might be called on to play a role in the South China Sea, being more acceptable to all the parties involved than the presence of the US 7th Fleet. One way to make this more credible would be for Australia to modify its order for F-35A aircraft and take early delivery of a small number of F-35B aircraft to operate from HMAS Canberra.

ABSTRACT
Over the last few years, academic and public inquiry into the South China Sea disputes has increased significantly as tensions in this region have flared up without any signs of abating. However, much of the attention has naturally focused on a rising China, which is the most powerful claimant in the dispute and the potential disrupter of the regional order. Other smaller claimants have been largely overlooked, or have been studied within the context of China’s policy. This imbalance in the literature has the potential to distort the cycle of the actions and reactions which have shaped the dynamics of the disputes.
This research, which offers the view from a smaller claimant but a key rival to China, seeks to address this gap in the current discourse on South China Sea politics. Specifically, it will draw on a wide range of primary and secondary sources to trace and account for continuity and changes in Vietnam’s approach to its disputes in the South China Sea with an emphasis on the period between 1991 and 2011. It is argued that in this period, Vietnam oscillated between bandwagoning and hedging strategies to respond to China’s rising power and assertiveness in the maritime domain.
The study, which presents the case of Vietnam in the South China Sea, examines the way in which Vietnam has managed its relations with China. It offers a critical evaluation of the realist school in international relations about how a medium-sized state responds to a power transition in the region. Though the case of Vietnam is unique, it is indicative of how regional countries react to shifts in power relations and to changes in China’s foreign and security posture.
Thanh Hai Do is a PhD Candidate in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He is a recipient of the Prime Minister’s Australia Asia Award, and has commenced his doctoral studies in Australia in July 2011. Prior to this academic endeavour, Thanh Hai worked as a research fellow at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

Asia Pacific Security and the USA

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Andrew Hurrell, University of Oxford, is speaking on "Global Order after U.S. Hegemony: Challenges for Asia and the Pacific". Professor Hurrell, suggested the greatest challenge for scholars was to conceive what might be a new world order where the USA and other western countries are not dominant. He briefly mentioned concerns such as cyberwar.

Professor Hurrell, discussed how previous assumptions that there would be a stable world order had been overthrown and there would instead be continuing "Westphalian" challenges. Not being a historian, I am not sure what this implies. But it seems to me clear that as US and western economic dominance declines, their global power will also decline. As an example, Australia has decided to join the China backed "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank", against the wishes of the USA.

China has progressed slowly to have a blue water navy. It may take another decade before it can mass produce aircraft carriers and perhaps even longer to produce aircraft for them. However, Professor Hurrell pointed out there are other forms of power projection. When in Samoa some years ago to teach a course, I noticed that China has given the country an impressive government building. More humorously, the locally employed guard outside the US Peace Corps compound was wearing a People's Liberation Army cap (I assume he got it cheap in the local market). 

Professor Hurrell claimed that domestic politics would become more important in the future, so that national dominance by China and India will be less significant. This sounded to me like someone from an English university hoping for a return to an era when the British Empire would manipulate the internal politics of Asia for its own ends. I suggest the opposite is more likely. At the moment a rag tag non-state group such as ISIS is able to manipulate domestic politics in Australia by the use of Internet based propaganda.

Professor Hurrell had published numerous papers and his latest book is "On Global Order: Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society" 2008). He is also giving seminar on "Global Governance: Can the Centre Hold?"
at ANU on Wednesday afternoon.

Japan’s Ocean Surveillance of Chinese Submarines

All 162 pages of the book "The Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities" (Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, ANU Press, 2015), are available free on-line. The book details the undersea and electronic intelligence systems run by Japan and the USA to detect Chinese military activities, particularly submarines. The authors suggest that wile effective this network is vulnerable to attack, leading to possible military escalation and use of nuclear weapons.

However, what the authors do not discuss is ways in which surveillance networks can be made less vulnerable with technological developments. Japan's manned coastal surveillance stations are, by their nature, prominently located along the coast and so vulnerable to attack. However, electronic surveillance can now be undertaken by miniaturized equipment operated by remote control, making it far less visible and vulnerable.

Table of Contents for The Tools of Owatatsumi:

• Preliminary pages
• Frontispiece
• Plates
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and Abbreviations

1. Introduction
2. Post-Cold War Intrusions into Japanese Waters
3. The JMSDF’s Ocean Surveillance Architecture
4. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)
5. The Organisation of the JMSDF: The High Command, Fleet Bases and Regional Districts
6. Japanese Undersea Surveillance Systems, 1920–45
7. Technical Developments since 1945
8. US SOSUS Stations
9. JMSDF ELINT/Undersea Surveillance Stations
10. Airborne Ocean Surveillance
11. JMSDF SIGINT Collection and Ocean Surveillance Ships
12. The US Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS)
13. The Maritime Safety Agency (MSA)/ Japan Coast Guard (JCG)
14. Assessment of Japan’s Ocean Surveillance Capabilities

• Bibliography

From: Ball, Desmond & Tanter, Richard, (author.) (2015). The tools of Owatatsumi : Japan's ocean surveillance and coastal defence capabilities. Canberra ACT ANU Press. Retrieved from http://press.anu.edu.au/titles/the-tools-of-owatatsumi/

War-fighting by Supporting Insurgents

Greetings from the Australian National University Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, where Lieutenant Colonel Ken Gleiman, US Pacific Command/Visiting Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, is speaking on "The American Counterculture of War: Supporting foreign insurgents and the American discourse of war". LTCOL Gleiman emphasized that he was speaking as an individual scholar. He outlined the USA's history of involvement with insurgencies, arguing that while the USA started as an insurgency (backed by the French government against the British), the US government early on passed laws against its private citizens fighting abroad (although many citizens supported revolutionary movements). LTCOL Gleiman pointed out the term "filibuster" was used to describe a US citizen fighting in a foreign war.  Apart from philosophical objections, most such foreign adventures failed in their military objectives. Despite the law, and lack of success of the ventures, ordinary citizens and US military offices were tolerated and even supported by the US public and some government officials.

Moving on to the last century, LTCOL Gleiman claimed that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the first US government organization authorized to support resistance movements, as late as 1942 in WW2. The OSS' methods were opposed by the US military (and of questionable operational value). The OSS was disestablished after WW2, but quickly replaced with the CIA to oppose communism by supporting insurgent groups around the world. The success of such operations was limited (apart from recently in Afghanistan). As with the OSS, the CIA's methods were not supported by the military.

LTCOL Gleiman contrasted the forms of insurgency the CIA supported with the popular revolutions which overthrew governments in Eastern Europe.

LTCOL Gleiman ended with a diagram from "The Economist" entitled "Traps for Washington", showing the complex interrelationships in conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Egypt.

LTCOL Gleiman suggested that Principal Agency Theory could be applied to supporting insurgents.

This presentation was very useful for putting current conflicts in places such as Ukraine and Syria in perspective.

Prospect of armed conflict in the South China Sea

Professor Leszek Buszynski, Dr Andrew Carr and Thanh Hai Do will discuss "Prospects and perspectives on the South China Sea Dispute", at the Australian National National University in Canberra, 4pm, 7 April 2015.

Prospects of armed conflict over the South China Sea maritime dispute are more real than ever as regional tension has escalated to dangerous levels in recent years. The dispute affects not only the claimants involved, but also peace and security in the wider region. Hugh White estimates that it could turn into 'the biggest war for many decades, and possibly the biggest since the Second World War'. As such, it is important to be aware of its significance from a range of perspectives.
With this in mind, the ANU ASEAN Society invites you to join us in our first public lecture of the year - 'Prospects and Perspectives on the South China Sea Dispute'. We have invited three distinguished speakers who will help you gain greater understanding of dispute from the perspectives of some key actors including ASEAN, Vietnam, Australia and the US. The speakers are:
• Professor Leszek Buszynski - Lecturer at the National Security College. He has done research on the South China Sea for more than twenty years and is currently engaged in a project on the South China Sea and Australia's Regional Security Environment.
• Dr Andrew Carr - Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. His latest book Winning the Peace, Australia’s Campaigns to Change the Asia-Pacific examines how Australia has influenced Asia's security and economic order.
• Thanh Hai Do - PhD Candidate at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs. His thesis seeks to account for Vietnam's approach to claims in the South China Sea. Thanh Hai was Deputy Director of the Centre for Political and Security Studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, a think-tank affiliated to the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.

The lecture will consist of presentations followed by a panel discussion during which you will be able to pose questions to our speakers.

There will be opportunity to interact with the speakers following the presentations.
Light refreshments will be provided.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Greetings from the Great Hall of the Australian National University in Canberra, where Ms Rose Gottemoeller, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is speaking on "Stemming the Nuclear Tide: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 45". She has written on and been cited about "Nuclear Nonproliferation". Ms  Gottemoeller pointed out that it is the 40th anniversary of the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Under current agreements Russia and the US will cut the the number of nuclear weapons to 1,550 by 2018. Ms  Gottemoeller credited Australia for putting in place the framework which allowed chemical weapons to be removed from Syria.

While reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons is a good thing, it occurs to me that those held by major powers are probably the least dangerous as they are unlikely to be used. A few weapons in the hands of small unstable states are far more likely to be used.

Also nations need to consider the control of new weapons which could make the risk of nuclear war more likely. In particular cyber-warfare has the potential to destabilize current international procedures to reduce tension. In addition the conventional arms race with submarines and amphibious warfare ships has the potential to increase the risk of war.

Climate Change and War

Dr Albert Palazzo, Director of Research in Strategic Plans - Australian Army Headquarters, will speak on "Climate Change and the Future Character of War", at the Australian National University, 6pm, 10 February, 2015. Also on this topic Dr Palazzo has written "Climate change, migration and the importance of the international order" (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 14 May 2014):

"The replacement of the existing world order will have implications for a planet affected by climate change. Without a functioning safety valve, conflict between and within states will become more frequent and more vicious. As the deficit between resource requirement and availability widens, peoples who see their futures in terms of survival will be more prone to move in order to provide for their needs. As the support of the international community lessens, the destabilisation of weak states will become more prevalent and some areas of the world will sink into turmoil and chaos."

Defence Diplomacy: Is the game worth the candle?

Greetings from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University where three distinguished speakers are addressing the question: "Defence Diplomacy: Is the game worth the candle?". Professor Hugh White began by pointing out that the British Fleet visited their German counterparts short before the outbreak of World War One. This defence diplomacy did not prevent war. He argued the idea of using the military for diplomacy in peacetime is appealing. This may work at the tactical level, but not higher. Military officers from different nations can more easily work together if they know each other. But Professor White argued that military officers are not highly enough placed for the most important diplomacy.

In contrast Dr John Blaxland argued that 2014 is not like 1918 and that in South East Asia a military uniform opens doors. This was based in aprt on his experience as Australia’s Defence Attaché to Thailand and Burma from 2008-2010. He expressed concern that the Australian Defense Force had been concentrating in the last few years on operations in the middle east and Afghanistan.



Peter Leahy ex-Chief of Army, described how Peter Cosgrove, then military commander talked his way into East Timor as leader of INTERFET. Australia's relationship with Indonesia was strained by the East Timor intervention, be renewed by Australia's assistance for the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. Peter Leahy jokingly emphasized the need for diplomats in the Asian region to play golf and sing karaoke with their counterparts. Australia's new Landing Helicopter Dock Ships (LHD) were nominated by Peter Leahy as a useful for disaster relief and therefore diplomacy. In my view the primary purpose of the LHDs, for amphibious assault, will not be lost on military personnel of the region. The likely result is that military in the region will scramble to acquire a similar capability and also the means to combat it, using submarines. The ability to equip conventional submarines with lithium iron battery technology derived from electric vehicles, increasing their underwater range by five to ten times, is likely to result in a new arms race (in my view).

Professor Nick Bisley pointed put he was the only speaker who had not served in the military or Defense bureaucracy. He noted that Defence Diplomacy where military provides material aid can provide more short term tangible results than high level diplomatic discussions. However, Professor Bisley suggested that this form of diplomacy has only a limited role.

At question time Peter Leahy expressed concern about Australian military officers and units being embedded in allied forces could become too closely enmeshed in the military operations of that country. One of the audience commented that Australian military attaches were assumed to be spies by other nations. Another question was on how much the military could do in the absence of clear national strategic direction. The New Colombo Plan was nominated as a useful form of soft diplomacy (or the "Reverse Colombo Plan" as as Professor White called it).

This was a fascinating discussion of the issues and a much more comfortable one than the previous frightening previous seminar on Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons in Sino-Japanese War. 

Papers are available:

• Time for a stocktake, Brendan Taylor
• Defending defence diplomacy, John Blaxland
• Grand expectations, little promise, Hugh White
• The possibilities and limits of defence diplomacy in Asia, Nick Bisley
• Military diplomacy, Peter Leahy
• Digging in its backyard: Why Australia should deepen engagement with Southeast Asia, See Seng Tan

Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons in Sino-Japanese War

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball are speaking on the alarming topic of "Escalation in the East China Sea: A Political and Military Possibility". Their thesis is that a dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea could result in a way which draws in the USA. A lack of crisis management and China’s command and control system's vulnerability could result in their use of nuclear weapons. Professor Ball stated that the USA had plans for "limited" use of nuclear weapons against China, including in a conventional war between China and Japan. Attacks on US undersea surveillance systems around China, some of which are collocated with Japanese facilities may also provoke a nuclear response on Chinese mainland bases. Knowing this China would then be tempted to make a preemptive nuclear strike. One area for concern is that the PLAN (Cihinese Navy) may become overconfident in its abilities.

Executive Summary:

• Political competition and a lack of crisis management mechanisms could make it very hard for China and Japan to resist escalatory pressures in the very plausible event of a minor armed clash in the East China Sea.
• Japan’s reluctance to use force may be less extensive than some assume and its connections to US strategy and C4SIR systems increase the prospect of early American participation.
• Command and control vulnerabilities could mean serious pre-emption pressures if Beijing thought a larger conflict was possible. American attacks on the PLA’s conventional war-fighting systems could create perverse incentives for China to use its nuclear weapons early while it was still confident in its physical ability to do so.

This would suggest some obvious actions:

• Crisis management mechanisms including a secure political hot-line and military to military communication channels which are regularly tested. Military personnel should visit each other, observe exercises and attend training courses.
• The USA could ensure it has a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (C4SIR) which can operate separately from that of Japan. Japan could harden its system.
• China could make clear it has a robust C4SIR. China's deployment of military forces world wide recently may be in part to send such a message to potential enemies. This could include conducting exercises which the media and other nations military leaders are invited to attend. China could improve its C4SIR using its considerable commercial ICT industry capability and workforce.

Ayson and Ball recommend:

1. Australian planners should assume that China and Japan may not be able to continue avoiding minor hostilities over their conflicting East China Sea claims.

2. Australian planners should also assume that initial hostilities between Japan and China could easily escalate into a much more serious conflict, potentially involving the United States and possibly crossing the nuclear threshold.

3. Australian policymakers and decision-makers should encourage their Chinese and Japanese counterparts to treat the Sino-Japanese relationship as an adverse partnership involving common as well as competing interests.

All of this is worrying for Australia as a close partner of the USA and Japan. I suggest Australian could go further and help directly with some of the risk reduction measures, especially where China and Japan could not be seen to be doing this directly. Australia could provide some channels for communication in a crisis. If Australian politicians and military commanders know their Chinese and Japanese counterparts and have secure and robust technical communications with them, they could help defuse a crisis.

Use of Nuclear Weapons Possible in Sino-Japanese War

Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball will speak on "Escalation in the East China Sea: A Political and Military Possibility" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 5:30pm, 11 November 2014.

Event Details

Presented by the Strategic & Defence Studies Centre
Even if the leaders of China and Japan can lessen the significant political tensions between North Asia’s two biggest powers, the East China Sea dispute could still spark a bilateral war which might also bring in the United States. A recent spate of near misses shows that a minor armed clash is eminently possible. Nationalist sentiment and the lack of crisis management mechanisms could make restraint difficult once this occurs. Japan’s reluctance to use force may be less extensive than some assume and its connections to US strategy and C4SIR systems increase the prospects of early American participation. China’s command and control vulnerabilities could create serious pre-emption pressures if Beijing thought a larger conflict was possible. Moreover American attacks on China’s C4SIR systems and its conventional maritime and missile forces might create perverse incentives for China to use its nuclear weapons early while it was still confident in its physical ability to do so.

Australian defence planners should not assume that China and Japan are going to be able to keep their tense relationship in the East China Sea below the threshold of armed violence. Neither should they assume that China, Japan, and the United States will find it easy to avoid a very serious escalation once minor hostilities have occurred. This seminar presentation marks the launch of a new SDSC Centre of Gravity paper by Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball entitled "Escalation in North Asia: A Strategic Challenge for Australia", based on their forthcoming Survival article "Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?".

Origins of the First World War

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Gary Sheffield, University of Wolverhampton, is speaking on "Not sleepwalking: The origins of the First World War revisited". He is taking to task  Christopher Clark author of "The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914" for the view that nations stumbled into WW1.

Professor Sheffield is the author of numerous war history books. He suggested the idea of WW1 happening by accident is part of a current disillusionment with the effectiveness of the use of military force and not a reading of the history of the early 20th century. In contrast he argues that WW1 was caused by contrast Germany and Austria.

These issues are not just a matter of historical interest. Australia currently has military forces in the middle east and the Prime Minister of Australia has accused Russia of being complicit in the murder of 28 Australians and threatened to physically assault the President of Russia. Wars have been started over smaller incidents.

Official History of Australian Security Intelligence Organisation

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor David Horner is talking on writing of "Spy Catchers: Official History of ASIO 1949-1963". He explained that this was the result of a government tender, but the book was written independently by university scholars and able to include the names of former ASIO officers (with their permission). Two more volumes are in production, the last to be released in 2015.

The release of the history is timely with the issue of national security and political freedom being publicly debated. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) was set up to combat the threat of soviet communism (specifically spying on UK and Australian government revealed by the Venona project). However, ASIO assumed that anyone with communist political views was a threat to national security. This has resulted in some amusing reading with the release of ASIO files on now respectable citizens who held radical (bit mostly harmless) political views during their university student days.

There were real communist spies in government agencies and for senior members of the Australian Labour Party (ALP). As Professor Horner pointed out, the exposure of these spies were seen by some in the ALP as politically motived and poisoned the relationship between ASIO and the ALP for decades.

At question time one of the audience explained that their father was a Russian spy  who worked in the Australian government and was ordered by the KGB to undermine the Australian war effort during WW2, when the USSR was allied with Germany. The questioner then asked if the psychopathology of those who take up causes such as spies should be a matter for medical research, not intelligence.

Professor Horner commented that some former ASIO agents were reluctant to be named in the books, but after hearing their collogues would be mentioned also wanted to be mentioned.

Professor Horner  said that two mistakes which ASIO made were to investigate every communist (however irrelivant) and to exceed their authority by taking direct action. ASIO's job was (and is) to collect information which is then acted on by government and the police force.

ps: ANU has also been recently used as the set for the ABC TV series "The Code" and a fictional "Cyber Crime Unit".