New Chinese Foreign Policy

Greetings from the Australian National University in Canberra, where Ryan Manuel, postdoctoral fellow and Will Zou, Morrison Scholar at the Australian Centre on China in the World, are speaking on 'Xi Jinping's "New Confucian" Foreign Policy'. Ryan argues that the Chinese Communist Party sees itself as a moral player on the world stage. Xi Jinping needs to reflect this, combining messages for the Chinese domestic ears and for the world. An interesting point made in terms of the situation in the South China Sea was that China uses scale: one country sets the precedent by doing small small scale building on a reef, China then builds a large airstrip on another reef. He suggests that the Chinese response to the US sending one frigate will be to send a fleet.

One problem for researchers is to determine what is an authoritative Chinese foreign policy statement. Ryan showed a diagram of the Chinese government and commented the state component looks much like that of Australia, the difference being the overriding role of  the party. The party Politburo Standing Committee issues "commands" equivalent to policy documents in the Australian system.

Ryan's analysis of 931 central decrees indicates that there are no authoritative foreign policy documents. He pointed out that the Chinese foreign minister has a relatively low rank in the government, compared to western equivalents. He conclusion was that it is Xi Jinping sets the foreign policy directly. An example "One Belt On Road" (September 2013) speech resulted in an action plan in 2015. However, Ryan did not indicate to what extent the action matched the original vision (in western government it is common for what is implemented to not match the original announcement).

Will Zou, addressed the question of what a Confucian foreign policy would look like. He carried out an analysis showed that Xi Jinping had used far more traditional Chinese sayings (such as "What matters most is harmony" and "It is the nature of things to be of unequal quality") than Hu Jintao. These were used particularly for USA, multilateral organizations and India. Will argues that therefore these speeches were intended for Chinese literate audiences and internal Chinese domestic audiences. The message is that China has its own culture which must be respected. This, I suggest, also is not different to western practice, where a leader will make a public speech in an international forum, but addressed at a domestic and internal government audience, drawing on national culture.

Will Zou, points out that Xi Jinping draws not just from Confucian sources. He quoted the People's Daily newspaper "We can already leave behind the experience and language of the west ...". This I suggest brings up a point in interpreting what a leader says: who actually wrote the speech? Leaders do not generally write their speeches and there is a team of people involved. There can be factions and differences of opinion within a leader's office. In answer to a question, Ryan said it was not possible to work out who wrote the speeches. However, I suggest it may be possible, I suggest, to carry out an analysis of speeches to determine who wrote which part and see what the factions are.

I had some insight into the Chinese government when I took part in a Beijing 2008 Olympics Organizing Committee meeting in 2003. Musch as might happen in Australia there were government, academic, business and media people involved. The Peoples Daily newspaper were providing the website for the Olympics. The closes equivalent of the Peoples Daily in Australia is the ABC, but the Peoples Daily is part of the government, rather than a media organization owned by the government. I asked Ryan if the way speeches are promulgated has changed and he said it had not: the text is put out and then the government system "kicks in" to interpret and "operationalize" it.

China Economy and Education

Greetings from Australian Centre on China in the World at the Australian National University in Canberra, where the "China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context" (Ligang Song, Ross Garnaut, Cai Fang and Lauren Johnston) was launched. There is a day long annual China Update. ANU has also been holding meetings with Chinese scholars on the use of on-line courses. Professor Garnaut attributed China's rapid economic growth to changes in labor market policy and in priorities. He noted that adjustments in China and the their effect on the world economy have only just started. 

I searched the report to see what it had to say about education in China, as I teach students from China at ANU and am on my way to two conferences with Chinese educators next week.

The report notes that the "China’s new model of economic growth"included "better use of resources in education, especially in rural areas, to increase
opportunities for all citizens in an expanding modern economy" (Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 4, 2015). The report goes on to say:

"... upgrading of the industrial structure associated with the new model of growth requires increasingly educated and experienced labour. Current rural education standards and incentives for migrants to accumulate and apply skills in urban employment may not make this more sophisticated labour available to expanding urban industries."
(Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 5, 2015)

The report notes this could result in  structural unemployment and "... could be a potential source of social instability ...".

The report then says:

"The focus on increased investment in education within the new model of growth combines with the large decline in the school-age population to introduce prospects for greatly improved labour quality ...".
(Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 26, 2015)

"Success in maintaining and lifting productivity growth requires heavy investment in education and training."
(Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 26, 2015)

 "... improving educational levels is an important way to promote consumption." (Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 99, 2015)

"... granting migrants full residency rights, such as access to education, health care and social security, is not only an important task and challenge of urbanisation, but also appears to be an intrinsic requirement for China’s economic development. " (Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 108, 2015)

At question time Professor Garnaut was asked about how to measure innovation in China. So I looked for "Innovation" in the report, although it seems to be about innovation in investment policies, not producing new products:

 "In 2014, similar schemes were established between Singapore-based banks and firms in China’s Suzhou Industrial Park, in Jiangsu Province, and Tianjin Eco-City, as part of a broader range of initiatives between the Chinese and Singaporean governments to develop these two innovation-oriented initiatives." (Song, Garnaut, Fang & Johnston, p. 284, 2015)

Table of Contents 

First page
Cover page
Title page
Imprint and copyright information
Tables
Figures
Contributors
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
1. Domestic Transformation in the Global Context
Part I: Domestic transformation and structural change
2. The New Model of Growth and the Global Resources Economy
3. A Compelling Case for Chinese Monetary Easing
4. Consequences of China’s Opening to Foreign Banks
5. Destination Consumption
6. National Energy Market Integration
7. China’s Gas Market Liberalisation
8. China’s Electricity Sector
Part II: China’s participation in global integration
9. Financial Integration and Global Interdependence
10. Capital Account Liberalisation in China
11. The Offshore Renminbi Market and Renminbi Internationalisation
12. China’s Manufacturing Performance and Industrial Competitiveness Upgrading
13. China Becomes a Capital Exporter
14. The Impact of Coastal FDI on Inland Economic Growth in China
15. China’s Trade Negotiation Strategies
16. Boom to Cusp
17. The Trend of China’s Foreign Investment Legal System

"The phrase ‘New Normal’ captures the ongoing shift in the pattern and drivers of China’s economic growth. China’s new growth rate is both slower and imposing difficult structural change. These new economic conditions are challenging yet offer opportunities for China and its economic partners. Reforms must be deepened but also make growth more inclusive and environmentally sustainable, over this decade and beyond.

This year’s Update offers both global context and domestic insight into this challenging new phase of China’s domestic economic transformation. How are policymakers elevating migrant workers concurrent with increasing consumption? Is China’s government spending enough on education and R&D to ensure it can achieve its aspirations to ascend the global manufacturing value chain and avoid the middle-income trap? Are energy market reforms reducing or increasing the price of gas and electricity in China? What are the consequences of China’s financial reforms and expanding Renminbi trading for foreign banks? What does China’s new growth model mean for the international resources economy and for Africa? Do SOEs face market conditions and are they dominating China’s fast-rising outbound investment? What is China’s strategy for navigating fragmented international trade policy negotiations?"

Local Government in China

Greetings from the China Institute at the Australian National University in Canberra, where Professor Christine Wong, University of Melbourne is speaking on "State of the Local State in China: Challenges for Xi Jinping and Beyond". This is the 75th George E Morrison Lecture.

After more than three decades of rapid growth and extraordinary achievement, China is facing big questions about its development model, which has lately been tarnished by an addiction to investment-led growth, environmental degradation, corruption, financial risks, and rising inequality. Local governments have played a starring role in both the achievements and many of the current problems. This presentation will examine the challenge of managing a modernizing China through the lens of central-local relations to argue that the economy has outgrown the administrative structure, and a fundamental reorganization will be required to realign authorities, resources, and incentives.

This follows recent events I have attended about Internet censorship and energy planning in China, where the role of local government was significant.

Professor Wong, explained China has a five level of government, with central government, provinces, prefectures, counties and townships. There are many people to be governed, but I suggest perhaps that is still too many levels of government (especially now the Internet can be used for government).

Professor Wong,  pointed out that even if the exact level of China's growth can be questions, it has been an impressive period of growth. China may have already overtaken the USA in terms of the size of its economy, or will do so in the next year. Being the world's largest manufacturer, exporter, foreign reserves holder and carbon dioxide emitter, it deserves close study.

Professor Wong pointed out that China has a welfare state with free basic education, health and other services. China also has 68,000 of express-ways and 11,028km of high speed rail. However, I keep waiting for the Professor to say: "But ...".

Professor Wong explained that the county was the most important level of government for service provision. Unlike other countries, were social security is a national responsibility, in China this is done at the local level.Education, medical and pension schemes have many hundreds of millions of beneficiaries. Local government accounted for 90% of infrastructure expenditure in 2007 and for most of the national roads.

Professor Wong told anecdotes of where roads stopped the last few kilometres short of a poor villages, as the lowest level of government can't afford to provide the service and the higher levels will not.

Another problem is that there is no common definition of national citizenship in China. Instead citizens are residents of where they were born.  As a result migrants to the city and their children, cannot receive services, not matter how long they live there. As a result about 16% of the population (and about half the migrants in cities) are missing out on government services, including education.

Professor Wong pointed out that until last year local government was prohibited from borrowing and so there were no statistics on the level of debt (as they were not supposed to be doing it). In 2013 local government debt was estimated to be ¥18 Trillion (and not sustainable).

By 2012 local government expenditure was about 22% of GDP. An area of interest is that expenditure counties is increasing, whereas central expenditure has been decreasing. The problem is that the counties are spending more than they receive in revenue.

Professor Wong explained that each level of government only communicates with those above and below them. So the counties are the only level which can communicate with the central government (including the central treasury). As a result the central government doesn't know what happens to the money it gives the county independently of what the county tells it.

The priority for all levels of Chinese government is economic growth. But Professor Wong explained that local government did not have money for investment. As a result local relied on land for 35% of revenue. Local Investment Corporations (LICs) were set up to borrow money and develop land (as suggested by the World Bank). This makes sense in terms of economic theory, as future users of the infrastructure can then pay for it. In practice the local government acquires land (as government owns the land anyway), borrows money from banks to develop the land and then sells the developed land. This has been very successful to pay for urban infrastructure, but removed financial constraints from government. Professor Wong described this as a Ponzi scheme, with new borrowing being used to pay the interest on old loans. The solution to this being to have the LICs issue bonds, to be purchased by state owned banks, converting the debt to a format which can be managed within the regulated banking system.

China's Third Plenum's financial reforms are centralising expenditure. Professor Wong argued that this was a problem as there was already an imbalance between the level of government which collected the revenue was different to that which spends it.

Professor Wong  pointed out that China has a very small central government, much smaller than Australia and the USA. China has 10 million civil servants, but only about 100,000 are in the central government. As a result these staff are not capable of providing significant oversight without cooperation of other levels of government.

It occured to me that IT could be applied to assist with all levels of Chinese government. This would be a way which local levels of government could continue to administer and deliver services, while having central oversight, without requiring more staff. By monitoring multiple levels of government and also key non-government organisations (such as banks and telecommunications companies), government could detect misapplication of resource through fraudulent reporting. As an example, the central government could get a reasonable measure of the number of residents, students and workers in a city, from financial transactions and cell phone statistics. In 2012 I talked to a visiting Chinese delegation on "Framework for e-Government: Security, Green ICT and Data Management". However, when I asked the professor about this, she pointed out that while Chinese school students have swipe cards to sign in each day at school, local authorities had still managed to rig have this system report daily teaching at schools which had been torn down years ago.

It would be interest to see a similar analysis for Australia. The Australian system has continual arguments over central distribution of revenue. Also an unhealthy relationship between land development and government is not unknown in Australia (as for example with NSW ICAC inquiries).

Sino-capitalist Urbanization With Internet Characteristics

Greetings from the Australian national University where Jane Golley is speaking on "Sino-capitalist urbanization", discussing the nature of China's urban development. She emphasised that China is very unlikely to adopt a pure market system for determining urban land use. The central and local governments will continue to use controls to try to balance development. It occurred to me that perhaps the Internet could be used for some decision making. This could provide a way to get the views of the citizens, while the  central government need not feel a loss of control.

Studying the Chinese Internet

The Australian National University has presentations on "Studying the Chinese Internet" (研究中国互联网／ 研究中國互聯網), Friday 1 August 2014. The workshop is free and it is possible to register just for day two. A small group is learning social network analysis today, using the free open source NodeXL and VOSON software. Tomorrow's presentations discuss the results of using such research and the challenges involved:

Day 1 (Thursday 31 July) – Small group training in social media analysis

Instructor: Dr Robert Ackland, Guest lecturer: Prof Jonathan Zhu

Day 2 (Friday 1 August) – Research presentations

9.00 Welcome

9.15-10.30 Keynote presentation

“Charting the Landscape of Chinese Social Media: What We Know and What We Don’t Know from Existing Research”, Prof Jonathan Zhu, City University of Hong Kong
中国社会化媒体研究的已知与未知 / 中國社會化媒體研究的已知與未知

10.30-11.00 Morning tea

11.00-12.30 Paper session 1

“A Web Analysis of HIV Information Delivery in China”, Dr Robert Ackland, Australian National
University and Dr Jiaying Zhao, Australian National University
爱滋病信息的传递 :
基于网络的分析 / 愛滋病信息的傳遞 :
基於網絡的分析
“Predicting Depressed Individuals with Suicide Ideation Using Social Media Data”, Jin Han, Australian
National University
微博社交网络抑郁用户识别 / 微博社交網絡抑鬱用戶識別
“Analyzing Events in Chinese Microblogs”, Dr Lexing Xie, Australian National University
社交网络上的新闻事件分析 / 社交網絡上的新聞事件分析

12.30-1.30 Lunch

1.30-3.00 Paper session 2

“Preliminary Analysis of Muslim Networking on the Chinese Web”, Dr Wai Yip Ho, Hong Kong Institute of
Education and Dr Robert Ackland, Australian National University
中国穆斯林网络的初步分析 / 中國穆斯林網絡的初步分析
“Multiple Identity Formation via Social Media by Professional Chinese Immigrants to Australia”, Dr Jerry
Watkins, University of Canberra and Dr Chong Han, University of Western Sydney
社交媒体上的多重身份构建:以澳大利亚中国技术移民为例 /
社交媒體上的多重身份構建:以澳大利亞中國技術移民為例
“Human Flesh Searching in the Greater China Region”, Dr Lennon Chang, City University of Hong Kong
分析大中华地区人肉搜索之现象 / 分析大中華地區人肉搜索之現象

3.00-3.30 Afternoon tea

3.30-4.30 Paper session 3

“Institutional Analysis of Chinese Internet Governance: Some Tentative Thoughts”, Ryan Manuel,
Australian National University
关于互联网体制与管理若干问题的分析 / 關於互聯網體制與管理若干問題的分析
“Internet Use in China: Citizens, Consumers, and Social Consumption in Chinese”, Dr Michael J. Jensen,
University of Canberra and Wei Si, University of Canberra
因特网在中国的应用 :
公民 ,
消费者与社会消费 / 因特網 在中國的應用:公民,消費者與社會消費
4.30-5.00 Wrap up

Future of Journalism

Last night I attended "Has journalism a future" with presentations by

Caroline Fisher (University of Canberra), Stephen Matchett, (Campus Morning Mail), Matthew Ricketson (University of Canberra) and Lenore Taylor (Guardian Australia). This was at the new

Centre for China in the World, at the Australian National University in Canberra. The entertaining evening was chaired by Colin Steel, ANU Emeritus Fellow.

 

The new Centre for China in the World is so new, that the WiFi has not yet been installed, which is why I am posting this the next day. It also has a "new car" smell. ;-)

The first speaker said the good news was that the cost of production for news had reduced. However, there is a tendency for the new media to concentrate on that most ancient and popular form of news: gossip. The market for news is shrinking and the print media made the mistake of giving away their content free online while trying to survive on advertising. A few premium paid news services may survive, but most will not.

Many policy journalists now write for free for "The Conversation", with journalism becoming philanthropy, part funded by the state. But without real journalists chasing hard facts there will be less oversight of government.

The second speaker took exception with the fist speaker having a problem with taxpayers funded journalism, pointing to the work of the ABC.

It occurs to me that all the journalists speaking seemed to have the idea that journalism was a noble search for the truth, whereas in a business sense it is the job of the journalist just to fill up the spaces between the paid advertisements (which are the important parts of the publication). Perhaps James Marcus' book "Amazonia: Five Years at the Epicenter of the Dot.Com Juggernaut" should be required reading at journalism school. In this one of Amazon.com's early employees relates how they were hired to Amazon to write and edit book reviews. They saw their job as writing Amazon to write and edit independent and interesting book reviews, whereas Amazon saw them as helping sell books. Amazon worked out that a crowd-sourcing system which passed on recommendations from customers to other customers was more popular and more effective at selling books than professional reviews, at which point the journalist was out of a job. The same is likely to happen to almost all journalism jobs.



The result may well be a reduction in serious investigative journalism, if that turns out to be something readers do not value. As an example of this future, yesterday I was contacted by a TV news service asking about hacking of WiFi baby monitors over the Internet. When I checked I found recent stories about this, but also almost identical stories a year ago. I explained to the journalist that I did not think this was a real story, it was recycled from a year ago. The journalist explained their boss wanted a story and so there would be a story: they did not seem to be concerned as to if it was true or not. I declined to take part in a story which was pandering to parent's fears, with little  basis in fact.

New Australian National Cyber Security Centre

The Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard,  visited the Australian Defence Department's Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) at the Defence Signals Directorate in Canberra to announce an "Australian cyber security centre to be established". This followed the launch of the  "Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security". The centre is planned to be staffed by the Defence Signals Directorate, Defence Intelligence Organisation, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Attorney-General’s Department’s Computer Emergency Response Team Australia, Australian Federal Police and the Australian Crime Commission. However, I suggest the government personnel will need to be supplemented by industry and academia, as that is where the greatest expertise in cyber-security resides and because it is the civilian infrastructure which is more vital and more at risk than government computer systems. It is not clear where the new centre will be located, when it will be established or what budget it will have. The DSD Cyber Security Operations Centre would be an obvious choice, but it may not be large enough. Also it is not clear if one physical centre is needed, or if it would be better to connect existing centres of expertise secure broadband links. A one minute video of the PM's Australian National Cyber Security Centre presentation is available;e from the Defecne Department. Interestingly, the PM mentions being "in the pit", referring to the horseshoe shaped sunken section of the centre.

Australian National Security Strategy Emphasizes Cybersecurity

The Australian Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, launched "Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security" at the Australian National University in Canberra, on 23 January 2013. The 58 page document is available as a 3.4 Mbyte PDF file 3.44MB and RTF 1.37MB. Also available are a Media release on the National Security Strategy and the text of the PM's speech "Australia's National Security Beyond the 9/11 Decade". In the list of key national security risks, "Malicious cyber activity" is placed third, ahead of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The PM also mentioned that an "Australian Cyber Security Centre" would be separately announced. The policy document also mentions as a priority "Integrated cyber policy and operations
to enhance the defence of our digital networks". This would be a welcome change in the government's current approach, which is to announce cyber-security strategies, such as the Cyber Security White paper, and then  not properly resource and implement them. Also the approach has been fragmented, with different government agencies having separate uncoordinated initiatives and not involving the private sector, or state governments. The Australian Defence Department officially opened its Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) at the Defence Signals Directorate in Canberra on 15 Januar 2010. Unfortunately the government chose not to support the non-government AusCERT , leaving the private sector open to attack.

Some excerpts from the "Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security" document:

AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

VISION

A unified national security system that anticipates threats, protects the nation and shapes the world in Australia’s interest

NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES

• To protect and strengthen our sovereignty
• To ensure a safe and resilient population
• To secure our assets, infrastructure and institutions

KEY NATIONAL SECURITY RISKS

• Espionage and foreign interference
• Instability in developing and fragile states
• Malicious cyber activity
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Serious and organised crime
• State-based conflict or coercion significantly affecting Australia’s interests
• Terrorism and violent extremism

PILLARS OF AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY

Countering terrorism, espionage and foreign interference
Deterring and defeating attacks on Australia and Australia’s interests
Preserving Australia’s border integrity
Preventing, detecting and disrupting serious and organised crime
Promoting a secure international environment conducive to advancing Australia’s interests
Strengthening the resilience of Australia’s people, assets, infrastructure and institutions
The Australia–United States Alliance
Understanding and being influential in the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific

AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK

Economic uncertainty and global reordering

• Ongoing global economic uncertainty and volatility
• Shift in economic and strategic weight, and trade flows towards the Asia–Pacific region creating new risks and opportunities for Australia
• Active middle powers increasingly influential in the region; but the United States - China relationship will be the single most influential force in shaping the strategic environment
• Multilateralism is becoming more important for regional security and at the same time more difficult

Continuing importance of non-state actors

• Persistent threat from terrorism and increasingly sophisticated serious and organised crime, aided by money laundering and corruption
• Technology enabling remote but pervasive threats - for example malicious cyber activity
• Increasing influence of legitimate non-state actors such as private companies

Fragility and conflict in at-risk areas

• Low likelihood of major power war, but probable ongoing low-level instability in Australia’s region
• Fragile states and instability in the Middle East and South Asia will remain a challenge
• Possibility for strategic shocks or local conflicts
• High demand for international development assistance

Broader global challenges with national security implications

• Resource security and scarcity
• Climate change
• Changing demographics
• Increasing urbanisation
• Increasing online engagement
• Resurgence of violent political groups
• Corruption

FIVE YEAR PRIORITIES

Enhanced regional engagement in support of security and prosperity in the Asian-Century
Integrated cyber policy and operations to enhance the defence of our digital networks
Effective partnerships to achieve innovative and efficient national security outcomes
...

Executive Summary

This National Security Strategy (the Strategy) is Australia’s first. It provides an overarching framework for our national security efforts, and sets priorities for the next five years. The Strategy is an important next step following the 2008 National Security Statement, which articulated Australia’s national security agenda and set in motion reforms to strengthen the national security community.
The Strategy is in two parts:

• Part I explains the national security framework - our vision and objectives, and the activities we undertake to achieve these objectives.
• Part II looks to the future - it examines the strategic outlook and sets priorities to ensure Australia embraces the opportunities and confronts the challenges of the Asian Century.

The Strategy lays out the pillars of Australia’s national security, and sets directions for the next five years. It will aid in focusing the Government’s pursuit of policies and objectives identified in the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. The Strategy will help inform prioritisation of our resources in a time of fiscal constraint.
Importantly, the Strategy also serves to inform the Australian public, industry and our international partners of our approach to national security. The Strategy will be implemented through enhanced annual planning and budgeting arrangements across national security agencies. There will be a greater focus on partnerships that will see the strengthening of ties with states, territories and business.
Building on the existing strong foundation, our vision for Australia’s national security is for a unified system that anticipates threats, protects the nation, and shapes the world in our interests.
Chapter One discusses Australia’s national security objectives: to ensure a safe and resilient population; to protect and strengthen our sovereignty; to secure our assets, infrastructure and institutions; and to promote a favourable international environment. These objectives anchor decision-making and planning for the national security community.
Chapter Two explains the evolution of Australia’s strategic environment. Given our geography and alliances, our approach to security has always emphasised the defence of our nation and its borders. Naturally, there has been a focus on our own region. Our efforts are reflected in our many regional partnerships. Importantly, our international engagement is imbued with our commitment to liberal democratic values, such as the rule of law, human rights, and equality of opportunity.
The events of the past decade were instrumental in shaping our approach to national security. We have built our capacity to combat terrorism and transnational crime, including through an expansion of our intelligence and law enforcement capability. We developed a more integrated approach to supporting regional stability, for example through our assistance to Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands. This experience also shaped our strong emphasis on civil-military cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Chapter Two concludes with a summary of the important national security challenges that Australia will continue to face, and the opportunities we must look to seize.

Chapter Three sets out Australia’s fundamental approach to national security and how this approach reflects the current national security environment. It describes the eight pillars of our approach to national security:

• Countering terrorism, espionage and foreign interference.
• Deterring and defeating attacks on Australia and Australia’s interests.
• Preserving our border integrity.
• Preventing, detecting and disrupting serious and organised crime.
• Promoting a secure international environment conducive to advancing Australia’s interests.
• Strengthening the resilience of Australia’s people, assets, infrastructure and institutions.
• The Australia–United States Alliance.
• Understanding and being influential in the world, particularly the Asia–Pacific.

The second part of the Strategy looks to the future. In particular, Chapter Four examines the strategic outlook to anticipate challenges and opportunities in the years ahead. Most importantly, it examines the shifting geopolitical environment of the Asian Century. As the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper made clear, our approach to national security must make the most of the transformative economic and strategic changes occurring in Asia.
Asia’s economic growth will increase pressure on water resources and food and energy supplies, with implications for global markets and stability. The growing economic and political weight of China, India and other Asian powers, is also changing the established strategic order, including as a result of their increased military spending.
Neither strategic competition nor the growth in defence capabilities of regional countries makes conflict in the region inevitable or even more likely. Major regional powers understand that a war would be catastrophic. Deepening relationships between states across the region and the increasingly complex interdependencies that now underpin the Asia–Pacific also act as strong stabilising forces.

But there is no room for complacency. The interdependencies that make conflict less likely also make the potential consequences of even the most minor conflicts more far reaching.The increasing capability of armed forces in the region likewise increases the potential for minor clashes to have dangerous outcomes. A concerted effort will be required to shape a peaceful and stable order. Trust and entrenched patterns of dialogue and cooperation will be critical.The threat posed by non-state actors is also likely to evolve and possibly expand - new technology will be harnessed by criminals and terrorists, as they continue to augment their tactics and approaches.
Chapter Five considers the implications of the strategic outlook for Australia’s national security arrangements. It outlines three priorities for the next five years, to achieve our vision for our national security:

• Enhanced engagement in support of regional security and prosperity in the Asian Century.
• Integrated cyber policy and operations to enhance the defence of our digital networks.
• Effective partnerships to achieve innovative and efficient national security outcomes.

... There are also more immediate national security
challenges facing governments around the globe.
In particular, non-state actors such as criminal and
terrorist organisations pose an enduring challenge.
Organised crime is becoming more sophisticated.
Our systems, methods and tools for dealing with it
must keep pace—cyber-enabled crime in particular
requires innovative responses that protect both the
rights and security of citizens. Terrorism remains a
serious threat requiring vigilance through a proactive
intelligence effort, strong partnerships with states and
territories, across business, the Australian community
and our international counterparts.

... In recent times, new and more complex national
security challenges have received greater global
attention. The growing number of malicious cyber
incidents has juxtaposed the dangers of a
hyper-connected world against the considerable
economic and social benefits afforded by the Internet.
Our national security and law enforcement agencies
are now focusing more urgently on how best to
combat cyber-based threats, but not at the expense
of Australians’ privacy and the broader benefits the
online environment brings.

... Malicious cyber activity: Every day, Australian
governments, businesses and individuals face a
range of cyber-related threats such as state-based
and commercial espionage, identity theft, and denial
and disruption of services. If left unchecked,
cyber-related threats have the potential to undermine
confidence in our social and economic stability and
our prosperity.

... Other activities, like our efforts to promote
international norms for cyberspace, see our
diplomats, international lawyers and policy specialists
working with industry, the not-for-profit sector and
foreign governments to shape a secure, open and
accessible online environment that directly benefits
our national security, societal safety and digital
economy.

... Serious and organised crime: Serious and
organised crime can undermine our border integrity
and security. It can erode confidence in institutions
and law enforcement agencies, and damage our
economic prosperity and regional stability. It can
involve the procurement, distribution and use of illegal
weapons. This type of crime is highly adaptive and
may link to, or exacerbate, other significant issues
of national security, such as terrorism and malicious
cyber activity.

... States have always used espionage as a tool to
pursue national interests. Today, our reliance on
cyberspace has increased our exposure to this threat.
Espionage and foreign interference activities against
Australia place a range of our national interests at
risk, including: classified government information;
commercial information with direct consequences for
business and the economy; intellectual property; and
the private information of our citizens.

...

From: Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security, Australian Government, 23 January 2013

China's new leaders

A Public Lecture on China's new leadership will be presented at the Australian National University,  in Canberra, 2:30 PM 13 December 2012.

Australian Centre for China in the World

Public Lecture

China's new leadership: insights and prospects

With the 18th Communist Party Congress held in early November comes a new group of leaders for the People's Republic of China. Although commentators are reasonably familiar with new Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, who made his third visit to Australia in June 2010, and his number two, Li Keqiang (slated to become Premier in March 2013), who also came to Australia in 2009 as Vice-Premier, many of the new appointments to the Central Committee and to the Politburo itself are much less well known. As Australia's future is so bound up with that of China, it is of great importance that we understand as fully as we can the complexion of China's new leadership, the interests they represent and the possible directions in which they may seek to take the country. The Australian Centre on China in the World has assembled a panel of Australia's most acute and knowledgeable observers of the Chinese Communist Party for a forum on the new Chinese leadership:

Dr Gerry Groot is Head of Discipline and Senior Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the Centre for Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, where he teaches Asian studies and Chinese politics. Much of his research revolves around the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Work Department, particularly the so-called democratic parties but also the many other aspects of united front work. An active member of the Chinese Studies Association, Gerry is also a board member of the Australian Centre for China in the World at ANU and will be the China Representative for the Asian Studies Association of Australia.

Professor Baogang He is currently Chair in International Studies at Deakin University. He received the Mayer Prize from the Australian Political Studies Association in 1994, and five Australian Research Council Discovery Grants. Professor He has provided consultation work for the United Nations Development Programme, Danish Development Agency, Ministry of Civic Affairs, Ford Foundation and Asia Foundation. Professor He’s publications deal with a wide range of issues such as deliberation, participation, citizenship, multiculturalism and civil society in China. Professor Richard Rigby has a PhD in modern Chinese history from ANU. He worked as a diplomat (including postings in Japan, the UK and China, and as Ambassador to Israel) and senior intelligence analyst in the Office of National Assessments from 1975-2008. He moved back to ANU in 2008 to assume the new position of Executive Director of the ANU China Institute, and is now concurrently Adjunct Director of the Centre on China in the World.

Dr Warren Sun is Reader in Chinese Studies at Monash University. He is a scholar of modern Chinese intellectual history, as well as an historian of contemporary China. Jointly with his long-standing collaborator Professor Frederick Teiwes, he has published eight books on Chinese elite politics, including The End of the Maoist Era.