Information Warfare Division Video

FOR THE WARFIGHTER

The Information Warfare Division (IWD) of the Australian Department of Defence has a snappy new video on the "new and emerging threats in the digital world", to promote Information Warfare jobs in the Australian Defence Force. But this may make people think the threat is from little green men crawling up our data cables. ;-)

Australia Declares Cyberwar

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and Australian Computer Society (ACS) today released a national cyberwarfare deterrence policy paper (Painter, 2018). The policy advocates unilateral reciprocity for cyber-attacks on Australia.

The report quotes Australia’s International Cyber Engagement Strategy:

"[h]aving established a firm foundation of international law and norms, the international community must now ensure there are effective consequences for those who act contrary to this consensus."

However, the Painter doctrine is more in line with the US strategy of promising "swift and costly consequences", saying:

"... every country has the right to act to defend itself, but, if possible, acting together, with each country leveraging its capabilities as appropriate, is better. Collective action doesn’t require any particular organised group ...". 

The Australian Public Service Commission (APSC) has issued a draft learning design standard, detailing the knowledge required for government cyber security specialists. Civilian specialists working for government may well find themselves involved in offensive operations. The ANU offers a course in Cyber Offensive Security Operations as part of a Master of Cyber Security, Strategy and Risk Management. To address the ethical issues with being involved in such operations I have run students through a hypothetical on Cyberwar over the South China Sea.

Reference

Deterrence in cyberspace - Spare the costs, spoil the bad state actor: Deterrence in cyberspace requires consequences, Chris Painter, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 1 June 2018.

Cyber-enabled Information Warfare in Canberra

Dr Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar, Stanford University, will speak on "Cyber-enabled information warfare and the end of the Enlightenment" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 12:30 pm 5 December 2017. His "On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and Manipulation" with Jackie Kerr is to be published in the Oxford Handbook of Cybersecurity (2018).

"The West has no peer competitors in conventional military power. But its adversaries are increasingly turning to asymmetric methods for engaging in conflict. In this public seminar, Dr Herb Lin will address cyber-enabled information warfare (CEIW) as a form of conflict or confrontation to which the Western democracies are particularly vulnerable. 

CEIW applies the features of modern information and communications technology to age-old techniques of propaganda, deception, and chaos production to confuse, mislead, and perhaps to influence the choices and decisions that the adversary makes. A recent example of CEIW can be seen in the Russian hacks on the US presidential election in 2016. CEIW is a hostile activity, or at least an activity that is conducted between two parties whose interests are not well-aligned, but it does not constitute warfare in the sense that international law or domestic institutions construe it. Some approaches to counter CEIW show some promise of having some modest but valuable defensive effect. If better solutions for countering CEIW waged against free and democratic societies are not forthcoming, societal discourse will no longer be grounded in reason and objective reality – an outcome that can fairly be called the end of the Enlightenment."

Australian Joint Cyber Reserve Force

Tom Worthington
on USS Blue Ridge

The Australian government is reported to be considering "Cyber commandos for defence reserve" modeled on those of the UK (Ellen Whinnett, Newscorp, 16 August 2017). The UK Joint Cyber Reserve Force. was stood up in May 2013 and I suggested Australia do some thing similar in August 2013.

These reservists would be similar to medical specialists who can apply their civilian skills in the military. This allows the military to use personnel who they could not afford to train and retain full time. It also provides a link between those running critical national infrastructure in the civilian sector and the government organizations tasked to protect it.

As I see it, members of the Cyber Reserve Force should be issued with secure communications equipment which they keep with them during their civilian job. The members would be in constant contact about threats and ready to act on them within minutes. This contrasts with a conventional reserve, where it takes days, weeks, or months for activation.

Australian Defence Force Information Warfare Division

An Information Warfare Division (IWD), has just been formed in Australian Defence Force Headquarters (July 2017). There are four branches: Information Warfare Capability, C4 and Battle Management Capability, Capability Support Directorate and the Joint Cyber Unit. The division is headed by MAJGEN Marcus Thompson as Deputy Chief Information Warfare. MAJGEN Thompson has a PhD in Cyber Security from the University of New South Wales. He is the author of "The cyber threat to Australia" . (Australian Defence Force Journal, 2012) and other papers on cyber security.

The ABC has speculated that one target for the new unit will be the Chinese South Sea Fleet, in the South China Sea.

It happens I have been teaching Australian National University IT students using a scenario about cyber-warfare over the South China Sea. In this hypothetical, students are asked to consider the use of information warfare as an alternative to conventional military action.

 As the ABC report notes, one of the problems with a cyber-warfare unit will be attracting, retaining and paying highly skilled personnel in competition with the private sector. An option I proposed in 2013 was the use of civilian computer professionals who are military reserve officers. After brief military training these personnel would return to their day jobs, but be ready to be instantly mobilized.

Cyberwar: The Most Hideous Form of Warfare of the 21st Century

Greetings from the great hall of the Australian National University in Canberra, where Dr Mohammad Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Kuwait is speaking on "Regional Security in a Turbulent World: A GCC Perspective". Dr Al-Sabah referred to cyber-warfare as "The most hideous form of warfare of the 21st Century". Dr Al-Sabah pointed out how terrorist groups were now very well versed in the use of the Internet.

However, in my view, there is nothing in the nature of cyber-warfare which makes it worse than the use of conventional weapons and certainly not in the same category as chemical weapons. In teaching ethics to computer students at the ANU I used a Hypothetical on Cyberwar as an example. As with other weapons, the users of cyber-weapons should be judged by the effect intended.

RAND Report on Cyber War with China

In the RAND report "War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable" Gompert, Cevallos and  Garafola assume a regional conventional war, using ships, submarines, aircraft, spacecraft and also cyber-war. RAND is a US based think tank, which also has a Canberra Office.

The authors suggest that "Escalating cyberwarfare, while injurious to both sides, could worsen China’s economic problems and impede the government’s ability to control a restive population." (p. xiv). Also that "We also assume that China would not attack the U.S. homeland, except via cyberspace, given China’s minimal capability to do so with conventional weapons." (p. 11) and:

"In the future, cyberwarfare against military, dual-purpose, and civilian systems could figure importantly in a severely intense war. ... Whether with kinetic or nonkinetic (namely, cyber) weapons, the highest targeting priority for China would be U.S. strike platforms, bases, and force concentrations in the region." (p. 19). 

Also the report warns that cyber-attacks could escalate to nuclear war:

"... it is important for the United States to be aware of potentially dangerous ambiguities involved in attacks on targets that the Chinese could regard as strategic: attacks on missile launchers, even if intended only to degrade China’s theater-range missile capabilities; attacks on high-level military C2, even if intended only to degrade China’s conventional-operational capabilities; cyberwarfare attacks on strategic systems;" (p. 30)

The report warns of the cost of cyberwar and the difficulty of preventing it harming civilian systems which support military operations:

"Would both countries not be tempted to crash telecommunications or air-traffic control or energy-distribution systems that support fighting, or interfere with government-service networks?" (p. 49)

What this report fails to address is the effect of deliberate attack and collateral damage on other countries. Cyber-attacks are difficult to confine to one geographic area and will likely effect interconnected international systems and national and local ones well away from the conflict. In addition both sides may well make use of cyber-attacks on third countries, as a way to send a low risk political signal.

Australian Government Needs a Planned Response to Cyber Attack

The security of government information systems is the responsibility of government ministers, not IBM or the ABS. What should be of concern is not just that there was a successful denial of service attack on the Australian Census, but the apparent lack of a planned and practiced response from the relevant government ministers and their staff. Had this been a more serious attack, such as one on critical infrastructure threating lives, the poor performance by ministerial level of government could have been disastrous.

At the senior levels of government there need to be plans in place for who says what and when. These plans need to be tested in exercises, just as is done for natural disaster planning, which Australian state and local governments do well. Internet Australia (IA) members are discussing what form of submission to make to the likely Parliamentary inquiries into this matter. I suggest the Australian Computer Society (ACS) join with IA on this and try to widen the discussion to cover Internet security more generally. ACS and IA need not agree on every aspect, buy could loosely coordinate, as was done for the Internet regulation inquiries of the 1990s, as  described by Chen (2000, p. 161).

Reference

Chen, P. J. (2000). Australia's online censorship regime: the Advocacy Coalition Framework and governance compared. Retrieved from
https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/38780/65881_00000240_01_AOCR.pdf?sequence=1#page=162

Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons

Dr Andrew Futter, University of Leicester,is  speaking on "Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy" at the Australian National University in Canberra. Dr Futter argues that the Internet amplifies the risks with nuclear weapons. The scenario in the film "War Games" is more possible. He commented that the 2012 Glogal Zero US Nuclear Policy Commission Report raised more questions than it answered.

Dr Futter pointed out that nuclear weapons are inherently vulnerable, as they must be ready for use at any time, while also being under central control. One example was a training tape loaded into a US system which made the operators believe there was a real alert. Dr Futter commented that with a more on-line system it will be harder to detect such errors.

Dr Futter suggested that non-state actors were more likely to mount a cyber-attack to cause an un-commanded launch of a nuclear attack, a state actor was more likely to try to disable an opponents weapons. It seems to me that the risk with a state sponsored attack would be so high that this is unlikely to be attempted, expect by a "rogue" state. A more likely scenario is an attack on conventional command and control systems would disable nuclear weapons as a side-effect.

Dr Futter also included hacking of an Israel Defense Force Twitter account to spread false information about a nuclear accident. He also pointed out that an attack does not need to be on the weapons system: disabling the sewage system on a submarine will disable it as a weapon.

Dr Futter then discussed the different nature of cyber and nuclear weapons and the feasibility of responding to a cyber attack with a nuclear weapon. It occurs to me that cyber weapons are more like biological and chemical weapons: they are unpredictable in their effectiveness, may harm the attacker more than the attacked. On the one hand a cyber attack is deniable, on the other its source may be detected but then have little effect, resulting in a large political damage for no military value.

Dr Futter commented that he hoped Nuclear Weapons Officers did not freely discuss their jobs on-line. This got a laugh from the audience, but a search of Facebook for "Nuclear Weapons Officer" resulted in several hits and more than one hundred listed on LinkedIn.

Dr Futter recommended Ghost fleet : a novel of the next world war by P.W. Singer and August Cole, as a fictional but perhaps prescient view of the future, where the only military equipment working is pre-Internet-of-Things. Also one of the audience members, Adam Henschke, mentioned his book (edited with Fritz Allhoff) "Binary bullets : the ethics of cyberwarfare" (I ran the ANU IT students through a hypothetical on the ethics of cyberwarfare over the South China Sea last semester).

Cyber Threats to Nuclear Weapons

Dr Andrew Futter, University of Leicester, will speak on "Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy" at the Australian National University in Canberra, 3pm 11 July 2016. 

"The development and spread of cyber ‘weapons’, information-warfare capabilities and the new dynamics of the ‘cyber age’ are providing a considerable – albeit nuanced – challenge to the management, thinking and strategy that underpins nuclear weapons. Although, in the near future at least, cyber-attacks will not supersede nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security, the tools and capabilities associated with cyber present new problems that affect the nuclear weapons enterprise in numerous ways."

See also:

• Australian Cyber Security Courses 

Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy

Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, today released a 67 page document entitled "Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy: Enabling innovation, growth & prosperity". The government will create a new position of Special Adviser on Cyber Security. The report says that cyber security governance will be streamlined and "clearly identify lead responsibilities", but unfortunately does not state these, clearly or otherwise. Also the Australian Cyber Security Centre will be moved from the ASIO building to a location most likely elsewhere in Canberra. There is also mention of research being commissioned on cyber security, but no funding.

The document provides a good overview of the problem of cyber-security and shows the authors had an understanding of the issues, but does not provide any actionable solutions. The report ends with what is titled an "Action Plan", but this does not have any firm deadlines nor resource allocation, so it is not really an action plan.

ps: As an example of one challenge see "Cyberwar over the South China Sea".

Cyberwar Preparations in Australian Defence White Paper 2016

The Australian Government issues a 2016 Defence White Paper  (25 February 2017). As well as big ticket items, such as twelve of the largest conventional submarines in the world, there is provision for cyber-security. The government proposes  800 new jobs in intelligence, space and cyber security. If well trained these personnel will have more military impact than the 12 new submarines. It happens that earlier in the week I prepared a "Hypothetical on Cyberwar Over the South China Sea" for teaching this workforce.

"New and complex non-geographic security threats in cyberspace and space will be an important part of our future security environment. The cyber threat to Australia is growing. Cyber attacks are a real and present threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability as well as to other government agencies and other sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure." (Page 17).

"2.5 Cyber attacks are a direct threat to the ADF’s warfighting ability given its reliance on information networks. State and non-state actors now have ready access to highly capable and technologically advanced tools to target others through internet-connected systems and we are seeing greater use of offensive cyber operations. This trend is likely to continue." (Page 53)

"2.51     Cyber threats also have impacts well beyond Defence, with the potential to attack other Australian government agencies, all sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure and, in the case of state actors, conduct state-based espionage including against Australian defence industry. The Australian Signals Directorate detected over 1,200 cyber security incidents in 2015, including attacks on government agencies and non-government sectors. Australian defence industry was one of the key non-government sectors targeted in that period, along with energy, banking and financial services, communications and transport. Cyber attacks also threaten Australia’s secure access to the global communications system which is critical to Australia’s prosperity." (page 54)

"3.19     To counter the growing threat of cyber attack, the Government is improving our national cyber security capabilities. Defence’s cyber security capabilities will be strengthened to protect the ADF’s warfighting and information networks. Defence will contribute to the Government’s enhanced national cyber security efforts, which include better coordinated cyber security capabilities and working with industry and academia to counter the threat of cyber attack." (Page 75)

"4.19     The Government is committed to ensuring that Australia can address the growing cyber threat including through enhanced cooperation with the United States and our other international partners. Defence makes a critical contribution to Australia’s whole-of-government cyber-security efforts, ensuring the integrity of Australian government information and systems. This includes the invaluable work of the Australian Signals Directorate. Defence will continue to work closely with other agencies to protect Australian interests in the cyber domain, including through the multi-agency Australian Cyber Security Centre.

4.20     The Government will strengthen Defence’s cyber capabilities to protect itself and other critical Australian government systems from malicious cyber intrusion and disruption. Enhancing the resilience of Defence networks, including networks used by our deployed forces, and the capability of the Australian Cyber Security Centre are key areas of focus in strengthening Australia’s cyber defences. This will include considerable new investment in strengthening the Defence cyber workforce, including new military and APS positions and training programs.
4.21     The Government will also establish a research and development capability to help strengthen the defences of the ADF’s military information systems against cyber attack." (Page 90)

"6.17     Within this total workforce of around 18,200 FTE, enhancements to intelligence, space and cyber security capabilities will involve 800 new APS positions. Four hundred new positions will be created in information technology support, simulation, support to Navy engineering and logistics, security, force design and analysis, and strategic and international policy, including civilian policy officers posted overseas." (Page 152)

Table of Contents

 Minister’s Introduction 9
Executive Summary 13
Strategy 14
Australia’s strategic outlook 14
Australia’s defence strategy 17
Capability 18
A more capable, agile and potent future force 18
Australian defence industry and innovation 20
Shipbuilding 21
Defence posture – more active and internationally engaged 21
International engagement 22
Defence preparedness 22
People 23
Resources 24
Reform 24
Funding 24
Implementation 25
Chapter One: The Government’s Approach to Defence 29
The purpose of this Defence White Paper 29
Why now? 30
Managing strategic risk 32
Chapter Two: Strategic Outlook 39
Australia’s security environment 39
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The United States and China 41
The rules-based global order 44
The threat of terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters 46
State fragility 48
Military modernisation 49
Cyber and space 51
Regional security environments 53
Australia’s borders and offshore territories 53
Our immediate neighbourhood 54
South East Asia 56
Indonesia 59
North Asia 60
South Asia and the Indian Ocean Rim 61
The Middle East 63
Weapons of Mass Destruction 64
Chapter Three: Australia’s Defence Strategy 67
Australia’s Strategic Defence Framework 68
Strategic Defence Interests 68
A secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and
proximate sea lines of communication 68
A secure nearer region, encompassing maritime South East Asia
and the South Pacific 69
A stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order 70
Strategic Defence Objectives 71
Deter, deny and defeat attacks on or threats to Australia and its national
interests, and northern approaches 71
5
Make effective military contributions to support the security of maritime
South East Asia and support the governments of Papua New Guinea,
Timor-Leste and of Pacific Island Countries to build and strengthen
their security 74
Contribute military capabilities to coalition operations that support
Australia’s interests in a rules-based global order 75
Implications for force structure and force posture 77
Chapter Four: The Future Australian Defence Force 83
Designing the future force 84
Capability priorities 86
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Space, Electronic
Warfare, and Cyber Security 86
Maritime Operations and Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces 89
Strike and Air Combat 94
Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 97
Key Enablers 100
Air and Sea Lift 106
Industry, innovation, research and development 108
A new approach to Australian defence industry policy 108
A new approach to defence innovation 111
Shipbuilding 113
Chapter Five: Positioning Defence for Tomorrow’s Challenges 117
International engagement 117
International defence relationships 120
The Australia-United States Alliance 121
New Zealand 124
Indonesia 125
2016 DEFENCE WHITE PAPER6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The South Pacific 126
Timor-Leste 128
South East Asia 128
North Asia 132
South Asia 134
Global relationships 135
Defence preparedness 140
Current operations 141
Chapter Six: People 145
Growing the integrated Defence workforce 146
Permanent Australian Defence Force 146
Reserves 148
Australian Public Service 149
Recruiting the people we need 150
Developing our people 152
Retaining our people 153
Defence culture 154
Looking after our people 156
The Defence community 159
Delivering the future workforce 160
Chapter Seven: Reform of Defence 165
The First Principles Review – The Government’s reform program 165
A strong strategic centre 168
Capability development life cycle 170
Corporate and military enablers 172
Implementing the First Principles Review 174
7
Chapter Eight: Funding Defence 177
The Government’s plan for funding Defence 177
The funding model 177
How will Defence funding be spent? 181
Budgeting in Defence 182
Chapter Nine: Implementing this Defence White Paper 185

Australia to Lead Next step in Securing Cyberspace

Greetings from the last public session of  "Securing our Future in Cyberspace" at the Australian National University. Professor Fred Cate from Indiana University has proposed Australia should act as a bridge between western nations security academics and officials and those in China. 

Role of Cybersecurity in Chinese Foreign Policy

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Jon Lindsay from University of Toronto is speaking on "The role of cybersecurity in Chinese foreign policy". Professor Lindsay, has written several papers and is editor of the book "China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain" (2015). He pointed out that the US Government makes a distinction between industrial and security espionage, which China does not necessarily follow. Somewhat more controversially he suggested the term "Advanced Persistent Treat" could be applied to USA's NSA, as well as its Chinese equivalent.

Professor Lindsay contrasted NSA's covert attempts to obtain information on-line with overt moves by China to ensure the Internet is not used internally for anti-state political activities. He pointed out that Chinese law imposes severe limits on what the Internet can be used for.

Professor Lindsay characterized Internet regulation as fragmented. The central state regulation body is under the propaganda ministry, concerned with the content. He commented that as a result cyber-crime, provided it is for economic gain, is less of a priority for government.

Professor Lindsay quipped that there are two sorts of organizations in the USA: those who have been hacked by China and those who do not realize they have. Admitting attributing attacks is difficult, he pointed out that phishing attacks align with the Shanghai working day (where PLA Unit 61398 is based), suggesting this is an industrial scale activity.

Professor Lindsay pointed out that a sophisticated system was needed to handle large amounts of information obtained through industrial espionage. He said that information on how this is done in China is obviously not freely available. However, information on collecting and processing overseas open access information. He made the point that China has been greatly increasing expenditure on the absorption of information, rather than just collection.

Professor Lindsay pointed to a PLA documentary on cyberwar "The Cyber storm has arrived" (2011), which features a fictitious attack on a Falun Gong group in the USA. The point being that a religious group is seen as a threat to the state. His implication was that this is different to western military doctrine. However, this reminds me that one of the US presidential candidates has proposed banning immigrants based on religion, on the assumption they are a threat to the state.

Professor Lindsay pointed out cyberwar increases the "fog of war". Even well resourced nation states will have difficulty conducting such a war. He suggested China had less experience at this than the USA. However, China has very expert IT professionals (I train some of them at ANU in Canberra). It has to be assumed the Chinese military train their IT professionals well. Also China has a military doctrine which is more accommodating of cyber-warfare.



This seminar is part of this week's conference "Securing our Future in Cyberspace", which ends Friday with "Securing our future in cyberspace - next steps".

Cybersecurity Conference in Canberra

The conference "Securing our Future in Cyberspace", is being hosted by the Australian National University in Canberra, 15-19 February 2016. There are also free public talks during the conference (registration for each required):

1. Towards a political ecology of cyberspace, Research symposium, 8:30am-12pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Chair: Professor Roger Bradbury, Director, Strategy and Statecraft in Cyberspace research program, ANU National Security College
2. Quantum sovereignty: the Westphalian principle and the global governance of cyberspace, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Tuesday 16 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Paul Cornish, Research Group Director for Defence, Security and Infrastructure at RAND Europe, Cambridge
3. Taming cyberspace: Applying international law in a new domain, Public seminar, 6-7pm, Wednesday 17 February 2016, Speaker: Professor Fred Cate, Vice President for Research at Indiana University, Distinguished Professor and C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law 
4. The role of cybersecurity in Chinese foreign policy, Public seminar, 12:30-1:30pm, Thursday 18 February 2016, Speaker: Assistant Professor Jon Lindsay, Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the University of Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs 
5. Securing our future in cyberspace: Next steps, Closing plenary, 12:30-2pm, Friday 19 February 2016, Speakers: Dr Herb Lin, Senior Research Scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and others.

Rearming Australia for Cyber Warfare

In "AUSTRALIA REARMED! Future Needs for Cyber-Enabled Warfare" Professor Greg Austin, from the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) states "Australia’s defence forces need to maintain distinct capabilities for cyber warfare at the strategic level ... for mobilization of the country in very short time to fight a medium intensity, cyber-enabled hot war ...". The ADF has made a significant step towards this already by including cyber-security in the curriculum of the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), where the ACCS is located.

In an accompanying paper, Group Captain (ret.) Dr. Keith Joiner discussed "Integrating Cyber-survivability into Australian Defence Force Platform Development". He points out that the ADF's taks is not only protect its systems in peacetime, "... but includes preventing its systems and platforms from being crippled or subverted by the offensive cyber operations of an enemy in combat...".

Australia has recently invested billions of dollars in advanced aircraft and ships. In any hostilities these can be expected to come under intensive and sustained cyber-attack, before during and after any conventional warfare. These attacks will not just be directly against the weapons systems, but also through their logistics and support systems, the personnel and their families and friends. It would be unfortunate if these platforms were disabled even before they could be deployed, because the ADF has not spent a few hundred million dollars to to conduct cyber- survivability trials and train personnel to protect the systems.

US-Australian Strategic Alliance in Space

Greetings from the Australian National University in  Canberra, where Adjunct Associate Professor James Brown is speaking on "Constellation Coalition: Australia and the US in space".  He described Australia, UK , Canada and USA as the "constellation coalition".

Professor Brown pointed to Planet Labs "agile aerospace" which has an Australian co-founder, launching "doves" (small disposable satellites). Also "OneWeb" who aim to launch 640 satellites, each 150 kg, for LEO broadband. The third was NZ company "Rocket Labs" which has developed a 3D printed rocket engine and carbon composite rocket, plaining to launch from southern NZ.

Professor Brown pointed to a Chinese anti-satellite weapons test which caused considerable space debris, but noted the USA and other countries have been quietly working on anti-satellite weapons. He also pointed out that cyber-attack was a method of disabling satellites without a kinetic weapon (even better if you can take over and use the enemy's satellite).

Professor Brown suggests the USA's goal is to have real time video surveillance satellites. I suggest this is not necessarily a good idea, as more raw data can impede military decision making. A military commander should not be looking at a megabits per second of real time video feed, they should have analysts (or software) doing that and displaying it as a few hundred bytes of information displayed a s a symbol on a map.

The US Congress banned contact between US and Chinese military and civilian space programs. Professor Brown pointed out this differed to naval personnel, where US and Chinese have met their opposite numbers (which is useful when there is tension).

Professor Brown pointed out that Australia's military plans depend largely on access to satellite communications, but spending on space is about the same as Iceland. Australia's space industry is much smaller than comparable countries, such as Canada. But Professor Brown undermined his argument by pointing out Canada put a man in space (which I suggest is little more than an expensive publicity stunt).

Australia's defense space policy, I suggest, can be best illustrated by the arrangement where Australia paid for a satellite, in return for use of the US defense satellite network. Apart from this Professor Brown pointed out Australia uses dual use civilian satellites.

It would be interesting to see if NBN's new, and very capable, satellites are to be used for defence purposes. While these satellites are limited to Australia (and nearby), there will be large amounts of bandwidth and equipment available, which could be pressed into service for military use, if needed.

One interesting aspect is that Professor Brown pointed out Australian common interests with Japan on space policy. One worry is that Japan has been assisted by France (which have interests which do not necessarily align with Australia or the USA).

Professor Brown showed images from the US Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) and discussed a joint US/Australian exercise about a fictional attack on assets in Australia's region. It might seem that Australia could not contribute much to such an operation. ANU may have the most credible Australian space capabilities, with its tracking facilities at Mt Stromlo Observatory (they can also manufacture and test satellites at Mt Stromlo's Advanced Instrumentation and Technology Centre). Australia also have credible capabilities for developing computer processing capabilities as a by-product of developing the Square Kilometre Array (SKA).

Professor Brown suggested moving space policy to PM&C. One reason suggested was because that is where Cyber-security policy is. Unfortunately PM&C have not demonstrated an ability to effectively administer cyber-security policy and it might be better to move it and space policy to an agency with the required skills.

Professor Brown suggested the 2017 International Astronautical Congress should have senior ministerial representation (perhaps even the PM). The conference is to be in Adelaide and the Australian Government is keen to show support for defense related industry in South Australia. However, 2017 may be beyond the government's planning horizon.

One point is that while there is this discussion of space systems, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should maintain a usable ground based long range radio network. The ADF Modernized High Frequency Communications System (MHFCS) provides low bandwidth unglamorous but reliable communications and such systems should be retained. These HF networks can only transmit hundreds, or thousands of bits per second, not millions. However, even so this can be used for text messages, still images and limited voice traffic.

Cyber Security Careers at the Australian Signals Directorate

Yesterday I was taking part in a discussion of the role of national security agencies with colleagues from the IT industry. I mentioned how when giving a seminar on computer security at the Cambridge University Computer Lab (UK) I noticed someone in the back row who did not look like a student or academic. They turned out to be from GCHQ, the UK security agency, presumably there to recruit students. Much to my surprise today I walked into seminar room N101 at the ANU Research School of Computer Science (to help get the projector to work) and found it was for staff from the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) presenting to students on Careers at ASD.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Greetings from the Great Hall of the Australian National University in Canberra, where Ms Rose Gottemoeller, US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security is speaking on "Stemming the Nuclear Tide: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at 45". She has written on and been cited about "Nuclear Nonproliferation". Ms  Gottemoeller pointed out that it is the 40th anniversary of the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". Under current agreements Russia and the US will cut the the number of nuclear weapons to 1,550 by 2018. Ms  Gottemoeller credited Australia for putting in place the framework which allowed chemical weapons to be removed from Syria.

While reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons is a good thing, it occurs to me that those held by major powers are probably the least dangerous as they are unlikely to be used. A few weapons in the hands of small unstable states are far more likely to be used.

Also nations need to consider the control of new weapons which could make the risk of nuclear war more likely. In particular cyber-warfare has the potential to destabilize current international procedures to reduce tension. In addition the conventional arms race with submarines and amphibious warfare ships has the potential to increase the risk of war.

USA Alone Cannot Defeat Islamic State

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Amin Saikali, author of "Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq" is speaking on "The Middle East: Is the ‘Islamic State’ vanquishable?" (there will be a podcast later). Professor Saikal argues that the so-called Islamic State (IS) cannot be defeated by the US-led air campaign. He says a land based imilitary operation will be required and this would be preferably undertaken by local forces, not the USA and its western allies. He also points out that IS promotes itself as a continuation of the Caliphate abolished with the formation of modern Turkey after WW1. But there is still a romantic notion of restoring power to the region. Professor Saikal argues that the appeal of a Caliphate can be countered by the formation of modern democracies respecting human rights. To an outsider it may seem madness that anyone would support a totalitarian theocracy, but it might be more appealing than current totalitarian governments.

In my view an areas where Australia could contribute is in combating IS on-line. There are some suggestions this may be happening with an Australian Cyber Offensive, but also can include more subtle information campaigns. These are important skills our military forces need to learn, in any case, for future conflicts.