Are US Drone Strikes Legal?

Professor Steven Ratner, University of Michigan Law School and Shahzad Akbar, Barrister, Foundation of Fundamental Rights (FFR) Pakistan, will discuss "Drone strikes, US policy and the law", at the Australian National University College of Law, in Canberra, 2 August 2013.

Steven Ratner: The United States government has offered a legal theory for the use of drones based primarily on the jus ad bellum concept of self-defense as well as jus in bello concepts of distinction and proportionality. The US position, now elaborated in a formal paper by the Obama Administration, combines traditional doctrines and new ideas. I will examine whether that policy is and should be the basis for a new set of legal regulations on drone warfare.

Shahzad Akbar: The United States government has been conducting drone strikes within the sovereign territory of Pakistan since 2004, in breach of a plethora of international and domestic laws. According to independent sources, these drone strikes have caused a large number of civilian casualties including those of women and children. I will discuss the impact of drone warfare on civilians in Pakistan and outline the various strategies adopted by the victims to seek redress.

Online Social Network Analysis for Education, Marketing and Information Warfare

Professor Amr El Abbadi, from University of California, Santa Barbara talked on "Information Diffusion in Online Social Networks: From Analyzing Trends to Stopping Misinformation" at the Australian National University in Canberra, this morning. He started by discussing Everett Rogers work on Diffusion of Innovations, and Malcolm Gladwell's popular book "The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference", before new in depth analysis of how trends spread on-line. This work has very wide spread application: it could be used to design better on-line courses by understanding how information about a topic is diffused within a class, it could be applied to an on-line political campaign, it could be applied to marketing a product. More worryingly, the same techniques could be used by an oppressive regime to identify and neutralize opponents. This could also be used as a key part of information warfare, to identify an attack and counter it. Presumably the DSD Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) are working on this as part of their Cyber Event Management and Reporting System , along with the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). There is more detail in the paper "Information diffusion in social networks: observing and affecting what society cares about".

COMPUTER SCIENCE SEMINAR

DATE: 2012-03-14
TIME: 11:00:00 - 12:00:00
LOCATION: RSISE Seminar Room, ground floor, building 115, cnr. North and Daley Roads, ANU
CONTACT: lexing.xie@anu.edu.au

ABSTRACT:
Social networks provide great opportunities for social connection, learning, political and social change, as well as individual entertainment and enhancement in a wide variety of forms. Online social networks also provide unprecedented amounts of information about social interaction and provide opportunities to study social interactions on a scale and at a level of detail that has never been possible before. In this talk, we will consider ways of systematically exploring the vast space of on-line social network problems. Namely, we will consider three dimensions; understanding, managing and reporting on social networks and focus on example studies relating to these dimensions. We will focus on two applications: limiting the spread of misinformation in social networks and trend analysis. In the former problem, we study the notion of competing campaigns in a social network, and explore the spread of influence in the presence of such competing campaigns. In particular, we develop protocols whose goal is to limit the spread of misinformation by identifying a subset of individuals that need to be convinced to adopt the competing (or "good") campaign so as to minimize the number of people that adopt the "bad" campaign . The second problem is motivated by the critical role the identification of popular and important topics plays in better understanding societal concerns. We propose two novel structural trend definitions referred to as "coordinated" and "uncoordinated" trends that use friendship information to identify topics that are discussed among clustered and unconnected users respectively. Our analyses and experiments show that structural trends are significantly different from traditional trends and provide new insights into the way people share information online.

This work was done jointly with Divyakant Agrawal and Ceren Budak.
BIO:
Amr El Abbadi is currently a Professor in the Computer Science Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received his B. Eng. in Computer Science from Alexandria University, Egypt, and received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from Cornell University in August 1987. Prof. El Abbadi is an ACM Fellow. He has served as a journal editor for several database journals, including, currently, The VLDB Journal. He has been Program Chair for multiple database and distributed systems conferences, most recently SIGSPATIAL GIS 2010 and ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing (SoCC) 2011. He has also served as a board member of the VLDB Endowment from 2002-2008. In 2007, Prof. El Abbadi received the UCSB Senate Outstanding Mentorship Award for his excellence in mentoring graduate students. He has published over 250 articles in databases and distributed systems.

Military Data Network Dependability

"Navy Network Dependability: Models, Metrics, and Tools" is another in the excellent series of technical report from RAND corporation on aspects of military operations. In this report the reliability of the telecommunications networks used by the US Navy is investigated.

The emphasis here is on how reliable the network shared between Navy ships and aircraft in a strike group looks to the military user. A methodology for assessing this is outlined and then applied. As with previous RAND reports the report provides a clearly written but technically rigorous analysis. However, it is limited by the brief given.

In this case the limitation of the analysis is shown by three examples of networking in a carrier battle group. These show the IP Network, Secure Voice Equipment String and the Tactical Data Link Equipment String. These are three different networks all of which have to be supported on ships and aircraft. The logical way to make this more reliable would be to use one network which could prioritise communications and route it over all avialable links. Having separate networks devoted to two different sorts of data and voice makes little sense and is a legacy of the development of such systems.

Navy Network Dependability

Models, Metrics, and Tools

By: Isaac R. Porche, III, Katherine Comanor, Bradley Wilson, Matthew J. Schneider, Juan Montelibano, Jeff Rothenberg

The Navy is increasingly dependent on networks and associated net-centric operations to conduct military missions, so a vital goal is to establish and maintain dependable networks for ship and multiship (e.g., strike group) networks. In this volume, the authors develop a framework for measuring network dependability that is focused on users' perceptions of whether individual network services are available, as opposed to hardware-focused measurements of whether individual pieces of equipment are functioning. The authors used this framework to modify a tool for modeling network availability that was originally developed by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; the modified tool allows the user to perform sensitivity analysis that captures the degree to which individual network components affect overall mission operational availability. The authors walk the reader through some exemplar analyses, then conclude with recommendations on how the Navy might facilitate future network dependability assessments, provide more meaningful results to network engineers, and, ultimately, enhance the dependability of networks across the fleet.

Pages: 126

ISBN/EAN: 9780833049940

Information Security Threat Environment

Robert Lowe, AusCERT Training Team Leader, gave an informative and frightening overview of the treats to computer systems at the ACS meeting in Canberra on Tuesday. He is also speaking in Perth 19 August, Hobart 21 August, Wollongong 26 August, Sydney 25 August, Adelaide 27 August and Darwin 11 September.

AusCERT is Australia 's national Computer Emergency Response Team, providing advice and monitoring security treats on the Internet. It provides a national alerting service and an incident reporting scheme.

Robert provided statistics showing many home computers have out of date operating systems and security software. Even when home users are alerted to a security problem with their computer, many simply ignore it. Robert pointed out that corporate users can't be complacent about their own security. Home computers are used to connect to corporate systems and can compromise them.

Some of the discussion was about cooperation between AusCert and government security authorities, with information on threats passed on for action. But AusCert is different to the other response teams around the world: it is not funded by a parent body. Other national response teams are directly funded by their national governments. AusCert has to raise funds from its members, by running courses and from short term government contracts.

AusCert's funding came to my attention some years ago, when I had a call at the Department of Defence from a well known Queensland security expert. They first asked me what sort of phone I was using. Having established that the line was secure enough, they explained that AusCert was about to run out of money and could DoD help with a bit? I send off a recommendation into the defence bureaucracy and a few days later someone whispered it was "sorted". The process was somewhat mysterious.

Ad-hoc funding is not the way to run an service essential to Australia's national security. The Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy and the Attorney General must be aware that an attack on Australia's networks threatens the national economy, as well as the lives of Australians. Adequately funding those who are protecting the infrastructure is an easy first step in combating the threat.

I attended part of the AWB inquiry, into bribery and breaking of UN sanctions with the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraqi. Senior public servants and ministers were asked what they knew and why they did not act. In that case they were able to successfully argue that they could not have reasonably known what was going on.

But if there is a major attack on Australia's network infrastructure, the Ministers and their senior advisors will have difficulty convincing the judge that they could not have anticipated it. If the resulting loss to the economy, damage to infrastructure or loss of life is large enough, those responsible can expect to be jailed.

EDUCATION ACROSS THE NATION - SECURITY (The Information Security Threat Environment)

AusCERT is the national Computer Emergency Response Team for Australia and a leading CERT in the Asia/Pacific region.

As a trusted Australian contact within a worldwide network of computer security experts, and an active member of the Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) and Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team (APCERT), AusCERT has access to accurate, timely and reliable information about emerging computer network threats and vulnerabilities on a regional and global basis and provides computer incident prevention, response and mitigation strategies for members, a national alerting service and an incident reporting scheme.

Providing computer information security advice to the Australian public and its members, including the higher education sector, AusCERT are the single point of contact for dealing with computer security incidents affecting or involving Australian networks.

The very nature of AusCERT's role makes this an Education across the Nation event not to be missed.

Biography: Robert Lowe

Robert Lowe has worked at AusCERT since June 2003 as a Computer Security Analyst. He is now AusCERT's Training Team Leader and assists in the development and delivery of AusCERT training courses. Prior to joining AusCERT Robert was a Senior Client Services Engineer for an Internet gaming software provider. Robert's previous experience includes systems and database administration, development, training delivery, as well as application integration and support. Robert graduated from the University of Technology, Sydney in 1999 with a Bachelor of Science (Computing) and has over 10 years experience in the IT industry.

ABC TV Documentary on Australian F18

Last night (8:30pm, 29 October 2007) the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ran a program "Flying Blind" critical of the decision for Australia to buy F/A-18F Super Hornets as an interim replacement for the F111. It is also critical of the decision to buy the F-35 JSF:

For more than 30 years Australia has rested its security on the seemingly ageless wings of its F-111 fighter fleet.

But in aviation circles these days there are doubts and rumblings. Some experts fear Australia is set to give away its crucial air superiority in the region.

The reason, they claim, is that decision-makers have made the wrong choices about the planes that will replace the F-111s.

From: "Flying Blind"? Four Corners, 8.30 pm Monday 29 October.

Available from the ABC are:

1. Program Transcript

2. Video On Demand

3. Background Reading

4. Discussion Forum

The program seemed a little one sided, with a few people interviewed at length on the F-18's faults and only a few small segments on its strengths. Also the program seemed to mix up the roles of smaller fighter aircraft, such as the Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon larger aircraft such as the Sukhoi Su-30/35/37 'Flanker'.

There was also some confusion over "generations" of aircraft. The Wikipedia entry for "Fighter Aircraft" describes the Rafale, Typhoon, 'Flanker' and the Super Hornet as "Generation 4.5 (1990-2000)", which seems reasonable. The F/A-18 Hornet is described as Fourth generation (1970-1990). The F-111 is not listed as it is a medium-range strategic bomber, reconnaissance, and tactical strike aircraft not a fighter.

Also the program seemed to miss the point that the Super Hornets were more stealthily than the F-18, plus have a very advanced radar and electronics, similar to that of the F-35. The Super Hornets are intended to operate in concert with each other, sharing data and with the Boeing Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft. It should even be possible to share data with troops on the ground by podcast for Network Centric Warfare.

The program seemed to alternate between criticism of the Super Hornets for being outdated and the F-35 for being not yet available. Given the choices currently available to the Australian Government, it seems to me to be reasonable to buy something proven to work now (Super Hornets) and keep the option to buy something better later, if it works (F-35). It is likely that the Super Hornet will work so well that Australia will skip the F-35 and instead buy UAVs later, along with converted civilian airliners.

Other options

It should also be noted that on 20 July the Australian Minister for Defense announced that Australia will spend $4B on the P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol and Response Aircraft (MPRA) to replace the AP-3C Orion. The MPRA is a modified Boeing 737 airliner, but it can carry about the weight of weapons as an F-111 and has a longer range. While not suitable for use in contested airspace, it would be useful for asymmetric warfare.

The RAAF has already ordered the Boeing Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control aircraft (AEW&C) , which is also based on the 737. The P-8A requires more modifications for an internal weapons bay and under wing pylons.

It is likely the aircraft will also be used for electronic surveillance and signals interception (SIGINT and ELINT). The aircraft have a lot of room, compared to the typical military aircraft, to carry rack mounted supercomputers for real time processing of signals and to act as a flying web server to distribute information to other aircraft, ships and vehicles.


Mix of F/A-18F Super Hornets, UAVs and Carrier F-35s for Australia?

The Australian government's decision to buy the F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter/attack aircraft seems a reasonable one. The Super Hornet is a two seat derivative of the F/A-18 Hornet currently in service with the RAAF.

The Super Hornet would be used as a stop gap due to a delay in the availability of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. These are to replace the F111s due for retirement in 2010.

The F/A-18F is relatively new design, has the advantage of being proven in service but is not a stealth aircraft like the F-35. While the Australian plan seems to be to only order enough Super Hornets as a temporary stopgap, it may make sense to retain them to replace the older F/A-18s. Australian could then consider if F-35s are needed, or if their job could be better done with UAVs exploiting advanced computers and telecommunications technology.

Lockheed Martin have proposed an UAV derivative of the F-35, with a typical mission consisting of four unmanned JSFs controlled from two piloted F-35 or F-22s. Sensor information would be shared between the aircraft via datalinks. However, the F-35 and F-22 are both single seat aircraft, leaving the pilot little time to fly another two aircraft remotely. In contrast the F/A-18F has two seats, making it more feasible for one of the crew to control the UAVs.

Australia could also consider a mix of land based F/A-18Fs and F-35B Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft based on the new Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships, which are essentially small aircraft carriers. The F-35B stealth capabilities would complement the longer range of the F/A-18F.

See also books on:

• Military Technology
• UAVs
• F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program
• Network Centric Warfare
• airborne early warning and control aircraft

Tatical UAV for Australian Army in 2009

The Australian Army will take delivery of Tactical UAVS in 2009:

The Defence Materiel Organisation has signed contracts with Boeing Australia Limited for the delivery and support of a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) capability for the Army.

Boeing Australia, teamed with Israel Aircraft Industries, will provide the I-View UAV system. I-View has a wingspan of 6.7 metres and has a fully automatic take-off and landing system that dramatically increases operational reliability. Its catapult launcher and unique parafoil landing concept enable it to be deployed and recovered from an uneven area smaller than a football field. ...

The Army’s TUAVs will be operated by 132 Battery, of the 20th Surveillance and Target Acquisition Regiment, which is based at Gallipoli Barracks in Enoggera. The introduction of the TUAVs in the Brisbane area is anticipated to create over 125 jobs in the region. ...

From: Contract Signature For Acquisition Of Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles For Army, Defence Media Release, 14/12/2006, CPA 369/06

The I-View uses a catapult to take off and a parachute to land. It has a 6.7m wingspan, weighs 165 kg, carries up to 30kg of sensors and can fly for eight hours at around 85 knots, powered by a piston propeller engine.

What is more interesting is that according to Asia-Pacific Reporter, the Amy will be able to receive images direct from the i-view in the field. However, from the photos available, the on consoles seem to need a truck to transport them. These are not the pocket size PDA devices I was suggesting.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Cyber Warfare Integration

Multi-mission Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, (MUAV), Project AIR 7000 Phase 1B, Australian Defence Department 2006:

Phase 1B is intended to acquire High Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Systems for maritime patrol and other surveillance. Phase 2B is intended to provide the manned component of the ADF maritime patrol capability that may involve upgrade or replacement of the AP-3C Orion aircraft. ...

The life-of-type for the AP-3C is being driven by the increasing cost of addressing airframe fatigue and corrosion, aircraft system supportability and mission system obsolescence. ... AIR 7000 will consider the future of the AP-3C in the context of future ADF requirements for maritime patrol and response. This will include the exploration of a broad range of options including aircraft refurbishment/re-manufacture or replacement, and the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as an adjunct to manned platforms....

Estimated Phase Expenditure $1000m to $1500m Scheduled Year of Decision FY 2007/08 Scheduled In Service Date 2009 to 2011

North West Shelf UAS Trial Further Information, DSTO, 2006:

Mariner Demonstrator UAV The purpose of the North West Shelf Trial is to:

assess the maritime surveillance potential of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to operate with Armidale Class Patrol Boats in providing an enhanced layer of security in Australia; and

enable Defence to make a practical assessment of the utility of UAVs as one component of an integrated national surveillance network. The trial will also assess the procedures and practices for sharing surveillance information among government agencies to develop a whole-of-government response to Australia's national security needs.

Unmanned Aircraft Trial Successfully Completed, DSTO, 3 November, 2006:

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, Senator Sandy Macdonald, today announced the successful completion of the recent Defence trial which assessed the capability of unmanned aerial systems performing maritime surveillance over Australia's North West Shelf. ...

The first phase of the trial involved American aerospace company General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) and its Mariner Demonstrator unmanned aerial vehicle, which flew a series of real-world missions from RAAF Learmonth in northern Western Australia during September.

This phase of the trial aimed to assess the ability of the Mariner Demonstrator to operate with the Royal Australian Navy's Armidale Class Patrol Boats as well as the Border Protection Command and other force elements such as the Pilbara Regiment, to conduct surveillance and response missions.

Between 28 August and 25 September the aircraft flew a total of 75.5 hours, with each sortie ranging from two hours to more than 20 hours. ...

The second phase of the trial was conducted by Northrop Grumman in San Diego.

"Northrop Grumman used its Cyber Warfare Integration Network to simulate and model the Global Hawk UAS, flying similar mission profiles as the Mariner Demonstrator had done over the North West Shelf," Dr Sare said.

"The CWIN exercise allowed us to fill in gaps in areas where it was not practical to use the UAS during the real-world trial phase. The San Diego end of the trial has also helped to demonstrate the ability of unmanned systems to provide enhanced surveillance of the northern maritime approaches to Australia," he said.

Dr Sare said Defence was currently preparing a full report on the trial to be presented to the Government by the end of the year.

Data from the North West Shelf UAS trial will help Defence in developing requirements for Project Air 7000 Phase 1, under which it plans to acquire a long endurance, multi-mission unmanned aerial vehicle. ...

Cyber Warfare Integration Network, Northrop Grumman, 2006:

Northrop Grumman has transformed its modeling, simulation and analysis capabilities into a distributed system-of-systems environment called the Cyber Warfare Integration Network (CWIN). A synthetic engineering environment, CWIN supports full spectrum battlefield operations and system-of-systems design and development. CWIN is geographically distributed among multiple sites, and allows collaboration among platforms, sensors, weapons and battle management/command and control (BM/C2) planning and decision tools. ...

CWIN also provides capability to explore and evaluate Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) management and exploitation, space operations, information operations, manned/unmanned concepts of operations and "Effects Based Operations." CWIN is capable of sophisticated experimentation with emerging machine-to-machine collaboration concepts, such as unmanned air vehicles, intelligent agents, and data warehousing and mining. ...

Mix of F/A-18F Super Hornets UAVs and Carrier F-35s for Australia?

The Australian government is considering buying 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter/attack aircraft. The Super Hornet is a two seat derivative of the F/A-18 Hornet currently in service with the RAAF.

The Super Hornet would be used as a stop gap due to a delay in the availability of the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. These are to replace the F111s due for retirement in 2010.

The F/A-18F is relatively new design, has the advantage of being proven in service but is not a stealth aircraft like the F-35. While the Australian plan seems to be to only order enough Super Hornets as a temporary stopgap, it may make sense to retain them to replace the older F/A-18s. Australian could then consider if F-35s are needed, or if their job could be better done with UAVs exploiting advanced computers and telecommunications technology.

Lockheed Martin have proposed an UAV derivative of the F-35, with a typical mission consisting of four unmanned JSFs controlled from two piloted F-35 or F-22s. Sensor information would be shared between the aircraft via datalinks. However, the F-35 and F-22 are both single seat aircraft, leaving the pilot little time to fly another two aircraft remotely. In contrast the F/A-18F has two seats, making it more feasible for one of the crew to control the UAVs.

Australia could also consider a mix of land based F/A-18Fs and F-35B Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft based on the new Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships, which are essentially small aircraft carriers. The F-35B stealth capabilities would complement the longer range of the F/A-18F.